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Abstract 
In his books Leviathan and the Air-Pump (1985) and A Social History of Truth (1994), 
Steven Shapin employed sociological interpretations of scientific knowledge. These 
books examined the embryonic scientific community of seventeenth-century England, 
pa1ticularly the role of Robert Boyle ( 1627-1691 ). Despite the constancy of his dedication 
to sociological tools, these two books display considerable differences in how society is 
used to interpret science. In Leviathan and the Air-Pump, Shapin and co-author Simon 
Schaffer contended that social tension and strife defined the development of science. In 
particular, they highlighted the role contemporary social and political struggles played in 
sparking controversy between the natural philosophies of Robe11 Boyle and Thomas 
Hobbes ( 1588-1679). In A Social History of Truth, Shapin argued that social factors such 
as credibility and trust played a fundamental role in natural science. Boyle assembled a 
strategy for establishing credibility using the tools that his local English and European 
society and culture provided him. This thesis will contend that, despite its many insights, 
Shapin's sociological agenda overreaches itself, and requires various philosophical and 
historical considerations to shore up its historiographical standing . 
. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction: Steven Shapin and the Sociological Historiography of Science 
In science convictions have no rights of citizenship .... Only when they 
decide to descend to the modesty of hypotheses, of a provisional 
experimental point of view, of a regulative fiction, they n1ay be granted 
admission and even a certain value in the realm of knowledge .... But 
does this mean . . . that a conviction may obtain admission to science only 
when it ceases to be a conviction? Would it not be the first step in the 
discipline of the scientific spirit that one would not permit oneself any 
more convictions? 
Probably this is so; only we still have to ask: to make it possible for 
this discipline to begin, must there not be some prior conviction - even one 
that is so commanding and unconditional that it sacrifices all other 
convictions to itself? We see that science also rests on a faith; there simply 
is no science "without presuppositions." 
Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gav Science ( 1887). 
The social history of science is an important component of contemporary 
historiography of science. It attempts to document and interpret the history of science by 
turning to the world of human interaction - society and culture - to explain why it is that 
scientists explain the natural world the way they do. As one might expect, historians of 
science who forward such interpretations seek ways to connect often abstract scientific 
concepts to various elements of the fluid social and cultural world. 
Variety abounds in the historiography of science. Historians have advanced many 
different theses to explain the historical development of science. What makes the socially 
oriented historiographical approach so interesting is the manifold ties it exhibits with 
other bodies of scholarly and academic work, including sociology and philosophy. The 
body of work composed by historian and sociologist of science Steven Shapin is an 
excellent example of this phenomenon. Critical examination of two of Shapin's 1najor 
scholarly accomplishments, Leviathan and the Air-Pump (LAP) and A Social Historv of 
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Truth (AST), published in 1985 and 1994 respectively, provides an excellent opportunity 
for the student to see both the strengths and weaknesses attendant to such a method. 
What such critical examination reveals is that Shapin has shown a continuing 
dedication to employing sociological interpretations of episodes of science's history; in 
the case of the two books to be explored in depth in this thesis, episodes centring on the 
life and work of Robert Boyle ( 1627-1691 ). However, this dedication has changed over 
time. In LAP, Shapin used sociological tools that highlighted the role of social strife and 
tension in establishing scientific knowledge. More particularly, this social strife and 
tension was based on a sociology of group interaction and competition, where the 
economic, political and social resources of a social group came together to establish and 
promote a specific collection of scientific claims, methods and practices. Despite the fact 
that Shapin continued to believe that such econon1ic, political and social foundations 
grounded scientific claims in AST, he retracted the sharp social conflict between groups 
in favour of an escalated importance for social cooperation in bringing about scientific 
knowledge. The defining features of this social cooperation were trust and 'Credibility. 
Thus, the student of Shapin finds models of social tension versus social trust guiding 
Shapin's sociological interpretations of the history of science, and must work to 
understand the origins and consequences of Shapin's developing thought. 
It is hardly novel to cite that the origins of Shapin' s thought on the history of 
science find their immediate roots in the work of the Edinburgh Strong Programme. Its 
main proponents, Barry Barnes and David Bloor, articulated a series of arguments in 
favour of founding an understanding of science thoroughly sociological in character: all 
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human knowledge, including science and mathematics, could be explained in terms of the 
social structure of the communities whence they appeared. Another hardly novel 
observation is that Barnes and Bloor drew much of their immediate intellectual 
inspiration and stimulation from Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 
They found a number of its concepts, such as the "paradigm," amenable to sociological 
reinterpretation. 
1:1 
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What is more interesting to note is that the intellectual heritage from which 
Shapin emerged, whatever its stated objectives, gave great prominence to the role of 
history in understanding scientific knowledge. Kuhn explicitly tried to show the utility of 
a historical perspective in expanding the horizons of philosophy of science; the Strong 
Programme's insistence on the universal presence of social factors in scientific 
knowledge opened epistemic terrain for historical exploration, in many ways making 
history of science a specialized component of social history. These influences are 
omnipresent in Shapin's oeuvre. History of science no longer would be just a catalogue of 
scientific discoveries and achievements con1bined with interesting anecdotes about 
scientists, but would be able to contribute real insights into science's claims about the 
natural universe. In the hands of the Strong Programme and Shapin, the transient, 
historically describable elements of society gain precedence over the seemingly eternal, 
philosophically depicted roles of reason, objectivity and n1athen1atics in science. For the 
Strong Programme and Shapin, sociologized history of science replaced philosophized 
history of science, with sociological categories of interpretation largely displacing 
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philosophicalJy articulated concepts such as rationality, objectivity and other vaunted 
epistemological elements of traditional philosophy of science. 
Over the course of the thesis, my critical argument will be that this goes too far, 
and that Shapin's claims regarding the social dependency of epistemic claims need to be 
moderated. To this end, the notions of "ontological equivalence" and "epistemological 
sensitivity" will be articulated. These ideas are not antithetical to a sociological approach, 
but show that the topic matter of scientific investigation, whether it be the celestial 
location of the planets or the chen1ical makeup of a flower, contain irreducible 
epistemological components which universally play a role in determining the knowledge-
to-society relationship. Such universal components may be differently articulated or 
differently handled in different human communities. In anticipation, let it suffice to say 
that some knowledge claims, for instance those relating to matter theory, may be more 
dependent on the sociological structure of the scientific community than others, for 
instance the clain1s of observational astronomy. These two notions will then provide 
grounds for a sociologically satisfactory definition of the role of genius in science's 
history, described below as "intellectual awe." Audiences in all historical circumstances 
have the potential to respect the role of intellectual acuity and power, a claim that in no 
way downplays either the role of reason or of society in the history of science, but shows 
that they are in fact compatible. 
The claims l have made above go some way toward explaining the 
"intellectualist" approach taken in this thesis. Although initially this may strike the reader 
as ironic, considering such intellectualisn1 in the history of science is partially the so11 of 
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thing that Shapin meant to counter, there are a number of justifications for it. As has been 
stated above, and will be fleshed out over the course of the argument, numerous strands 
of thinking derived from historiographical, sociological and philosophical sources set the 
course for Shapin's thinking. Thus, isolating the ideas upon which Shapin plotted this 
course is a pragmatic and worthwhile approach for a thesis of this scope and length. 
Despite the fact that this allows fewer pages for intimate interaction with the historical 
Pfimary sources upon which Shapin based his work, it provides a solid critical 
I 
preparation for any such future interaction by revealing the advantages and disadvantages 
of Shapin's approach. Additionally, some of the philosophical strengths and weaknesses 
of Shapin's approach are of immediate consequence to his historiographical strengths and 
weaknesses. In particular, a measure of philosophical awareness and argument in many 
ways buttresses Shapin's sociological tendencies by showing places where these 
tendencies take Shapin off the rails and by offering philosophical considerations for how 
he might get back on track. 
1.1 Thesis Outline 
Chapter 2 offers an interpretation of the origins of Shapin's sociological approach 
with three main components. First, an examination of his description of the "internalism-
externalism" debate will provide insight into how Shapin reacted to the idea that rational 
factors were internal to the history of science whereas social factors were external. 
Following this will be a brief examination of the important ideas of Thomas Kuhn and the 
possibilities they offered the sociologists of the Edinburgh Strong Progran1n1e. Kuhnian 
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ideas such as "paradigm," "normal science," "incommensurability," and "revolutionary 
science" were tantalizingly susceptible to the sociological reinterpretation of the 
Edinburgh Strong Programme. Once this examination is complete, the four main 
components of David Bloor's Knowledge and Social Imagery will be studied as a way to 
introduce the Edinburgh Strong Programme in the sociology of scientific knowledge. The 
four tenets of the strong programme - impartiality, causality, symmetry and reflexivity-
will be described and critiqued. Because culture is a sociologically defined concept in the 
Strong Programme's view and crucial to understanding Shapin, mention will be n1ade of 
Barry Barnes' notion of science as a form of culture. Shapin's thinking took form in this 
milieu. 
Chapter 3 will analyse the model of social competition and strife between social 
groups found in Leviathan and the Air Pump (LAP), a work coauthored by Simon 
Schaffer. Here Shapin and Schaffer offered a bold and innovative interpretation of a 
particular moment in the history of science emphasizing the significance of social factors. 
Their philosophy of history proposed that science, as a form of knowledge, be seen as a 
component of the politics and econon1ics of social groups struggling for survival and 
superiority within society. Importantly, Shapin and Schaffer introduced what has been 
called an "interest model" into their history of science, which is to say they described 
science as driven by political motives that aimed to consolidate and/or augment the social 
group's economic and political power. Science, far from being objective and neutral, was 
another weapon in the social struggle between different social groups. Loyalty to specific 
knowledge claims parallelled loyalty to a specific social group, political ideology, 
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economic model and so on. This approach to the history of science den1anded that Shapin 
and Schaffer closely examine the political, social and intellectual history of the period 
they were studying, and not limit themselves to the biography of recognized scientists. 
Chapter 4 wi11 concentrate on the analysis and critique of Shapin's model of social 
credibility as found in A Social History of Truth (AST). Shapin's confidence in the 
intimate relationship between social factors and scientific knowledge did not slacken, but 
in AST he moved away from a strife-based conception of scientific knowledge to an 
r., 
,, 
interpretation of science as based on trust. In Shapin's mind, a knowledge claim became 
knowledge when a myriad of personal, biographical and social factors coalesced to make 
the claim credible in the eyes of contemporary audiences and peers. These myriad factors 
governed the selection of credible knowledge claims. This approach demanded that 
Shapin attend closely to how scientists cooperated amongst themselves, the sort of moral 
interactions they had, the socia11y tinted nuances of their thinking, and so on. 
In conclusion, Chapter 5 will contend that examining the social foundations of 
trust and credibility provides a more promising line of inquiry than describing the 
dynamics of social tension and strife. The two approaches are not mutually incompatible; 
Shapin's account in LAP is sufficiently convincing to reach the conclusion that social 
tension can be relevant to the historian of science, but AST is even more successful in 
showing that the specific nature of trust and cooperation should always be relevant. 
Science can be seen as a weapon in social struggle, but even when so en1ployed it wi11 
only be available as such because a nexus of trust and credibility created a system of 
claims that could be wielded in favour of other human activities. Additionally, the trust-
7 
credibility thesis allows a role for other factors relevant to the history of science, such as 
the role of the natural world itself in shaping scientific debate and discovery. 
Consequently, historians of science should continue to articulate how knowledge is 
credible, while leaving the role of social conflict for those particular historical episodes 
requiring it. 
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Chapter 2 
Shaping Shapin: The Intellectual Heritage of Steven Shapin's Thought 
The sociologist is concerned with knowledge, including scientific 
knowledge, purely as a natural phenomenon. The appropriate definition of 
knowledge will therefore be rather different from that of either the layn1an 
or the philosopher. Instead of defining it as true belief- or perhaps, 
justified true belief- knowledge for the sociologist is whatever people take 
to be knowledge. 
David Bloor, Knowledge and Social ln1agery ( 1976). 
Steven Shapin's scholarly oeuvre emerged from an intellectual heritage that 
shught to make history a central component of understanding scientific knowledge. In 
particular, this heritage aimed to move away from the tendency to see science as a 
rational product of the individual human mind - identified as typical of the history and 
philosophy of science - to a view of science as a product of the historical interactions of 
groups of human beings. What resulted was a Shapin who was completely dedicated to 
history as a tool for understanding scientific knowledge, a history which in turn was 
dedicated to the use of sociological tools and perspectives for achieving its 
interpretations. 
Understanding this influence on Shapin can be approached fron1 a nun1ber of 
angles. Three components will be isolated and exan1ined in this chapter, sta1ting with the 
so-called ''internalism-externalism" debate. Shapin's analysis of this topic revealed his 
deeply historical appreciation of science. Next, Thomas Kuhn and his book The Structure 
of Scientific Revolutions provided a powerful motivation for historians of science to see 
their work differently, and Shapin and the Strong Programme were influenced by its 
arguments and ideas. Thirdly, the lead proponents of the Strong Progran1n1e, David Bloor 
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and Barry Barnes, partially inspired by Kuhn, established a research agenda for the 
history of science based on identifying social factors which established scientific 
knowledge claims. Outlining the program of their Strong Programn1e, which included 
four tenets and a particular concept of culture, will be requisite here, with an eye to the 
sort of historical inquiry in which such a program might result. Appreciating· the role of 
these three elements in Shapin's thought will prepare the way for more in-depth 
examination of his historical work in subsequent chapters. 
2.1 Shapin on Internalism-Externalism 
Shapin defined the internalism-externalism debate in the historiography of science 
as the struggle between a camp of historians who wished to brand rational and scientific 
factors as "internal" and social, political, economic and cultural factors as "external." 
Importantly, Shapin cited such a dichotomy as central to the general historiographical 
tendency of concentrating on "intellectual" and "rational" factors to the detriment of 
"social" factors when explaining historical episodes of science.1 Intellectual and rational 
factors might include the use of mathematics to describe a natural phenomenon; the use 
of experiment to test the predictions of a specific theory; the invention of scientific 
apparatus; and so on. Social factors n1ight include the economic wealth of the scientist; 
his or her religious views; the possession of academic honours and entitlements; 
nationality; and so on. On the surface, such a division seems natural enough: a discipline 
1 This section is based on Steven Shapin, "Discipline and Boundin_g: The History 
and Sociology of Science as Seen Through the Externalism-lnternalisn1 Debate," Histo1y 
of Science ( 1992): pp. 333-369. 
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such as biology which employs sophisticated intellectual abilities and complex 
technologies would seem to be more influenced by the biologist's skill in employing 
those abilities and technologies in the laboratory than her social status or political beliefs 
outside of it. 
A hypothetical example will help make this dichotomy of int~rnal and external 
factors clearer. Consider, for instance, a biologist in her laboratory. Assume that she 
follows rigorous scientific method and protocols: her measurements are accurate, her 
II 
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observations astute, her scientific problems well defined, the scientific apparatus she 
employs in working order, and so on. Additionally, imagine that she is a member of her 
academic department's social club, volunteers weeknights at a soup kitchen, is a card-
carrying member of a political party, and is a landscape painter of some ability. For the 
internalist historian of science, only the first set of factors, those involving her activities 
in the laboratory, are significant; what she does outside of the lab n1ay have anecdotal 
interest, perhaps reflecting her vigorous curiosity and sense of personal responsibility, but 
in the end means little to her scientific achievements. Jt is what happens in the lab that is 
key. The externalist historian of science, however, would be inclined to consider those 
external, outside-of-the-lab characteristics of value too. 1t is exactly how they are of value 
that must be determined. 
Shapin thought that this dichotomy was correct only in a facile sense. Obviously 
internal factors defined in this manner would always be primary for the historian of 
science, for it was in science that the historian was interested, and therefore the laboratory 
setting would always be important. Conversely, external factors would always be 
1 1 
secondary, as they failed to show how the science got done- clearly, going to the soup 
kitchen is not looking through a microscope. Shapin labelled this an "asymmetry" in the 
debate, stating that "[f]ormally, something like 'pure internalism' can exist and be 
practised while 'pure externalism' cannot without historical contradiction." The whole 
structure of the debate disbarred external, "social" factors from playing a meaningful role 
in understanding the history of science. Notably, Shapin saw this asymn1etry as a problem 
in the debate: l will return to it after completing my examination of his presentation of 
internalism and externalism.2 
In general, Shapin identified the internalism-externalism debate as a collection of 
various acts of drawing "boundaries." According to Shapin, by placing differing degrees 
of emphasis on internal and external factors, historians were implicitly or explicitly 
shrinking or expanding the domains of influence on science. Here, only purely rational 
factors mattered; there, social factors influenced the development of scientific ideas. 
Historiography of science becomes an attempt to define the proper extent of various 
influences on the development of scientific knowledge.3 
To provide a fuller image of science, replete with historical and social detail, 
Shapin took on the problem from a different angle, effectively melting the external and 
internal into one on the basis of two considerations. Firstly, he noted that there is "society 
in science." The scientific community has social structure. For Shapin, science is a forn1 
of culture, and therefore participates in society, is acted upon by society, and even 
2 Shapin, "Discipline and Bounding," p. 347; quote alsop. 347. 
3 Shapin, "Discipline and Bounding," pp. 333-335. 
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operates independently as a sub-society. Therefore, society is already an internal factor, 
and cannot be shunted aside without historiographical consequence. Shapin formalized 
this conclusion by propounding his idea of "cultural items." These were elements of the 
contemporary cultural setting which historical agents en1braced or discarded as relevant 
to their actions and beliefs. This positing of an influential contemporary setting opens 
room for history to enter fully into the study of scientific knowledge.4 
r 1 
,, 
Secondly, Shapin based his argument on "historicism." Basically, historicism in 
the sense Shapin used it is a historiographical tool demanding that historians see the past 
in terms of how the historical agents they are studying saw it. Shapin defined it this way: 
"1 take historicism in a loose sense, as the programme dedicated to analysing historical 
action in historical actors' terms." For instance, if a seventeenth-century English scientist 
in fact saw hin1self as a "natural philosopher," then it is the historian's responsibility to 
draw out the consequences of such a self-description, and avoid enforcing a view of how 
contemporary scientists see themselves on the past. Perhaps the seventeenth-century 
natural philosopher saw his work as a glorification of God, whereas his twenty-first 
century progeny sees religion as detrimental to an effectively working laboratory. The 
onus is on the historian to delineate and defend through evidence what historical agents 
conceived of as proper knowledge and what means were to be employed to secure it. 
Shapin's historicism entails interpretational flexibility - rigid strictures on what 
constitutes science, past, present and future, simply do not result in accurate history of 
4 Shapin, 44Discipline and Bounding," pp. 349-350; 352-353 for cultural "items" or 
"resources." 
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science, but enforce a vision of what the historian thinks the past should look like in light 
of the present. 5 
Shapin's examination of the internalism-externalism debate is characterized 
throughout by a robust and worthy atten1pt to show the importance of historical analysis 
in detailing science's development. A thorough appreciation of the role of social factors 
almost necessarily entails a powerful role for history, for social factors change with place 
and tin1e, and it is the job of historians in archives and with primary sources to relate such 
changing factors to changes in scientific knowledge. On the other hand, the intemalist 
camp, at least at its extreme fringes, might find historical inquiry superfluous, contending 
that a purely philosophical understanding of rationality would show what makes science 
knowledge. Shapin was working via social means to firmly establish history's role in 
understanding science. 
Despite Shapin's valuable insights into the internalism-extemalism debate and the 
solid foundations he supplied for historical inquiry into science, there is a point of 
concern that needs addressing as it anticipates a nun1ber of critical arguments offered later 
in this thesis. This is the notion of asymmetry in the internalism-extemalism debate raised 
above. Although Shapin was surely correct to point out the asyn1metry which favours the 
internalist side of the debate, his handling of it is suspect for the following reason. 
5 Shapin, "Discipline and Bounding," p. 351; quote from p. 354. The sentiment 
expressed in the last sentence of the paragraph is echoed, in a Marxist vein, by historian 
Robert M. Young in his book Darwin's Metaphor: Nature's Place in Victorian Culture 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1985): pp. 167-171. Young expressed how many 
historians were dissatisfied with the "separation of 4 Science' fron1 social, philosophical, 
and theological issues," and began to seek out alternative historiographical approaches 
combining these elements. Notably, Young turned n1ostly to Marx for such an alternative. 
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Consider Shapin's comment on academic ownership: ''lt is a fact about our present 
academic arrangements that historians of science own the rights to talk about Newton 
rather than historians of politics .... And it is a further fact that the history of science, as 
it has been, presently is, and likely will remain, is primarily interested in Newton as 
mathematician and natural philosopher."6 Shapin's point is that such academic 
configurations tend to favour an internalist approach, and his criticism of this narrow 
tendancy is well warranted. However, there is good reason why a figure such as Newton 
r r 
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falls into the hands of historians of science as opposed to historians of politics, the sin1ple 
fact being that his greatest contributions were to mathematics and natural philosophy and 
not to politics. This rather banal observation is nonetheless of great impo11, for it suggests 
that, in his attempt to draw a meaningful role for social factors in the history of science, 
he lost sight of the fact that natural science is ostensibly occupied with the study of the 
physical universe, not with the political rule and social guidance of hun1an communities. 
Because it is in knowing the universe that scientists immerse themselves, problen1s of the 
relationship between the knower and the known obtain. If the historian is going to take 
the epistemic dimension of the scientist's labours seriously, then he or she n1ust be 
prepared to integrate a coherent epistemological perspective into his or her 
historiographical tools that takes the knower-known interaction seriously. Shapin's talk of 
"present academic arrangements" casts doubts on whether he saw the importance this. To 
put it bluntly, such talk suggests that Shapin was guilty of overplaying sociology's role in 
understanding science, assuming that a socially sensitive history of science would have to 
6 Shapin, "Discipline and Bounding," p. 34 7. 
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be sociological in character, excluding a substantive role for philosophy. Thus, later I 
shall introduce ideas which speak to the problem of trying to do this without erasing 
either rational or social factors in the history of science, notably my notions of 
"ontological equivalence" and "epistemological sensitivity." Shapin's perspicuous 
appreciation of the internalism-externalism debate is not defeated by attention to this 
detail. Shapin's thinking can be fused with other, more intellectualist considerations- a 
point that will emerge below in the discussion of the Edinburgh Strong Programme as a 
particular constellation of ideas for promoting the social history of science. 
The lesson to take away from Shapin's treatment of the internalisrrt-externalism 
debate is that he was trying to establish a thoroughly historical vision of scientific 
knowledge through establishing a historiographical role for social factors, while 
challenging the very concepts of the "internal" and "external." Historians such as Shapin 
held an ardent conviction that social factors were integral to science's historical 
development, and therefore sought a theoretical perspective that would adequately 
express this.7 A parallel effort to establish a central role for history in understanding 
scientific knowledge is found in the work of Thomas Kuhn, whose book The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions attempted to show the impo11ance of history to the philosophy of 
science. His work had a formative influence on the Strong Programme and Shapin.8 
7 For similarly strong convictions on the importance of social factors in science, 
see Robert Young, Darwin's Metaphor, passim. 
8 This influence is evident in Barnes' full-length scholarly publication T.S. Kuhn 
and Social Science (New York: Columbia University, 1982): passin1. For useful 
comn1entary on the influence of Kuhn on historians of science keen to adopt social 
perspectives in their scholarship, see Jan Golinski, Making Natural Knowledge: 
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2.2 Thomas Kuhn and the Sociology of Science 
Kuhn's work revealed the importance of historical inquiry in understanding the 
development of scientific knowledge. Philosophy of science alone was not sufficient. My 
attention here will be focussed on those elements of Kuhn which not only gave history a 
key role, but opened possibilities for sociological inquiry. Although Kuhn himself did not 
take a strong sociological line in his thinking, his arguments provided enticen1ents which 
t~e Strong Programme later took up. Kuhn developed a sophisticated tenninology to 
It 
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describe the historical development of scientific knowledge.9 Therefore, the fo11owing 
pages will elucidate the Kuhnian ideas of ''normal science," "paradigms," "revolutionary 
science," and "incommensurability," which the Strong Programme and Shapin would 
interpret in a sociological light. 
"Normal science" was the daily ebb and flow of n1ost scientific work. Kuhn 
characterized normal science as predominately puzzle solving which aimed to solve set 
problems with an established set of scientific tools and training. Both the problen1s and 
their solutions derived from what Kuhn called a ''paradigm." This is one of the n1ost 
Constructivism and the History of Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1998): pp. 
13-27. For an alternate perspective, maintaining that because of his continuing 
internalism, Kuhn offered false hope for socia11y minded historians of science, see Robert 
Young, Darwin's Metaphor, p. 225. 
9 ldeas on science similar to Kuhn's had been anticipated and developed in the 
French philosophical tradition. Consider, for instance, Gaston Bachelard's concept of 
"epistemological rupture" and "sanctioned knowledge." Georges Canguilhen1 fut1her 
articulated these ideas. Both were as keen as Kuhn to use history as a source for 
developing an accurate picture of science. See Mary Tiles, "Bachelard, Gaston," 
Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 3, ed. Edward Craig (New York: Routledge, 
1988): pp. 620-624; Gary Gutting, "French Philosophy of Science," Routledge 
Encyclopedia, vol. 4, pp. 779-786. 
17 
attractive and slippery of Kuhn's ideas, as his use of the term was not consistent and a 
number of possible definitions are available. A basic definition he offered was that it 
consisted of "some accepted examples of actual scientific practice - examples which 
include law, theory, application, and instrumentation together- [that] provide models 
from which spring particular coherent traditions of scientific research." Elsewhere he 
referred to the paradigm as a "constellation of group commitments" and as a collection of 
"shared exan1ples." To simplify things, an acceptable, comprehensive definition of 
Kuhn's paradigm is as a comn1unally accepted collection of particular preconceptions, 
ideas, and discoveries about nature, which were accompanied by and intimately related to 
formalized theories, scientific instrumentation, technical practices and educational 
techniques. 10 
What a paradigm does is provide a common ground for a group of scientists to 
proceed forward with normal science, solving a stubborn question or puzzle about nature, 
and in that success attracting followers and supplying the approach and tools to deal with 
further puzzles. Because of this, normal science, despite the arduous technical and 
intellectual labour involved, strove for the predictable in its findings: radical or novel 
results were not expected, and indeed would be a source of consternation and concern, 
possibly suggesting inadequacies and weaknesses in the paradigm. The Newtonian world-
view was one such example. Newton provided a perspicuous and sophisticated-solution to 
the prize problem of describing and predicting the orbits of the planets through a striking 
10 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 3rd ed. (Chicago: 
University of Chicago, 1996 [1st ed., 1 962]): pp. 10-1 1, 176-191; quote on p. 10. 
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mathematical presentation of an idea known as gravitation. However, Newton went 
further, suggesting that all the universe was subject to the same mathematical 
formalization, a move which offered potential followers rich oppot1unities to apply the 
methods of the Newtonian paradigm to solve complex and demanding problems of 
planetary and stellar motion. Achieving a paradigm took great effort, and not all 
provinces of intellectual effort had attained one - for example, the social sciences. Pre-
paradigmatic science, for instance celestial physics in the two hundred years in1mediately 
1. r 
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before Newton's accomplishments, saw practitioners fight over how to go about 
interpreting nature; achieving a paradigm meant providing the means to interpret some 
key natural problem in a powerful and persuasive way, and through it opening the door to 
explaining other, related phenomena. If the solution was convincing enough, it would 
attract able scientists away from other competing schools and reach a critical mass of 
practitioners so that competing schools gradually disappeared through attrition and the 
failure to win new disciples. At times, Kuhn was wont to think of a paradigm as a world 
view. 1 1 
For the purposes of this chapter, Kuhn's use of the words "group" and "sharing" 
in describing paradigms and normal science is particularly interesting. For instance, one 
of the "constellation" of group commitments was what Kuhn called "values," concepts 
such as accuracy, simplicity, compatibility with other theories, and so on. This talk of 
concepts valued, concepts shared, and concepts belonging to groups moved the 
understanding of science away from simply rational categories where concepts are proved 
11 Kuhn, Structure, pp.1 0-20, 30-32, 35-36, 11 1-112, 151. 
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or established by observation of nature to where they are part of the comn1unity's 
character. In short, the paradigm was not a completely rationally established entity, but a 
conglomerate of scientific success stories, theoretical dispositions, commonly held beliefs 
about nature, and so on. 
Kuhn, however, was emphatic that no paradigm exhaustively accounted for all 
natural or experimental phenomena. To continue the Newtonian example, Newton's 
paradigm gave mathematical forn1alism a vaunted role, and it was so powerful in 
providing sought-after explanations of planetary n1otion that most natural philosophers 
were willing to put aside their misgivings regarding, for instance, its lack of a mechanism 
to account for gravity. For Kuhn, however, the very act of puzzle solving upon which 
normal science advanced contained the seeds of its own demise: eventually, scientists 
would reach a point where the application of their paradigm was so precise and detailed 
that increasingly more and more phenomena would fall outside of its purview; in other 
words, scientists would begin to hit upon more and more "'anomalies:" findings that could 
not be adequately framed and explained in the context of the current paradigm. Kuhn was 
emphatic: ""Normal science does not aim at novelties of fact or theory and, when 
successful, finds none. New and unsuspected phenomena are, however, repeatedly 
uncovered by scientific research, and radical new theories have again and again been 
invented by scientists." 12 Anomalies foment unease among practitioners, and an 
awareness that more and more anomalies are cropping up imparts the motivation for 
scientists to seek other explanations, resulting eventually in ""paradigm change" or ""shift" 
12 Kuhn, Structure, p. 52. 
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- the movement to a new set of theories, predispositions, etc. that successfully explains 
the anomalies and previous phenomena. Kuhn labelled the most extreme form of shift a 
"scientific revolution." 13 
Kuhn defined a scientific revolution in the following n1anner: ' 'scientific 
revolutions are here taken to be those non-cumulative developn1ental episodes in which 
an older paradigm is replaced in whole or in part by an incon1patible new one."14 Their 
i11compatibility was a crucial point, one that is explained via Kuhn ' s notion of 
ti: 
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incommensurability. Importantly, Kuhn emphasized that scientific revolutions were very 
similar in kind to political revolutions, a tantalizing assertion for sociologically inclined 
historians of science, and one that Kuhn ' s use of sociologically ripe terms like 
"institution" and ''community life" made additionally seductive. lt is worth quoting Kuhn 
again at this point: 
Political revolutions are inaugurated by a growing sense, often restricted to a 
segment of the political community, that existing institutions have ceased to meet 
the problems posed by an environment that they have in part created. In 1nuch the 
same way, scientific revolutions are inaugurated by a growing sense, again often 
restricted to a narrow subdivision of the scientific con1n1unity, that an existing 
paradigm has ceased to function adequately in the exploration of an aspect of 
nature to which that paradigm itself has previously led the way. 15 
Kuhn immediately went on to add that the collapse of one paradigm and the con1petition 
to replace it occurs in an environn1ent without clear rules or guide1ines, which were lost 
with the previous paradigm's failure to maintain an environment of normal science, and 
n Kuhn, Structure, pp. 17-18, 52-53, 64-65; 90-91. 
14 Kuhn, Structure, p. 92. 
15 Kuhn, Structure, p. 92. 
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which await re-institution, in a new shape and form, under a newly installed paradigm. 
An obvious example of a scientific revolution would be the paradigm shift from the 
Ptolemaic, earth-centred universe to the Copernican, heliocentric model. Importantly, the 
paradigm is a self-contained package, holding all the necessary conceptual and practical 
equipment necessary to sustain itself. This self-contained character predicates, however, 
its self-referential character, or as Kuhn put it, its "circularity." The rationality of a 
paradigm, so to speak, is contained within it, and does not span different paradigms in the 
revolutionary context. In an inconspicuous statement of great sociological significance, 
Kuhn stated that "there is no standard higher than the assent of the relevant community." 
This repeated use of terms such as community and institutions, juxtaposed with 
statements about the circularity of paradigms and the inability to mediate between them 
with reason or logic, offered tempting vistas of sociological interpretation for some 
historians of science. 16 
To flesh out this circularity-fraught struggle between paradigms, Kuhn employed 
his notion of "incommensurability." As with many of Kuhn's ideas, incon1mensurability 
is not easy to pin down with one, quick definition. Three main elements, however, may be 
identified. First, two competing paradigms will cite different problems within their field 
of study that demand solution. The example of the Newtonian shunting aside the need for 
a mechanism for universal gravitation shows this well: for Newtonians, the mathematical 
formalism of Newton's achievement was sufficiently persuasive, whereas n1ore 
mechanistically inclined natural philosophers saw such a lack as a serious shortcon1ing. 
16 Kuhn, Structure, pp. 92-94; quote p. 94. 
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Different visions of what needs to be answered and what can be answered here clash. 
Second, competing paradigms are incommensurable with one another because they 
employ traditional vocabulary, terminology and even technology in different ways. Thus, 
criticisms of one by the other are never wrong in a facile sense, but are ineffectual 
because the competitors conceive of the terms being used in differing ways, a fact 
obscured by the use of the self-same terms. Kuhn used the example of Copernicus' 
h~liocentric paradigm to elucidate this. Copernicus' Aristotelian-Ptolemaic critics were 
r: 1. 
,, 
not wrong in a simple sense in rejecting his views, because for them the very definition of 
the earth was that it was the unmoving centre of the universe; to say, as Copernicus did, 
that the earth orbited the sun was semantically absurd for them, for they held to a whole 
system of physics that depended on the earth's placement at the centre of the universe. 
Third, and Kuhn cited this as the "most fundamental" sense, the incon1mensurability of 
competing paradign1s meant that "the proponents of con1peting paradigms practice their 
trades in different worlds."17 Different categories of understanding are employed; 
different interrelations between observed entities are posited; different standards are 
employed to assess those interrelations, and so on. In summary, Kuhn was aiming to 
show that paradigm shift could never be a clean, logical, rational developn1ent, but 
entailed a good deal of intellectual and scientific disputation, frustration and antagonism. 
Because paradigms were incommensurable, overthrow was what happened to bring one to 
preeminence and cast the other into obscurity. As Kuhn pointed out, a paradign1 rarely 
17 Kuhn, Structure, p. 150. 
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achieved supremacy through convincing its foes - the proponents of the defeated 
paradigm generally died off, without any new adherents to carry on their fight. 18 
In effect, Kuhn's sophisticated model opens science to historical inquiry by 
suggesting how the more transient entities with which historical study generally concerns 
itself- culture, persona)jty, politics, society - play a role in the actual epistemic activity of 
scientists. These transient elements are set in contrast to the seemingly eternal elements 
which philosophy of science seeks to establish and refine such as reason, reality and so 
on, that if exhaustively justified scientific knowledge would put the epistemic content of 
science beyond the scope of historical inquiry. For if there were one permanent, 
unchanging method for procuring knowledge, and science had discovered this method, 
then ephemeral social arrangements, political circumstances, cultural mores and so on 
would have but anecdotal interest, and the scholar really interested in finding out what 
makes science a form of knowledge would be better served by investing his or her efforts 
in philosophy. 
This being said, it is necessary to acknowledge that Kuhn was not a thorough-
going sociologist of science, as will be seen below by the simple fact that the Strong 
Programme needed to reinterpret and bolster his work in order to give it a solidly 
sociological footing. Part of the issue here is that Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions had a strong metaphorical tendency in his thinking, and it is often difficult to 
assess how literally Kuhn himself took these metaphors. This tendency is well illustrated 
in his sections on the parallels between political and scientific revolutions, and his 
18 Kuhn, Structure, pp. 111-112, 148-151. 
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frequent and enthusiastic use of research in cognitive psychology, such as Gesta1t 
switches and Bruner's and Postman's playing-cards experiments. 19 ln the case of 
scientific and political revolutions, it is telling that Kuhn used the term "parallel" to 
describe the similarities, and did not state that they were one and the same in sttucture 
and evolution. In the case of the psychological references, Kuhn was more emphatically 
metaphorical, repeatedly using the word "suggest" and its cognates. lt is also notable that 
for all of his talk of communities and groups, Kuhn rarely offered any sociological 
fr 
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models explaining such structures or analysing them, at least not as explicitly as he did 
with psychology. Thus, it is a very good question indeed how far Kuhn intended to take 
any sociological reinterpretation of science. 
The reason for this becomes clearer when one reminds oneself of what role Kuhn 
desired history to play in the vision of science he presented in The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions. lt is important to realize that, despite the in1portance he placed on history as 
a crucial tool in understanding scientific knowledge, Kuhn had in no way abandoned 
epistemology and philosophy of science. ln fact, it would be more reasonable to say that 
Kuhn's aim was a properly historicized philosophy of science, which would allow 
historians and philosophers of science to work in concert to stin1ulate advances in each 
field. A few years after the initial publication of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 
Kuhn reflected on his work in the following manner: 
Traditional discussions of scientific method have sought a set of tules that would 
permit any individual who followed them to produce sound knowledge. 1 have 
tried to insist, instead, that, though science is practised by individuals, scientific 
19 Kuhn, Structure, pp. 62-64, 111-115. 
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knowledge is intrinsically a group product and that neither its peculiar efficacy nor 
the manner in which it develops will be understood without reference to the 
special nature of the groups that produce it. In this sense my work has been deeply 
sociological, but not in a way that permits that subject to be separated from 
epistemology.20 
In this way, Kuhn's thought ironically was not as revolutionary as some of his interpreters 
would have it. His own work was a smaller scale paradigm shift that modified the internal 
workings of his field, but did not entirely supercede it. 
2.3 David Bloor and Barry Barnes: The Edinburgh Strong Programme 
Unlike Kuhn, David Bloor and Barry Barnes, lead thinkers of the Edinburgh 
Strong Programme, were unequivocal in their support for the sociology of scientific 
knowledge. The "Strong Programme" was so labelled because it advanced a "strong" 
sociology of knowledge: all elements of scientific knowledge, whether 1nathematical, 
experimental , observational or theoretical, were open to sociological inquiry and 
explanation; as Bloor stated, " [t]here are no limitations [to the sociology of knowledge] 
which lie in the absolute or transcendent character of scientific knowledge itself, or in the 
special nature of rationality, validity, truth or objectivity."21 For n1y purposes here what is 
important to recognize is that advancing this thesis sin1ultaneously and intentiona1ly made 
historical inquiry crucial to understanding scientific knowledge. To get a sense of this, an 
examination and analysis of the program of the Strong Programme will pave the way for 
2° Kuhn, "Preface," The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition 
and Change (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1 977): pp. xx. 
21 David Bloor, Knowledge and Socialln1agery, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of 
Chicago, 1991 ): p. 3. The first edition was published in 1976. 
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an appreciation of the sociological roots of Shapin's scholarly oeuvre. This progran1 can 
be approached through Bloor's seminal Knowledge and Social Imagery where he listed 
four ''tenets" of the Strong Programme. Then, reference to Barnes' insistence on the 
importance of culture in the development of science will further help to show the 
historiographical implications of the Strong Programme. 
What were the four tenets of the Strong Programme? They were: (a) causality, (b) 
impartiality, (c) symmetry, and (d) reflexivity. To varying degrees these build on and 
n: 
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reinforce one another. All of them expressed Bloor's confidence that sociology was a 
perspicacious tool for understanding science. Bloor did not aim to elucidate their 
historiographical applicability, but to establish a theoretical foundation for such 
application in historical inquiry, as his brief forays into a variety of topics in the history of 
mathematics showed.22 
To commence with (a) causality, Bloor contended that sociologists should attempt 
to reveal the causes that generated knowledge claims. Knowledge varies over tin1e and 
place, and the sociologist needs to account for such variation. Using his ex pe11ise in 
describing and explaining society, the sociologist could account for collectively held 
belief through showing the nexus of social causation lying behind any knowledge claim. 
Bloor even went so far as to argue that mathen1atics, seemingly the province of 
22 Particularly worthy of attention is David Bloor, HPolyhedra and the 
Abominations of Leviticus: Cognitive Styles in Mathematics," Essavs in the Sociolo~v of 
Perception, ed. Mary Douglas (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982): passin1. 
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knowledge most distant from sociological description, was as much the product of 
socially generated consensus as any other form of knowledge.23 
This talk of Hsocial causation" requires further analysis. What does it mean to be 
socially caused? Bloor's use of the notion of cause is purposely loose and incompletely 
articulated, showing his lack of interest in philosophical methods. His proudly held 
"scientism" expressed his belief that the Strong Programme replicated scientific 
methodology in the sociology of knowledge.24 Bloor defined knowledge as collective 
belief: "knowledge for the sociologist is whatever people take to be knowledge." The 
major problem of the sociology of scientific knowledge is the Hvariation" in human-held 
beliefs about the structure of the natural universe. For Bloor, the fact that different 
peoples have explained the universe differently demands sociological investigation. Thus, 
social causation for Bloor is the idea that the colJectively held beliefs which human 
communities label Hknowledge" spring fron1 the social structures of the communities 
themselves. Bloor's primary conviction was that sociology could explain scientific 
knowledge. Writing early in the history of the Strong Programn1e, he explicitly left it for 
more empirically minded scholars such as Shapin to show its value through concrete 
inquiry. 25 
23 Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery, p. 7; for his commentary on 
mathematics, see p. 3 and Chapter 5. 
24 Bloor, Knowledge and Sociallmagery, pp. 5, 13, 160-161. 
25 Bloor, Knowledge and Sociallmagery, pp. 4-7, 12. Bloor did qualify his belief 
in the universality of a social element in knowledge systen1s, stating in a number of places 
that other causes play a role, and that in son1e instances social causation n1ight function as 
a ''background condition;" see Knowledge and Social ln1age1y, pp. 7, 166. For n1ore 
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Bloor intended this Strong Programme empiricism to stand in direct confrontation 
with the philosophy of science. Yet, as Michael Friedman points out, the Strong 
Programme itself advanced a blatant "philosophical agenda" of its own: 
[The] defenders of [the sociology of scientific knowledge] represent 
themselves as explicitly rejecting the aims and methods of traditional 
philosophy - not simply as leaving them out of account. They feel 
compelled, that is, explicitly to deny the philosophical theses underlying 
the traditional normative enterprise: for example, 'science is not a set of 
universal standards, sustaining true descriptions and valid inferences in 
different specific cultural contexts'~ 'there is no sense attached to the idea 
that some standards or beliefs are really rational as distinct from merely 
locally accepted as such'; 'there are no context-free or super-cultural 
norms of rationality'~ and so on. Moreover, it is precisely by insisting on 
such negative philosophical conclusions that defenders of [the sociology of 
scientific knowledge] adopt an explicitly philosophical agenda which itself 
goes beyond the bounds of purely descriptive empirical research. 26 
This is a poignant statement, for the Strong Programme and Shapin himself did not 
relinquish their anti-philosophical tendencies despite the burden of philosophical baggage 
evidence that Bloor's style of presentation, where citing already existing examples of 
affiliated scholarship and encouraging others to pursue the Strong Progran1me's agenda to 
establish its empirical success was opposed to developing philosophically exhaustive and 
coherent arguments, was an explicit approach, see Bloor, "The Strengths of the Strong 
Programme," Philosophy of the Social Sciences 11 ( 1981 ): particularly p. 206. For more 
on the Strong Programme's philosophical component and its resulting openness to 
philosophical critique, see Larry Lauden, "The Pseudo-Science of Science?" Philosophy 
of the Social Sciences 11 ( 1981 ): pp. 1 73-198~ and Michael Friedman, "On the Sociology 
of Scientific Knowledge and its Philosophical Agenda," Studies in History and 
Philosophy of Science 29 ( 1 998): pp. 239-271. 
26 Michael Friedman, "Philosophical Agenda," p. 244. Friedman went on to argue 
that not only was this philosophical agenda unnecessary, but implausible, attempting to 
bend the purely norn1ative aims of its philosophical hero Wittgenstein to empirical ends 
they were never intended to n1eet; see particularly pp. 251 -256. 
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they felt obliged to carry into their scholarly labours.27 The consequences of such a 
rejection of philosophy will be discussed throughout this thesis. 
Next, Bloor recommended that sociologists be (b) impartial to whether 
subsequent generations or contemporary audiences saw the epistemic item under 
investigation as true or false. Strong Programme sociologists should simply allow a 
group's affiliation with some knowledge claim to be the justification for sociological 
interpretation; in other words, the sociologist should take the fact that a historical 
community held the belief as sufficient reason for study, no matter whether the society the 
sociologist inhabits considers the idea valid or not. The sociologist needs to take care not 
to discount ideas that his or her own society does not believe. Once the sociologist is 
impartial in this regard, his or her ascription of causes to differing bodies of knowledge 
can then be (c) sym1netric. This dealt with a widely held tendency, known as the 
"arationality" principle in some circles, for critics to invoke sociological explanation only 
when a body of knowledge was perceived to be false, on the assun1ption that social 
factors could only distort knowledge formation. For these critics, what is based on reason 
and logic needs no explanation, being self-evidently correct, whereas what is en·oneous 
requires the introduction of other factors, possibly social in character, to show where 
27 The persistence of this stance in Shapin's writing is evident in essays as 
temporally diverse as his "History of Science and its Sociological Reconstructions. 
"History of Science 20 ( 1981 ): passim, to his "Rarely Pure and Never Simple: Talking 
about Truth." Configurations 7 ( 1 999): passim. 
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things went wrong. Bloor considered this asymmetry a false conceit, and widened the 
scope of sociological inquiry to include all communally held epistemic items.28 
Reflection shows how intimately the first three tenets are interrelated. Once the 
sociologist defines knowledge as collective belief, then it flows from this that the 
~ 
sociologist should not import his or her own valuations of veracious versus erroneous into 
the study of knowledge claims. Further, once one accepts this definition of knowledge 
and additional1y assumes that some form of social causation is at work in all forms of 
I 
I . 
human belief, then naturally one should not limit his or her sociological attention only to 
epistemic claims deemed erroneous, as all knowledge will have an irreducible 
component of the social for the sociologist to identify and elucidate. Bloor's tenet of 
social causation predicates the impartiality and symmetry tenets, which in turn allow the 
sociologist to reveal the often sophisticated social causation lying behind epistemic 
claims.29 
Finally, Bloor put forward the maxim of (d) reflexivity. Edinburgh Strong 
Programme sociology was no different than any other scientific discipline, or indeed fron1 
those epistemic communities the Strong Programmer investigated. Thus, sociology 
should be an ex pression of social causation too, something that the sociologist should be 
28 Bloor, Social Imagery, p. 7, 11-12. 
29 Bloor fleshed out a further defence showing the intin1ate interconnectedness of 
the causality, impartiality and symmetry postulates of these first three tenets in HStrengths 
of the Strong Progran1me," pp. 204-207. 
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prepared to explain when presenting his or her own interpretations of science. 30 This is 
the least important of the tenets for tny purposes here, as it functioned mainly to shield 
the Strong Programme from accusations of an intellectual elitism that might suggest that 
the tools of the Strong Programme were capable of explaining all other forms of 
knowledge, while isolating then1selves from the same critique. Should the sociologist so 
choose, he or she could plot a sociology of knowledge of the sociology of knowledge. 
What are the historiographical implications of the Strong Programme's research 
I 
agenda? The argument here is very similar to that presented above in the examination of 
internalism-externalism or Kuhn. For if knowledge can be seen as containing an 
ineradicable element of social causation, then the historian can study knowledge through 
. 
examing the social circumstances that obtained in the historical setting where the 
knowledge appeared. Historical inquiry has the power to reveal the social scenarios 
historical agents encountered, and therefore can be extended to elucidating the knowledge 
systems through the same processes of study. The historian need not worry whether 
contemporary or historical audiences deemed the knowledge clain1 under examination 
spurious, for as long as a community held it to be true, then it is classified as knowledge 
and therefore should not be disdained as unworthy of historical inquiry. This is clearly 
evident in the brand of historicism which Shapin pron1oted as a partial solution to the 
30 Bloor, Social Imagery, p. 7. Elsewhere, Bloor pointed to his "inductivism" as 
grounding the scientistic tendency partially represented in his reflexivity postulate. By 
this, he seemed to be pointing to a kind of extrapolation from actual practice in science to 
the methods of the Strong Programme. lt should also be noted that in n1aking this 
argument Bloor indicated Kuhn as one of his authorities. See Bloor, "Strengths of the 
Strong Programme," pp. 206-207. 
internalist-externalist controversy.31 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the historian 
need not set aside one toolbox and pick up another to deal with supposed true and false 
bodies of belief- under the symmetry postulate, knowledge systen1s are explicable using· 
the same sociological tools, regardless of their supposed epistemic worth. The adoption of 
this tenet will be very clear in Shapin's work, as the failure of Hobbes' natural philosophy 
to defeat Boyle's experimentalism did not relegate the former to a secondary status in 
Shapin's mind - it was a full player in seventeenth-century English natural philosophy. 
r 
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Besides these four tenets, the Strong Programme placed considerable emphasis on 
the role of culture in scientific knowledge. Barnes propounded a Strong-Programme 
notion of culture at some length. In short, the Strong Programme saw culture as a vehicle 
for social interests, a repository of historically established knowledge, and as a lens 
through which human agents perceived and understood reality. Each of these components 
requires analysis. 
Interests for Barnes are thoroughly social entities. In its most visceral sense, an 
interest is something a social group pursues, defends and n1aintains in order to sustain or 
' bolster the community's social position and strength. In the case of communities of 
knowledge-makers, the interest was primarily the need to produce accounts of their world 
that allowed for its prediction and n1anipulation. The scientific con1munity posed -cet1ain 
questions to nature and found answers in the name of the social group's prosperity. The 
actualization of this interest was the ability to con1e up with results which the community 
had predicted and which resulted in the ability to use nature to forward the social group's 
31 See p. 1 3 of this chapter. 
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purposes. Interests, however, were not simply conscious strategies for guiding social 
activity, but actually shaped the human cognitive appreciation of nature; in Barnes' 
idiom, interests worked to ''pre-organize" knowledge. He cited physiological diagrams of 
the human body as an example. According to Barnes, these images did not only aim to 
depict nature, but also to discipline and form the student's intellectual and cognitive 
abilities so as to understand nature physiologically. The specific interest of the 
community in this case was to build its strength through enlisting new adherents and 
,~ 
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succeeding in having them see nature in the manner of that community. Interests supplied 
the motive, direction, and structure of human knowled1!e.32 
'-" 
If interests played a key role in the composition of knowledge, then so too did 
history. For Barnes, all knowledge has a historical lineage, and this lineage is available to 
the practicing scientist in the form of "resources." This n1etaphor was crucial for the 
Strong Programme, as it gave a concreteness to culture necessary if it were to be 
something employable in sociological hands. The past had bequeathed the present a wide 
variety of methods, techniques, claims, counter-claims and so on for the practising 
scientist to take up, reworking them into seemingly new accomplishments; additionaJiy, 
resources from other provinces of culture such as economics or art - seen1ingly unrelated 
to science - might be taken up and wielded in scientific discourse. In the form of 
resources, Barnes saw history as an inescapable contributor to the scientific endeavour, a 
fact which hints at the conservative nature of the knowledge-maker's enterprise: all 
32 Barry Barnes, Interests and the Growth of Knowledge (London: Routledge and 
K. Paul , 1 977): pp. 6-7, 12-16, 18. 
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knowledge claims are based on an inherited past that they cannot escape- this theme is 
apparent throughout Shapin's oeuvre. The knowledge of the present owes its shape to the 
intellectual work of the past, and the present blends endlessly into the future, finality did 
not exist in knowledge. Knowledge is as history-laden as it was interest-laden.33 
Closely connected to both the interest and historical elements of culture was its 
role as a lens for shaping both the appearance and interpretation of nature. In short, this is 
the argument that membership in a given community entails that the member will 
r 
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perceive and interpret reality in a communally shared n1anner. The basic philosophical 
contention behind this idea is that facts are the result of theory, and not vice versa. 
According to Barnes, the cognitive tendencies of an individual human tend to follow 
those of the community of which he or she is a part. If, for instance, a person belongs to a 
community which sees the universe as a mechanistic and non-teleological entity, then 
cognition will proceed to organize sensory input in a n1anner befitting this theoretical 
perspective; if, on the other hand, one believes the universe to be imbued with God-given 
purpose, the community will marshal reality so as correspond with this view. Obviously, 
Barnes recognized that there are limits to this: experience does not directly equip the 
community with detailed sensory evidence of mechanistic corpuscles or divine purpose. 
However, in his mind community membership structures experience so that it fits as 
closely as possible with basic assumptions, regardless of the absence of unequivocal 
evidence of the community's beliefs. 34 
33 Barnes, Growth of Knowledge, pp. 11-12, 89. 
34 Barnes, Growth of Knowledge, pp. 1 7-18, 87-88. 
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Barnes attempted to make the experience-shaping characteristic of culture n1ore 
concrete through associating it with language. For Barnes, human knowledge was a 
formation of language. All human knowledge was couched linguistically; and language, a 
human phenon1enon, was open to sociological understanding. Language mediated all 
experience; the linguistic particularities of the con1munity distilled the products of the 
senses in a pre-patterned manner. Thus, in Barnes' interpretation, language had important 
cognitive-psychological consequences, and the study of the specific language features 
r: 
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through which humans justified their understandings of nature was an insightful way to 
mine the character of human knowledge.35 
Barnes' theory of culture advances n1any exciting philosophical propositions: 
language and community structure cognition, theoretical predispositions determine facts, 
human interests and history structure epistemic beliefs, and so on. The Kuhnian influence 
here is clear, not only in Barnes' taste for using psychological references to develop his 
theory, but also in the paradigm-like vision of culture which emerges, where the basic 
explanatory elements of an epistemic system- for instance, the facts and experiments of 
the scientific world-view - only n1ake sense in a n1atrix of theoretical assumptions 
embedded in language. Each community has its own socially derived semantics, a 
Barnesian sociological development of Kuhn's observation that those who share a 
paradigm understand terminology and theories differently than those inhabiting another 
35 Barry Barnes, Scientific Knowledge and Sociological Theory (London : 
Routledge & K. Paul, 1 974): pp. 16, 18. 
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paradigm. 36 Throughout, Barnes attempts to recast elements of Kuhn's thinking in a 
sociological mould. 
Shapin's contact with the ideas of the Strong Programme was immediate and 
intimate - he was a lecturer at the University of Edinburgh, alongside Barnes and Bloor, 
for much of the 1970s and 1980s. At that time he published a course bibliography for a 
course in "the social history of science," a course that ran alongside a '"philosophical' 
component." The aim of these courses was promoting the "sociology, philosophy, social 
r 
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history, and contemporary political aspects of science."37 lt can be seen from this that 
Shapin was deeply immersed in the Edinburgh Strong Programme, and he positioned 
himself intellectually as a voice that would promote historical application of the 
theoretical sociological insights of Barnes and Bloor. lt is this attempt that will absorb my 
attention in the next two chapters. 
36 Barnes, Scientific Knowledge, pp. 10-1 1. 
37 Steven Shapin, 41.A Course in the Social History of Science," Social Studies of 
Science 10 ( 1980): pp. 231-258; all quotes fron1 p. 231. 
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Chapter 3 
Nature, Society and Social Strife in Leviathan and the Air-Pump 
As we come to recognize the conventional and artifactual status of our 
forms of knowing, we put ourselves in a position to know that it is 
ourselves and not reality that is responsible for what we know. Knowledge, 
as much as the state, is the product of human action. Hobbes was right. 
Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump ( 1985). 
Emerging from his years of teaching and research at the University of Edinburgh, 
Shapin's Leviathan and the Air-Pump, hereafter LAP, was a major contribution to the 
~ ' 
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sociological study of the history of science. Coauthored with Simon Schaffer,1 this book 
presented an interpretation of Robert Boyle's ( 1627-1691) experimentalist program in 
seventeenth-century England and Thomas Hobbes' ( 1588-1679) criticisms of it. The 
interpretation was boldly and thoroughly sociological in approach. Shapin and Schaffer 
1 This was Shapin and Schaffer's only major scholarly collaboration, representing 
for both their first major publication after their doctoral dissertations. This chapter will 
not attempt to differentiate their voices in LAP. Schaffer has continued to write 
extensively on the history of science, like Shapin remaining dedicated to the promotion 
and development of a sociological perspective. In particular, his curiosity has been 
attracted by s~venteenth, eighteen, and nineteenth-century European astronomy. 
Examples of his writings include: Newtonian Cosmology and the Steady State, 1980 
(Ph.D. thesis, Cambridge University); "Natural Philosophy and Public Spectacle in the 
18th Century," History of Science 21 ( 1983): pp. 1 -43; "Authorized Prophets: Con1ets and 
Astronomers after 1759," Studies of 18th- Century Culture 17 ( 1985): pp. 45-74; "Comets 
and Idols: Newton's Cosmology and Political Theology," Action and Reaction: 
Proceedings of a Symposium to Commemorate the Tercentenary of Newton's Principia, 
Paul Theerman and Adele F. Seefe. (Newark: Delaware, 1993); "The Show that Never 
Ends: Perpetual Motion in the Early 18th Century," British Journal of the Historv of 
Science 28 ( 1995): pp.l57 -189. 
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emphasized how the differing social statuses of Boyle and Hobbes shaped each's natural 
philosophic outlooks. 2 
In LAP the sociological model depended heavily on notions of social strife and 
tension. This characteristic needs critical attention, as later in A Social History of Truth 
(AST), Shapin would acknowledge the limitations of relying on social strife and tension 
and propound an alternative detailing the role of credibility and trust in knowledge. lt will 
be seen that, despite its strengths, their sociological approach faced problems generally in 
its downplaying of the significance of epistemological considerations and in its overly 
narrow conception of social structure. To moderate their sociological hand, l shall argue 
that a new philosophical awareness is required in the social history of science, an 
awareness expressed in the ideas of "ontological equivalence" and "epistemological 
sensitivity." lt will also be seen that there are faults in the historiographical application of 
their sociological methods, particularly in how they handled their interpretation of 
Hobbes. 
2 Although some readers may be inclined to draw a sharp distinction between 
Hscience" and Hphilosophy ," for the sake of historical accuracy Hnatural philosophy" or 
Hphilosophy" and their adjectival forms will be used throughout this thesis to describe the 
Hscience" of Boyle and Hobbes. They thought of themselves as natural philosophers, and 
1 will respect that description. For the sake of the larger critical and historiographical 
perspective, however, it is safe to equate science and philosophy in the pages that follow, 
unless specified otherwise. Shapin's comments on knowledge apply quite broadly to any 
form of knowledge, be it philosophical or scientific. 
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3.1 Fundamental Notions of Shapin's Image of Science 
Keeping with my intention to take largely an intellectualist tack by analysing the 
key ideas behind Shapin's thought, here l will present some of the ideas to which Shapin 
objected and the alternatives he proposed in LAP. Their origins in the inte1lectual heritage 
of Thomas Kuhn and the Edinburgh Strong Programme, described in the previous 
chapter, are manifest. First, Shapin doubted the fo1lowing: 
. r: that science has a privileged objectivity and conclusiveness in its methods; 
• that observation, particularly as expressed in the methods of experiment, 
functioned as an independent, overarching control on theory; 
• that the centrality of experiment in modern science confers decisiveness to 
science's epistemic clain1s; 
• that science had succeeded in isolating itself from society, culture, and politics; 
Shapin did not dispense with these factors entirely, but chose to reinterpret them 
sociologically. Thus, science's objectivity and experiment's centrality become comn1unity 
accomplishments, not the products of solitary contemplation and reflection; the 
interpretation of observation is handled in light of the interests and beliefs of Boyle's 
social community, not his individual intellectual acumen; and finally, science is portrayed 
as being an expression of social, political and cultural circumstances, a human activity 
that reflects how society is organized in both how it is done and the results it achieves. 
These features of Shapin's thought clearly express the tantalizing historical opportunities 
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Kuhn suggested in that they translate such notions as paradigms into sociological entities 
that carry a load of social, political and cultural elements. 
It will help to see this from the other side and establish positively some features of 
science in Shapin's view. Shapin's sociological interpretation of scientific knowledge was 
coloured by ideas from the Strong Programme, particularly its first three tenets: causality, 
impartiality and symmetry. He grounded his interpretation on the following con1mitments: 
• science, like all knowledge making, is a social activity, consisting of a collection 
of specific social conventions; 
• science is a product of cooperative hun1an activity;3 
• all knowledge-claims, including those of science, have a definite social and 
political character, derived from the social milieus within which scientists work; 
• the conventions which shape scientific knowledge are themselves shaped by the 
economic and social categories of those who speak about nature. Therefore, all 
knowledge transfers the distinctions of social class onto the natural world; 
• scientific knowledge achieves solutions to "the problem of social order;" in other 
words, it is a way of forwarding the political agendas of those doing science. 
3 To provide philosophical backing for these first two points, Shapin assumed 
Wittgenstein' s phraseology: science was a "form of life" and a "language game;" see, for 
instance, Simon Schaffer and Steven Shapin, Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, 
Boyle and the Experimental Life (Princeton: Princeton University, 1985): pp. 15, 22. 
Shapin's assumed his understanding of Wittgenstein under the n1antle of Strong 
Programme mentor David Bloor, who propounded an approach to the sociology of 
knowledge based on Wittgensteinian philosophy; see his Wittgenstein: A Social Theorv 
of Knowledge (New York: Columbia University, 1983): passim. There, Bloor defined 
uform of life" as a upattem of socially sustained boundaries;" see p. 140. 
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For Shapin, in line with his Strong Programme mentors, scientific knowledge contained 
an irreducible element of the social. All knowledge claims had a causal source amid the 
social communities of historical agents; thus, the same tools were to be applied to 
scientific know ledge as to social structures, regardless of whether the know ledge was 
widely held to be true or was only seen as such by a small community. As with Kuhn, 
Shapin carried out further acts of translation in applying the Strong Progran1me to 
~i-s tori cal interpretation. For instance, the Strong Progran1me definition of knowledge as 
collectively held belief is made historiographically applicable in the role of social 
conventions in knowledge - epistemic claims which the community holds n1ust have 
concrete social expression, and that expression was in the form of conventions.4 
Perhaps what is most interesting here is that Shapin immersed science in a vision 
of society where tension and strife between different, class-like social groups, in1parted 
the motivation to do science, not as a purely intellectual investigation, but as a crutch for 
political machinations, a legitimating tool to ground social ambitions and political power.5 
Shapin and Schaffer stated in the concluding chapter of LAP that, 
... the contest among alternative forms of life and their characteristic 
forms of intellectual product depends upon the political success of the 
various candidates in insinuating themselves into the activities of other 
4 Bloor described conventions on a more normative, theoretical level, describing 
them as founded on language games and argued that human "conventional behaviour" 
was the source of the human imposition of meaning on the environn1ent. See Bloor, 
Wittgenstein, pp. 49, 137. 
5 Schaffer and Shapin, LAP, pp.l56, 1 71, 192, 199. 
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institutions and other interest groups. He who has the most, and the most 
powerful, allies wins. 6 
Science's success resides not in the perspicacity of its vision into the essential character 
of nature, but in its success in forging the right political allegiances. Is it necessary to take 
this approach if one wishes to take up a sociological approach to the history of science? 
No. Before coming to a detailed justification for this conclusion, however, these radical 
pronouncements on science and society shall be examined in depth. 
3.2 Three Core Ideas 
To do so, l will analyze three key ideas that emerge from my reading of LAP: (a) 
nature is not knowable in one, final, conclusive way; (b) scientific knowledge is a product 
of social conventions; and (c) science is a social-political tool. Some may not grant a 
distinction between the second and third ideas, but it is crucial to understanding later 
developments in Shapin's thinking about science, particularly as expressed in A Social 
History of Truth. This is because one does not have to see social conventions as 
originating in social tension and strife, but may turn to other characteristics of human 
communities, such as trust and credibility, to find their origins. 
Before moving into hard issues of interpretation, a brief historical outline of 
exactly what sort of knowledge Boyle sought in his experin1ents will be useful. Boyle's 
main philosophical interest resided mainly in what would now be considered chen1istry, 
6 Schaffer and Shapin, LAP, p. 342. 
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but which might more insightfully be considered matter theory. One factor to keep in 
mind is that n1ost natural philosophers of the first half of the seventeenth century did not 
consider chemical researches a proper area for natural philosophic curiosity. The 
44alchemists" and 44iastrochemists" mainly saw chemistry as a way to n1ake medicines. 
This was known as the Paracelsian tradition. The then dominant form of chen1istry, it 
conceived of chemistry in a very organic sense, and most of its concepts seem completely 
ubrelated to the discoveries of modern chemistry. As mechanical explanation gained more 
I I 
ground in natural philosophy, some began to advance mechanistic explanations for 
chen1ical phenomena. Boyle was an eager innovator in this push because of his 
confidence that experimentally based chemical researches would provide the mechanistic 
natural philosophy with a proper matter theory. Although Boyle continued n1any 
Paracelsian traditions, he firn1ly embraced moving corpuscles as the fundan1ental 
constituents of matter. He used numerous experiments to articulate and defend his 
corpuscularianism/ and it is to Shapin and Schaffer's scepticism about the Boy lean 
conception of experiment which we will now turn. 
The (a) inconclusiveness of knowledge based on experiment is a major then1e of 
LAP. Shapin and Schaffer contended that Boyle saw Hmatters of fact" as incontestable, 
whereas causal explanations were sources of division within the philosophical 
community. Boyle wanted to rejuvenate hun1an knowledge by building a natural 
7 Richard S. Westfall, The Construction of Modern Science: Mechanisn1s and 
Mechanics (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1971 ) : pp. 65-81. 
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philosophic system that relied only on matters of fact, eschewing causal explanations. 
Experiment would build a large store of facts about nature, without den1anding that each 
experimenter advance causes for these facts, thus freeing the experin1entalist natural 
philosophy from divisive internal dispute. Shapin and Schaffer gave detailed examples of 
some of Boyle's experiments to show that "matters of fact" were indeed contestable. 
Because they conjectured that all observation was predicated on having some set of 
theoretical predispositions, they contended that matters of fact were indistinguishable 
from causal explanations. Theoretical predispositions structured how the observer saw the 
experiment, and thus tainted the matters of fact with a large dose of causal reasoning. For 
Shapin and Schaffer, Boyle's was an impossible program- any experiment was 
susceptible to various interpretations. 
Boyle's Hvoid-in-the-void experiment" is an excellent exan1ple of this. Here Boyle 
elucidated his own answer to the famed "Torricellian space." Evangelista Torricelli noted 
in 1 644 that when a full tube of n1ercury was tipped upside down into a vessel of the san1e 
substance, the mercury failed to empty completely fron1 the tube. A space was left 
between the top of the tube and the remaining n1ercury, which levelled off some distance 
above the level of the mercury in the vessel. Boyle tried the experiment inside the glass 
receiver of his air-pump. As the process of exhausting the receiver of air progressed, the 
mercury in the tube fell closer and closer to the level of the mercury in the dish. Although 
it did not drop to exactly the same level, Boyle extrapolated from this experiment that air 
had pressure and "spring." In conditions outside of the pun1p, the weight of the airy 
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atmosphere exerted a pressure on the mercury in the dish, preventing all the n1ercury in 
the tube from draining. Once sealed inside the receiver of the air-pump, but before 
Boyle's lab workers pumped the air out, the level of the mercury remained the same, 
Boyle explained, because the air had a springiness which compensated for the loss of 
atmospheric pressure. With the air removed, the mercury could then drain freely into the 
dish. Boyle claimed that he had overcome air's pressure and spring through his 
~*periment.8 
It was at this point, however, that Shapin and Schaffer asked a sticky question: 
what were the pressure and spring of the air? Were they n1atters of fact or hypotheses? 
They noted that, despite Boyle's exhortations to avoid causal explanation and rely only on 
matters of fact, air pressure and spring were as n1uch causal as factual. Boyle, they said, 
failed to explain how he arrived at these ideas from observing the fall of the n1ercury in 
the pump's receiver. Although Boyle refused to indicate the causes of the spring and 
pressure of the air, he treated them as causes. Shapin and Schaffer saw this as 
epistemologically suspect. If matters of fact were different from causes, then they had to 
be different, and Boyle's matters of fact had clear causal functions for Shapin and 
Schaffer.9 
Boyle's ostensible antipathy to causal explanation created another problem, one 
concerning the ontological status of the Torricellian space. The main reason it was of 
8 Schaffer and Shapin, LAP, pp. 40-49. 
9 Schaffer and Shapin, LAP, pp. 52-55, 220-224. 
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interest to philosophers was because many clain1ed it was proof of vacuity in nature -
space could be completely emptied of matter. If not, what exactly was in the space 
between the surface of the mercury and the top of the tube? The plenists, however, were 
convinced that the universe was stuffed full of matter, with no vacuous spaces. Therefore, 
somehow the Torricellian space was replenished with n1atter. Boyle, however, said little 
on this head - he felt it to be the sort of questioning inappropriate for the experimentalist. 
Experiment, he assured, could never answer this sort of metaphysical debate, and this was 
proper: if experiment could not decide the matter, then the question was futile and not 
worth posing. Boyle redefined the question to suit experimentalisn1 - a vacuum had 
indeed been created during the experiment, but not necessarily one devoid of all matter, 
only devoid (or almost devoid) of normal air. So he used the tern1 "'vacuum", but in a way 
that evaded its traditional meanings. 10 Again, according to Shapin and Schaffer, 
predispositions decided how observers were to interpret experiment- only certain sorts of 
questions were admissible. Shapin and Schaffer did, however, suggest that Boyle leaned 
towards the vacuist side of the metaphysical debate. As some scholars have noted, matter 
theory was contentious because it involved the ontological status of God. 11 Boyle, being 
much concerned with showing himself a good Christian, wanted God to fit into a 
10 An excellent example of Shapin and Schaffer employing Kuhnian 
incommensurability; see Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
11 Edward Grant, Much Ado about Nothing: Theories of Space and Vacuum from 
the Middle Ages to the Scientific Revolution (Can1bridge: Cambridge University, 1981 ): 
pp. 259-264. 
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mechanistic universe. Many anti-mechanistic criticisn1s of the Cartesian and Hobbesian 
ontologies charged that in a fully mechanistic plenum, everything was deterministic, and 
thus God could not exert his will, at least not after he gave the initial impetus that put the 
universe in motion. By pern1itting the possibility of vacuum, Boyle espoused an ontology 
compatible both with a corpuscular mechanist view of matter and a universe fully under 
the sway, at all times and places, of an on1nipotent God. Theoretical predispositions, this 
t~fne of a theological-ontological character, governed the interpretation of experiment. 12 
Shapin and Schaffer drove home the point that experimentation was not 
epistemologically conclusive by introducing Hobbes' criticisms of Boyle's work. 13 
Hobbes interpreted the ''void-in-the-void" experin1ent very differently, using his own 
mechanistic and plenist account of what had happened to the n1ercury. For Hobbes, the 
.. 
whole universe was fi11ed with matter- it was a plenun1. No en1pty space - or vacuun1 -
existed. The Torricellian space was fi1led not just with n1atter, but air, straight from the 
12 Schaffer and Shapin, LAP, pp. 141, 202-207. 
13 lt must be emphasized that the interpretation found in this chapter of Hobbes 
and his thinking, particularly regarding the relationship between his political philosophy 
and his vision of knowledge, is Shapin and Schaffer's reading of Hobbes. They atten1pted 
an innovative fusion of the political with the episten1ological to present Hobbes as an 
absolutist in knowledge as well as in the polity. There are, however, other interpretations 
of Hobbes which do not accept such a fusion. For instance, Hobbes advised his absolutist 
monarch to exercise moderation in regulating his subjects' beliefs, due to the volatility 
and variety found amongst those beliefs; forbearance on the pa11 of the n1onarch in 
matters epistemic would allow the preservation of absolute power in the political sphere. 
Shapin and Schaffer presented a radical reading of Hobbes, and the reader should keep 
this in mind. Tom Sorell, "Thomas Hobbes," Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 
4, ed. Edward Craig (New York: Routledge, 1998): pp. 459-476. 
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atmosphere. When Boyle had air withdrawn from the air-pump's glass receiver, according 
to Hobbes' interpretation, it went into the atmosphere, thus increasing the amount of 
matter in that vicinity. This resulted in a circulation of air that immediately redressed the 
emptying receiver. Because of the overload in the plenum, the exiting air forced an 
opposing stream of air back into the receiver. This occurred violently at points of leakage, 
such as around the tube through which the outward flowing air passed. Leakage, 
according to Hobbes, was inevitable, because the infinitely divisible air was bound to find 
some compromise in the structural integrity of the air-pump. The Torricellian space itself 
was filled with this air, which "penetrated" the mercury to return to the emptied space by 
the same process explained above. The space was achieved because of a certain balancing 
act in nature - the downward flow of the mercury was eventually halted because the air 
passing back up through it into the Torricellian space resisted the flow. Shapin and 
Schaffer emphasized that Hobbes adhered to the belief that for a proposition to be 
philosophical knowledge, it had to contain a causal explanation. Without causality, 
knowledge could not be philosophical - it would be craft. He thus expounded his 
explanation in completely causal terms. 14 
For Shapin and Schaffer, Hobbes saw the "void-in-the-void" experiment very 
differently from Boyle because of his differing theoretical attachment to mechanistic 
plenism and the causal nature of philosophical knowledge, which combined to create a 
forceful argument against experimentalism as a philosophical project in general. 
14 Schaffer and Shapin, LAP, pp. 83, 89-91, 139-143. 
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Experiment in and of itself was not decisive. Hobbes did not allow Boyle to dodge 
judgment of the ontological character of the Torricellian space - to do so was a fault, not a 
strength, of Boyle's philosophy. Epistemologically, he demanded that Boyle either deem 
the spring a cause, or else determine one. If not, experimentalisn1 was no better than son1e 
sort of craft, and could not be honoured with the name philosophy. Ignoring Boyle's 
protests, he treated the spring of the air as a causal explanation, and tripped up Boyle by 
stating that the springy air smelled of self-moving matter- definite anathema to Boyle as 
II 
it conflicted with both his mechanistic and his religious convictions: matter that moved 
itself would not need a God to help it do so. 15 
In short, Hobbes denied Boyle's matters of fact outright. The same sensory 
episodes sparked very different intellectual responses. A number of consequences flow 
fron1 Shapin and Schaffer's presentation: far fron1 being incontestable, one person's 
"'matters of fact" collapsed completely in the face of another's different episten1ological 
and ontological perspectives; experiment in no way relieved the observer of the burden of 
his or her theoretical predispositions; it is a fundamental characteristic of the hun1an 
epistemological condition that episodes of sensory experience are open to many 
interpretations. This observation ties in directly with the Edinburgh Strong Programme's 
ideas of social causation and culture described in Chapter 2: Hobbes and Boyle were, 
according to Shapin and Schaffer, fighting for different epistemic clain1s due to their 
different social placements. 
15 Schaffer and Shapin, LAP, pp. 121, 141-142, 204. 
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Shapin and Schaffer concluded LAP with the statement "Hobbes was right." What 
he was right about in their minds is of the utn1ost bearing to the question at hand. For 
them, Hobbes was right in acknowledging that reality can never detetmine human belief. 
Jt is a n1istake to think that experiment (or reality) creates knowledge- agency in 
knowledge belongs to humans. Experimentation is not a privileged epistemological tool; 
it does not alJow nature to express itself in some special way. Jt is merely another way that 
humans poke and prod at nature. To Jet oneself assume that one's philosophy allows 
nature to speak for itself is to march down the path to ran1pant inconsistencies and 
absurdities. For Shapin and Schaffer, Boyle folJowed that path through trying to do the 
impossible: alJowing nature to dictate its own character. What he achieved was to let a 
certain human image of nature run loose, uncontrolled, in the guise of an incontestible 
reality. Nature was a human idea. Understanding it hinged on recognizing its origins in 
human agency, not in an ineffable external agency. And so, "Hobbes was right." 
Knowledge for Hobbes had to be made by humans fron1 the ground up. Shapin and 
Schaffer agreed. This expresses the inconclusiveness of experiment in LAP's image of 
science most strikingly. 16 
Now the second core idea: (b) the role of social convention in knowledge. The 
person who thought that experiment was a superior knowledge-gathering method is left 
with a conundrum: if nature fails to shape hun1an knowledge, then what exactly does the 
work of convincing a human that a particular way of looking at the world is the right one? 
16 Schaffer and Shapin, LAP, pp. 149-154, 344. 
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Here Shapin and Schaffer's Strong Programme credentials are blatant. They responded 
that one's social environment fulfilled this role, a move which directly fulfilled the first 
directive of Bloor's Strong Programme. Because the causative character of nature was 
limited, social causation was needed to undergird knowledge systen1s. Thus for Shapin 
and Schaffer, social factors stabilize facts, making them institutions. Let us look at how, 
according to Shapin and Schaffer, Boyle did this in his specific historical circumstances, 
p~rticularly those of the Royal Society. 
Boyle's membership in the Royal Society is a crucial element in Shapin and 
Schaffer' s argument, and thus warrants some historical description. Starting circa 1 645 
primarily as an informal meeting of philosophers and thinkers at Gresham College in 
London, the Royal Society was meeting formally by 1660. lt \Vas granted Royal assent in 
1662. Boyle, Henry Oldenburg, Christopher Wren and Robert Hooke were an1ong its 
early members. lts appearance was part of a trend across Europe towards organizing 
natural philosophic groups during the seventeenth century, partially because universities 
tended to be inhospitably disposed towards the new, non-Aristotelian natural philosophy; 
the Acaden1ie Royale des Sciences in France, established in 1666, is another example. 
Despite the trappings of forn1ality signified by the appellation "Royal," the Royal Society 
remained quite informal, and became popular with educated society at large. Many of its 
members had rather flimsy scientific credentials. Nonetheless, it served as a hub for the 
communication of seventeenth-century philosophic discovery and thought for n1uch of 
Europe. The Royal Society was a place where those syn1pathetic to the experimental 
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natural philosophy could exchange views, see experiments performed, and find out what 
new discoveries were on the horizon. 17 
Shapin and Schaffer recast this interpretation in the following manner. To support 
his view of nature, Boyle established and led a community - the Royal Society - whose 
members would attest to the actuality and validity of the facts he espoused. In Shapin and 
Schaffer's interpretation, facts needed a human community to survive, and there was a 
strong parallel between social membership and epistemic conviction. Through appealing 
to the socially founded moral and cultural sensitivities of Society members, Boyle could 
recruit members to espouse his claims, for instance, about the spring of the air. In Shapin 
and Schaffer's terminology, Boyle used these social mores to design "technologies" to 
convince others of the wo11h of experimentalism; these technologies were the "literary 
technology" of his writings, the "material technology" of the air-pump, and a "social 
technology" that ordered and managed the experimentalist community. A humble and 
detailed writing style showed Boyle's unbiased, fastidious approach to knowledge-
creation; the sophistication of the air-pump could be wielded flexibly to garner assent; and 
the avoidance of causal explanation fostered tolerance among experimentalists, who 
needed only admit the matters of fact which the pump presented them to gain 
membership. 18 
17 Westfall, Construction of Modern Science, pp.lOS-114. 
18 Schaffer and Shapin, LAP, pp. 25-26, 65-69, 76-79. 
53 
The point about literary technology is relatively straightforward: Boyle used a 
particular argumentative style in his writing to instill confidence in his gentle audience. 
Shapin and Schaffer propounded this notion largely through the idea of "virtual 
witnessing."19 lf in1mediate observation of an experiment was the route to epistemic 
confidence, then a way was needed to communicate experin1ents far and wide - obviously 
not every possible observer could be present at the scene of the experiment itself. Boyle 
a~complished virtual witnessing by sprinkling his texts with engravings of experimental 
scenes, loading his pages with "prolix" prose, and comporting himself literarily as a 
modest and unpretentious author. His personal1nodesty appealed to the criteria which his 
social peers in the upper echelons used to discern the valid from the spurious. Being 
modest involved speaking without undue confidence and candour, cultivating a 
disinterestedness towards both one' s own and others ' philosophical claims, being civil 
and courteous to philosophic opponents, and piously following proper Protestant 
Christian belief. ln1portantly, the matter of fact was presented confidently, but causes 
cautiously. According to Shapin and Schaffer, Boyle intended to make the reader feel as if 
he were present at the experiment, and to build confidence in the reader through showing 
how experimentalist philosophers politely interacted with one another.20 We will continue 
discussion of the social technology that the literary technology promoted later. For now, 
19 The concept of Hvirtual witnessing" is one to keep in mind, because it is the root 
of the more sophisticated notions of trust and credibility that Shapin later developed in 
AST. 
20 Schaffer and Shapin, LAP, pp. 55-72. 
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however, it is important to remember that via "literary technology" Shapin and Schaffer 
were pointing out the rhetorical character of Boyle's experimentalism, a feature they 
contended was a concomitant of any knowledge-making practice. 
Because Boyle, and many subsequent historians, saw the experimentalist 
enterprise as hinging on tools like the air-pump, it is necessary to examine closely Shapin 
and Schaffer's concept of material technology. The air-pump was a physical entity of 
some engineering complexity. Its technical sophistication made it a rallying point for the 
experimental community- it was a symbol. Further, the fact that its design was not perfect 
- it constantly faced problems of leakage - gave Boyle an additional way to argue for and 
against claims. This was an important claim in LAP's approach, because for Shapin and 
Schaffer it showed the lack of conclusiveness in experiment. When Boyle deemed an 
experiment successful, he asse11ed that the pump worked; when an experiment failed, he 
often sought failure in some feature of the air-pun1p to redeem the knowledge claim and 
suggest that, had the pump worked con·ectly, then the results of the experiment would 
have matched expectations.21 Shapin and Schaffer interpreted historical episodes recorded 
in Boyle's canon of published experiments to reveal how humans can interpret those 
experiments in any number of ways. The example of the Torricellian space and Hobbes' 
and Boyle's differing interpretations of it described above shows this contention. Boyle's 
belief was that promoting the proper literary and social technologies would lead to a 
21 Schaffer and Shapin, LAP, pp. 30, 44, 48, 180-181. 
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proper appreciation of the phenon1ena which the material technology of the air-pump 
exhibited experimentally. 
Boyle's social technology, according to Shapin and Schaffer, aimed to promote 
consensus and peace within the experimental community. Central to this task was the 
matter of fact's dominance epistemo1ogica1ly, argumentatively, observationally, and 
conversationally; in Shapin and Schaffer' s turn of phrase, it was the "currency of 
i~te11ectual exchange."22 By using matters of fact as the focal point for talk about nature, 
Boyle believed experimentalists would be protected from reproach; if their intellectual 
views were unpalatable, the matter of fact was at fault, not the human being. A1l that was 
needed was that each member accept the matter of fact - causal explanations could take 
whatever form they wished. With the possibility of personal attack re1noved, civility 
would reign, even in the face of disagreen1ent about causes. Talk of causes was very 
worrisome for Boy1e.23 Shapin and Schaffer transformed a seen1ingly purely 
epistemological factor, Boyle's notion of the matter of fact , into a social factor as well. 
Here the reader should take pause to consider what l argued earlier regarding the 
importance of society in Shapin's picture of science in LAP. Scientific knowledge, 
according to Shapin, owes its acceptance to social conventions. ln this view, it is the 
human presentation of the claim that is more important than the actual epistemic content 
of the claim itself. Yet how is it that these social conventions are persuasive? The idea 
22 Schaffer and Shapin, LAP, p. 73. 
23 Schaffer and Shapin, LAP, pp. 65-69. 
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that knowledge gains shape and acceptance through social conventions needs to be linked 
to the third component idea of this reading of LAP: that (c) knowledge is intimately 
involved with the achievement of particular social and political aims. To do so, a number 
of steps are required. First, the reader needs a sense of the historical backdrop to Boyle's 
experimentalism. That backdrop was Restoration England. This then needs to be 
connected to Shapin and Schaffer's interpretation of experimentalism's political and 
social agendas. Next, a brief analysis of the particular features Shapin and Schaffer 
projected on society and their possible intellectual precursors in the thought of Karl Marx 
will indicate the sociological specificity of LAP's interpretation: the model of society in 
LAP was but one possible sociological approach. Finally, focus on the moral imperative 
in scientific knowledge that emerges from this sociological construal will be required, 
thus revealing a Shapinian mechanism constructed to n1eet the Strong Programme demand 
for showing the "social causation" behind knowledge claims. The social structure of 
Boyle' s world made certain political goals imperative, and the force that guided the 
members of the community towards those goals was morality. 
In LAP, Shapin and Schaffer honed in on how Boyle and Hobbes acted out their 
historical roles during the Restoration ( 1660-1 685). Two key themes in this period were 
the fear of absolutist tyranny and the challenge of establishing religious tolerance. Taking 
place in the second quarter of the seventeenth century, the English Civil War, fought 
between Royalists and Parliamentarians, led to the regicide of Charles I in 1 649 and the 
subsequent creation of the British Republic, divided into the Commonwealth ( 1649-1653) 
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and the Protectorate ( 1653-1660) periods with Oliver Cromwell the leading political and 
military figure. This was followed by the reestablishment of the Stuart dynasty, with 
Charles ll taking the throne in May 1660. As one historian has commented, the 
Restoration was a difficult time, for it was an attempt to reestablish a monarchical systen1 
in a society that had spilled much blood to get away from just such a system. In particular, 
one of the great fears driving the Parliamentarians in the Civil War had been the perceived 
a~solutism of Charles I and his system of "Personal Rule," a system which bypassed and 
evaded the English Parliament. Therefore, Charles II needed to n1aintain great respect for 
Parliament and handle carefu]]y the monarch-Parliament relationship. In general, the 
political culture was tense, with the astute Charles II keeping the situation contained. 
Further, a key flash point throughout the seventeenth century was the issue of religion, 
particularly the management of the variety of Protestant sentiment within the Church of 
England and dealing with the widespread fear of Ron1an Catholicism. Fear of absolutism 
and varying attitudes toward religious pluralism cut across society; for instance, both the 
Parliamentarian and Royalist camps in the Civil War consisted of a mix of nobility, gentry 
and other social and economic classes. Religious sentiment fired both camps, and the 
proliferation of religious fundamentalism was seen as one reason why civil war had raked 
the country.24 
24 See David L. Smith, A History of the British lsles: The Double Crown, (Oxford: 
BlackweJl, 1998): passim. 
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It was in the political and social milieu of Restoration England that Shapin and 
Schaffer's answer for Boyle's antipathy to causal explanation lay. They provided the 
following interpretation. Boyle was a noble. During the Civil War, the nobility had been 
torn into those who wanted the kingship abolished and those who supported ··absolutist 
royal authority. Many members of the nobility realized that their social status was 
predicated on a monarchical society, but realized too that the power they enjoyed could 
exist only under a king whose rule was less than absolute. Fu11her, the nobility was also 
deeply frightened by the rifts which religious debate had caused in English society. They 
wanted to maintain their Christianity, while avoiding religious divisions. So, to preserve 
their social status the nobility had three key interests: have a king on the English throne; 
make sure the king did not exercise absolute power; and restore the power of the Church. 
Shapin and Schaffer argued that Boyle was devoted to these interests. 25 
In this context, Shapin and Schaffer keyed their discussion on the issue of dissent. 
The political and religious leadership of the nobility perceived that the strife of the Civil 
War originated mainly in the proliferation of "subjects' beliefs."26 Differing views of 
religion and politics led to radicalism, which in turn led to strife. Nobles like Boyle strove 
to find a way to accommodate differing opinions, but within confines that would prevent 
civil conflict from erupting. To this end, ideas of discipline and limited forms of tolerance 
became popular among some segments of the nobility. Variations in Protestant Christian 
25 Schaffer and Shapin, LAP, Chapter Vll, passin1. 
26 Schaffer and Shapin, LAP, p. 298. 
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belief, for instance, as long as they exhibited a general acceptance of God's existence and 
authority, as well as a hatred of Catholicism, were permissible. There was space for a 
degree of pluralism within the Protestant religious community. Under ce1tain restrictions, 
a variety of opinions were permissible. If individuals did not accept a Protestant God, 
however, they were banished from discussion and their ideas suppressed.27 
According to Shapin and Schaffer, experimentalisn1 and its accompanying 
~'pctrine of probabilism worked in this direction. Like the relaxed confirmism demanded 
of the individual vis-a-vis a Protestant God, the experin1entalist demanded only that the 
individual acknowledge the matter of fact as the supreme element in knowledge. Boyle 
asserted that nature was God's creation, and that those things witnessed in experiment 
were expressions of his will. Shapin and Schaffer maintained that Boyle and his fellows 
were trying to move agency away fron1 human individuals to a divinely created physical 
world. This move founded Boyle's causal pluralism. According to his reasoning, God 
could have structured a plethora of causes behind one perceived effect - only He knew the 
causes. Humans were not to step on His epistemological turf by suggesting that they had 
absolute knowledge of causes. So Boylean experimentalists were to avoid ardent 
attachment to causes, for such had brought about the internecine conflagrations of 
seventeenth-century Britain. It simply was not the experimentalist's duty to advance 
causal argument in his work (ahhough he might indulge himself in such speculation in his 
27 Schaffer and Shapin, LAP, pp. 283-284, 289-290, 298-310. Also see 
'~.Latitudinarianism," The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church, ed. F.L. Cross 
(Oxford: Oxford University, 1997). 
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spare time). The experimentalist's fear of absolutism in knowledge was an 
epistemological parallel to the noble's fear of the king wielding absolute power. Such 
power removed the possibility of the way of life of the nobility. For Shapin and Schaffer, 
this correlation between experimentalist rhetoric and the aristocratic social propaganda 
was more than just a coincidence: experimentalisn1 was a "solution to the problem of 
social order." By articulating and enforcing a doctrine that placed the ultimate power over 
human ends outside humans in God and His Creation, the nobility could defeat the idea 
that individual opinion should guide behaviour. Experimentalism was to show that 
political stability and diversity of opinion could peacefully coexist. In short, "[n]o isolated 
powerful individual authority should impose belief' on the philosophical community or 
on the political community. Boyle had specific political goals that would protect his social 
position, and his experimentalist philosophy served those ends.28 
Consider son1e features of Shapin and Schaffer's strife-ridden society, where 
historical agents struggle to maintain or overthrow "social position" and advance 
"political goals." In its most basic characteristics, it is tense, competitive, and 
antagonistic. The antagonism is founded on groups of individuals who share common 
social origins and therefore strive for common political ends; the existence of different 
social groups holding differing levels of political power and influence fires this 
antagonism. Importantly, the tension and strife of this Shapinian-Schafferian society 
emerges from the battle for political dominance. Knowledge is but one component in a 
28 Schaffer and Shapin, LAP, pp. 139-140, 147, 298-319; quote p.298. 
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larger social-political battlefield, and for Shapin and Schaffer its vicissitudes and 
development melded cleanly into the large-scale backdrop. Although Shapin n1ainly 
forged his thought under Strong Programme tutelage, the sociology of knowledge 
pedigree goes back further yet (and beyond the scope of this thesis) at least to Karl 
Mannheim, and through him to the influence of Karl Marx, who Isaiah Berlin called the 
"true father ... of modern sociology."29 This observation is relevant because it speaks 
p~ofoundly to the character of the project Shapin and Schaffer set themselves and shows 
the specific tradition in which their understanding of sociology operated. Two points need 
to be made to draw out the significance of this observation: first, a basic exan1ination of 
the relationship between society and thought in the Marxian universe; and second, a 
general, circumstantial argument that Shapin was well positioned to be influenced by this 
atmosphere of Marxist critique during the forn1ative years of his intellectual training. 
Following the argument in Chapter 2 that the efforts of Kuhn, the Strong 
Programme, and Shapin were directed towards giving history, via sociology, a central role 
in understanding science, then it should be no surprise that the imprint of Marx is 
apparent in a book such as LAP. Marx's sociological doctrine of "historical n1aterialism" 
gave a huge push to social history, particularly in drawing attention to the influence of 
economics on the social structure. The most important point of this doctrine is that those 
who control economic power - often referred to as the "means of production" - forn1 a 
29 Isaiah Berlin, Karl Marx: His Life and Environment, 3rd ed. (New York: Tin1e, 
1963): p. 130. 
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social group or "class" which in turn controls political power; in the case of capitalism, 
the economic system which Marx identified as currently obtaining, the "bourgeoisie" was 
the group in command. Those who were outside of this class were the exploited masses, a 
Hproletariat" (in the capitalist phase) who the bourgeoisie used for their labour and the 
accumulation of wealth. The social-political structure in this model is completely 
economically determined, a fact which is of the utn1ost relevance to those interested in the 
history of ideas. In short (and grossly simplified for my purposes here), Marx saw the play 
of economics and class as the material of history, whereas the thought of human beings 
formed a Hsuperstructure" atop this material foundation. For Marx, the majority of this 
thought was the imposition of the rationalizations or "mystifications" of the ruling elite on 
the masses in order to stabilize the contemporary economic order of things in their (the 
don1inant class's) favour; combined with the ruling class's political institutions, habits, 
morals and other ways of living, a whole "ideology" existed that, if adopted universally, 
would allow the tuling class to maintain its ascendence. The oppressed classes needed to 
recognize the economic system that determined their position in society and their ensuing 
exploitation if they were to build an intellectual system - i.e. one based on the dictates of 
Marxism itself- that would aid them in fomenting revolution and overthrowing their 
oppressors. In this schema, then, ideas have little value in and of themselves, but are 
expressions of the desire to gain or maintain power, depending on one's sociallocation.30 
30 Berlin, Marx, pp. 101-130. lt should be pointed out that Marx primarily attacked 
economics, the tool bourgeois intellectuals applied n1ost ruthlessly or ineptly (depending 
on their consciousness of the nature of capitalism) to extend their n1ental sway; he saw 
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It seems that Marx did not intend this analysis to be applied to science 
immoderately, as he cited science and human rational faculties as tools in the struggle 
against exploitation and class dominance. 31 However, the universality with which he 
applied the above critique to all other elements of bourgeois culture meant that, in the 
hands of sociologists of knowledge, science- an activity plied primarily by the moneyed 
classes, those with the leisure time to invest in such investigations - too might prove 
~~enable to such a critique. I do not want to say Shapin or even the Strong Programme 
therefore practised a strict Marxian form of history; reading more vulgar Marxian 
accounts, such as a Boris Hessen, promptly makes it clear that the Strong Progran1me saw 
greater variety in society than simply two predominant classes of oppressed and 
oppressors.32 However, the parallels are striking: Boyle, a men1ber of Restoration 
England's power elite, attempted to buttress institutions, such as the Church and noble 
other fields of knowledge as less significant in capitalist exploitation. For some 
interpreters, this meant that the dominant menta lite did not affect all fields of intellectual 
endeavour equally profoundly - those farther from the means of controlling the systen1 
were less touched by class politics and consciousness. Such a remark has bearing on how 
deeply the social structure might affect esoteric fields of science. See Robert J. Antonio, 
"Materialism," Encyclopedia of Sociology, Vol. 3, 2nd ed., eds. Edgar F. Borgotta and 
Rhonda J. V. Montgomery (New York: Macmillan, 2000): p. 1783. 
31 Berlin, Marx, p. I 16. This thrust in Marx's thinking was somewhat countered 
by a conviction that bourgeois culture could not but affect science in some way. See 
Richard W. Miller, "Marxist Philosophy of Science," Routledge Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, Vol. 6, Ed. Edward Craig (London: Routledge, 1 998): p. 147. 
32 Boris Hessen, The Social and Economic Roots of Newton's 'Principia' (New 
York: Howard Fertig, 1971 ): passin1. (Originally published in Science at the Cross Roads, 
1931 ). 
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privilege, that advanced his material interests through his natural philosophy; whereas 
Hobbes, on the other hand, used his natural philosophic ideas to attack those institutions 
from which his social standing disbarred him. Most importantly, a sort of Marxian 
antagonism obtained throughout LAP, as a gutsy, no-holds-barred attitude reigned 
between the various groups of society. What can be said comfortably is that Shapin and 
Schaffer were inspired by a Marxian ethic in LAP.33 
Such inspiration was readily available during Shapin's formative intellectual 
years. Circumstantial evidence for this is clear in Robert Young's call for a "radical" 
historiography of science in an essay that in1plicitly sheds some light on the origins of 
Shapin's sociological thinking. As Young pointed out, many intellectuals in the Western 
den1ocracies questioned the liberal institutions around then1 during the late 1960s and 
1 970s. Shapin's intellectual n1entality springs from this n1ilieu: he con1pleted his graduate 
work in the early 1 970s; further, in both in LAP and elsewhere, he described science as a 
liberal institution, and described some of the influences to which he turned to develop an 
intellectual standpoint to express his dissatisfaction with contemporary science.34 Young 
33 lt is also worth noting that Marx's belief in the materialistic determination of 
human thought - that humanity's material conditions determine their consciousness and 
not vice versa - also provides some mechanism for the Bloorian notion of "social 
causation." For Marx, the superstructures of human thought that grow atop the social-
economic foundations of human existence could arise either consciously or 
unconsciously. Perhaps to some degree, Bloor and subsequently Shapin failed to 
articulate a mechanisn1 for social causation as they presupposed such a materialist social 
influence on human thought. See Berlin, Marx, p. 1 10. 
34 For instance, see the remarks questioning liberal institutions in LAP, pp. 343-
344, and his ren1arks in the foreward to DanielS. Greenburg, The Politics of Pure 
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also identified the Marxian origins of much socially founded history of science, and 
announced the need that existed in the 1970s for a more sophisticated articulation of how 
class and society, traditionally framed as external factors, affected the actual contents of 
scientific knowledge.35 The Strong Programme and Shapin's subsequent scholarship were 
responses to the same urge. 36 Shapin's earlier scholarship handled notions of class and 
class struggle much more explicitly,:n and provides grounds for seeing LAP in a similar 
' 
1i~ht. What resulted in LAP were social groups that resembled social c1asses. For science 
was a result of social struggle, whether it was between Hobbes and Boyle, Mechanic's 
Institutes and a wayward proletariat, or moral philosophers and radical phrenologists.38 
Science, New edition (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1999): pp. xv-xxi, particularly xv, 
. . . 
XV11-XV111, XX-XXI. 
35 Robert M. Young, Darwin's Metaphor: Nature's Place in Victorian Culture 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1985): pp. 164-247, and particularly pp. 212-213 for 
Young's comments on scholarly doubts regarding liberal institutions, and pp. 170, 200-
202 for his words on the need for new historiographical tools. 
36 Should any doubt exist on this head, please note Barnes' syn1pathetic treatment 
of Marx and Marxian notions of social structure in lnterests and the Growth of 
Knowledge (London: Routledge and K. Paul, 1977): p. 47; and also Young's comments 
in Darwin's Metaphor, pp. 244-245, on the Marxist potential in the writings of Mary 
Douglas, to which the Strong Programme often turned for motivation and leadership. 
37 For instance, see Barry Barnes and Steven Shapin, "'Science, Nature and 
Control: Interpreting Mechanics' Institutes," Social Studies in Science 7 ( 1977): passim, 
or Steven Shapin, "The Pottery Philosophical Society, 1819-1835: An Examination of the 
Cultural Uses of Provincial Science," Science Studies 2 (1972): passin1. 
38 The criticisms of G.N. Cantor are particularly apposite to understanding the 
social theory underlying Shapin's work on phrenology, and this can be extended to LAP. 
See Cantor, "A Critique of Shapin's Social Interpretation of the Edinburgh Phrenological 
Debate," Annals of Science 33 ( 1975): pp. 245-256. 
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Shapinian scientists' views of the natural world were mediated by social status. Shapin 
was not an explicit Marxist, but the ideas that he developed in LAP reveal a Marxian 
tincture. 
LAP resembled the work of social and intellectual historian Christopher Hill in 
this regard. Hill's scholarship showed how the seventeenth century in England was 
populated with all sorts of exotic-sounding political entities struggling to gain supremacy 
in the conditions of bourgeois revolution. Diggers, Fifth Monarchists, Levellers, 
Presbyters, Anabaptists - all struggled to defend their social interests. 39 Shapin and 
Schaffer added the experimentalists to this list.40 Many of Shapin's earlier writings had 
discussed how scientific societies directly expressed class interests in the setting of social 
and economic tumult. The middle class of North Staffordshire in the early nineteenth 
century gathered together under the aegis of the Pottery Philosophical Society to talk 
science, a hobby which they hoped would emphasize and enliven their leisured existence. 
Science let them focus their minds on God's wondrous nature, while also allowing them 
to learn about new ways to build wealth through scientific innovation. lt also socialized 
the middle class, giving them a forum to muster their strength against the old-guard of 
39 Christopher Hill, The World Turned Upside Down: Radical ldeas During the 
English Revolution (New York: Viking, 1972): passim; and Intellectual Origins of the 
English Revolution (Oxford: Clarendon, 1965): passim. 
40 The origins of this placement are visible in the writings of James R. Jacob and 
Margaret Jacob. See, for example, J . R. Jacob, HThe ldeological Origins of Robert 
Boyle' s Natural Philosophy," Journal of European Studies 2 ( 1972): passim. 
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aristocrats.41 Similarly, the middle class, from around 1825 onwards, established 
"Mechanics' Institutes" to focus, control and harness the working class. Science would 
smooth out the rough edges of the hard-drinking and morally derelict proletariat, in1prove 
their productivity, and keep then1 distracted from movements that sought to work them 
into a revolutionary, anti-bourgeois fervour. 42 In LAP, the Royal Society took on a similar 
role. It was a rallying point for the Protestant gentry and nobility. It served as a vehicle for 
tHe promotion of the ideals that protected their social, economic and political position. 
Science grew out of social needs, and the model of social needs Shapin and Schaffer 
devised gave precedence to the role of social strife and tension between economically 
differentiated social groups. 
With this background, Shapin saw an interconnection between 
philosophical/scientific systems and social-political stratagen1s. Historians unsympathetic 
to a sociological history of science might describe such parallels as n1ere coincidence and 
classify them as external factors that did not influence (in the case of true knowledge 
claims) the internal epistemic content of science, as was discussed in Chapter 2.43 Shapin, 
however, was inclined to see them as more substantial. Building on the work of social and 
cultural anthropologists like Mary Douglas, Shapin turned the coincidence interpretation 
41 Shapin, "Pottery Philosophical Society," pp. 311-315, 318-320, 328, 335-336. 
42 Barnes and Shapin, "Interpreting Mechanics' Institutes," pp. 38, 40. 
43 An example of the "arationality" principle at work, with which the syn1metry 
postulate of Bloor's four tenets of the Strong Progran1n1e ain1ed to deal. 
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on its head and turned parallels into ''homologies:" such parallels were not coincidences, 
but shared a common social origin. Because of this, such homologies between philosophy 
and social identity should be expected. Doing science, in his view, was a way of 
developing and reinforcing one's social image. Through n1aking particular knowledge 
claims, usually in opposition to some other group's beliefs, the social group solidified 
their unity. It was very much a team-versus-team view, and knowledge exercises like 
science aimed at reshaping the world in the image of each social group's assumptions 
about what the world was like, and how hun1an beings should live in regard to that 
reality.44 
This particular sociological background and theoretical equipment convinced 
Shapin and Schaffer of the third component we are analysing: that science was a social 
and political tooL This a1lowed them to argue that Boyle's experimentalism had an 
explicit political and moral dimension. The importance of this must be emphasized, for it 
is the clearest manifestation of Bloor's tenet of social causation in hun1an knowledge that 
was mentioned in Chapter 2. Shapin and Schaffer argued that Boyle construed his 
material, literary and social technologies in such a way as to n1ake it a moral 
responsibility for Boyle's audience to acquiesce to the matter of fact. This morality was 
shaped around the cultural mores of the noble Boyle and his socially elite peers. Thus, 
those most likely to accept the matter of fact would come from Boyle' s social class. Boyle 
44 Steven Shapin, "Homo phrenologicus: Anthropological Perspectives on an 
Historical Problem," Natural Order: Historical Studies in Scientific Culture, eds. Steven 
Shapin and Barry Barnes (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1979): pp. 46, 60. 
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had active political goals; experimentalism expressed these goals; those who shared 
Boyle's standards of moral comportn1ent would accept the social conventions of his 
philosophical clique, thus making the ex peri mentally generated matter of fact the 
epistemic champion of the nobility. Thus united, the nobility could carve out a "calm 
space"45 within Restoration society. The resulting tranquillity was to be both 
epistemological and social. Boyle the philosopher could continue to make his knowledge-
c~:aims, unthreatened by pesky non-experimentalists like Hobbes, while Boyle the 
aristocrat could continue to live his privileged material existence, without being subject to 
the overthrow of the mob or the stifling absolutism of the king.46 
Hobbes' opposition to Boylean experimentalism was cast in terms of social 
causation as well. He was an outsider, whose ideas the nobles widely scorned as those of 
an atheist, a materialist and a threat to the peace. To call someone a ''Hobbist" in the 
decades following the Civil War in England was a grave accusation.47 According to 
Shapin and Schaffer, Hobbes opposed Boyle on matters of the vacuum and causation of 
visible phenomena because he was not part of Boyle's social set, and therefore did not 
share his social interests. Most poignant for Shapin and Schaffer was Hobbes' tireless 
fight against Church power in the secular political sphere. Hobbes contended that peace 
would only come once the king ruled absolutely and all obeyed his will. For Shapin and 
45 Schaffer and Shapin, LAP, p. 7 6. 
46 Schaffer and Shapin, LAP, Chapter Vll, passim. 
47 Smith, Double Crown, p. 240. 
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Schaffer's Hobbes, there could be no variation of opinion on how to rule if one wanted 
peace, and variation could be avoided through universal subn1ission to one ruler. Hobbes 
had witnessed Church figures attempting to gain earthly political power during the Civil 
War and after. Thus, Boyle's attempt to give the weakened Church a new crutch through 
experiment was anathema to Hobbes. According to Shapin and Schaffer, Hobbes invested 
the monarch with absolute power in his ideal polity - even the power to determine the 
structure of know ledge of nature. While Boyle put hun1an fate in the hands of God, spirits 
and other unearthly, immaterial entities, Hobbes put the prosperity and hope of humanity 
in the hands of its ruler. Hobbes subjected theology and natural philosophy to the 
philosophy of the polity. Hobbes saw a11 knowledge as human-1nade, and a ruler, once 
properly invested with absolute authority and the complete subn1ission of the people, 
could establish a natural philosophy to explain all causes which would brook no dissent, 
for to do so would be to challenge the unchallengeable authority of the king. Human 
knowledge of the natural world depended on civic order, and civic order would never 
emanate from the natural world, only from the social world. Knowledge was a product of 
society- society was not a product of knowledge. This hierarchy was a central ingredient 
of Shapin and Schaffer's view of scientific knowledge.48 
To help elucidate the consequences of this interpretation, a step-by-step recipe for 
Shapinian knowledge-making in LAP is useful. First, humans have social needs, which 
they struggle to achieve through creating political systems; they are thus goal-oriented 
48 Schaffer and Shapin, LAP, pp. 92-107, 150-154, 310-319, 320-33 I. 
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creatures, and this goal-orientation takes shape in a context where different groups of 
people hold different levels of power and wealth. The second stage in the process is that 
each group constructs its particular knowledge systems from the views it has about the 
world and how humans fit into it. Knowledge is formed to help achieve these social and 
political ends. Each group within society has conventions about the way society and 
nature are/should be. These 44Cultures of conventions" shape behaviour, and it is on this 
b~sis that members within that culture build and accept what they take as valid 
knowledge. This gives knowledge its conventional character- a knowledge claim must 
reflect these conventions, or risk being ignored. The end of the process is reached when 
the sponsoring social clique wins out in the social-struggle lottery, then its system of 
knowledge becomes an institution, its claims becon1ing Hreality." Its survival is a result of 
the success of the social group that propounded it. The role of nature is completely 
secondary, even seemingly inconsequential, in the success of a knowledge clain1 in the 
pages of LAP. Knowledge for Shapin and Schaffer was a social rallying point, somewhat 
similar to a team sport. Social needs determined episten1ic choices. Like other brands of 
knowledge -philosophical, religious, folkloric or mythological - features of science such 
as truth and objectivity, are seen as "accomplishments, as historical products, as actors' 
judgements and categories."49 Shapinian-Schafferian science has little to distinguish it as 
a unique and privileged form of human epistemic activity. 
49 Schaffer and Shapin, LAP, p. 14. 
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3.3 LAP's Image of Science: A Critical Appraisal 
It becomes increasingly evident when reading LAP that Shapin and Schaffer 
wanted to show that the challenges Hobbes presented to Boyle's experimentalism are · 
fundamental to alJ knowledge at all times, in all places, and in all cultures: knowledge is a 
constellation of social conventions that human agents use as a tool to accomplish social 
ends. This idea appears explicitly in the final chapter. 5° To better approach this 
conclusion, it is worth examining the core ideas of LAP critically. 
In portraying experiment as an inconclusive way of knowing, Shapin made a 
philosophical claim. 51 Thus, it is appropriate to subject it to some philosophical 
consideration. To that end, the notions of Hontological equivalency" and Hepistemological 
sensitivity" will be introduced to throw light on the problen1. What will appear is that 
social factors have varying degrees of influence on scientific problems, depending on the 
very nature of the question being asked and object being studied. With the 
inconclusiveness of experiment thus amended, 1 will proceed to a critical examination of 
the sociological component of Shapin and Schaffer's work. A number of problems with 
fusing the social and the epistemic will be brought out. l wiJl contend that Shapin's 
portrayal of society is limited by his tendency to see social factors as largely strife-ridden 
confrontations between different social communities. Then l will examine the social 
50 Schaffer and Shapin, LAP, Chapter VJll, passim. 
51 Michael Friedman, "On the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge and its 
Philosophical Agenda," Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 29 ( 1998): pp. 239-
242. Please see Chapter 2 for more details. 
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environments which Boyle and, in particular, Hobbes faced to show the difficulties of 
applying sociological explanations to all epistemic items. In the end, it will be seen that 
intellectual obstinance - the human agent's unwillingness to alter epistemic viewpoints 
based on his or here social interests - is fundamental to the world view Shapin and 
Schaffer espoused in LAP. 
First there is the issue of the epistemological inconclusiveness of experin1ent. One 
df the key argumentative then1es of LAP was the disagreement between Boyle and 
II 
Hobbes over the use of experiment in philosophy; this disagreement involved both the 
interpretation of specific experiments and the legitin1acy of experiment as a general route 
to securing knowledge of the physical universe. The results Boyle extracted from his 
experimental handling of the Torricellian space were not the san1e as Hobbes'. According 
to Shapin and Schaffer, because Hobbes den1anded that causes of phenomena be posited, 
whereas Boyle felt the search for causes led to ungovernable dispute, they approached the 
interpretation of experiments differently, and therefore differing interpretations followed. 
Thus, Hobbes argued that the air-pump could never be conceived as making a vacuum 
because his natural philosophic system did not allow for such; Boyle, on the other hand, 
found the plenum-vacuum debate tiresome and divisive, and therefore cast his 
interpretation in terms of the spring of the air, pushing aside final answers on the 
existence or non-existence of the vacuum. More generally, and more profoundly, Shapin 
and Schaffer argued that Hobbes, based on a familiarity with experiment and his own 
causalJy based method, saw experiment as something distinct fron1 philosophy. For them, 
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"[ w ]hat Hobbes was claiming was that the systematic doing of experiments was not to be 
equated with philosophy: going on in the way Boyle recommended for experimentalists 
was not the same thing as philosophical practice."52 Thus, hypothetically, even if Boyle 
and Hobbes had agreed on an interpretation of some experiment, such agreement would 
have been limited, as Hobbes saw the role of experiment in deciding natural philosophic 
debates as limited. 
What the reader needs to take into consideration when examining this theme is 
Shapin's Strong Programme background. He and Schaffer were looking at knowledge as a 
historical, sociological phenon1enon: if a group of people believed something, then it 
could count as knowledge, and thus the historian could probe the social foundations of the 
group to establish historical interpretations of that knowledge system. The 
historiographical consequence of this approach was a broadening of the historian's scope. 
Previously ignored scientific arguments or systems, such as Hobbes', were in fact relevant 
to the history of science. Fron1 this, the idea that experiment was inconclusive followed 
almost axiomatically, for on sociological grounds the n1ere persistence of a group's 
objections to a knowledge claim would constitute grounds for deen1ing the claim 
indecisive. 
With this in mind, the question of the necessity of philosophical considerations in 
historiographical practice arises. For Shapin and Schaffer, as well as their Strong 
Programme mentors, philosophy was too inflexible to be of historiographical value. 
52 Schaffer and Shapin, LAP, p. 129. 
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Knowledge systems vary with place and time, yet the general thrust of much philosophy 
of science was to show why one particular set of knowledge claims is better than others. 
This results in a chauvinism for those who have inherited the culture that such a 
philosophy of science aims to justify. Shapin and Schaffer addressed this problem 
eloquently in their talk of "member's" versus "stranger's accounts. "53Y et it is not so clear 
that profoundly philosophical considerations need be so inflexible. In fact, they need be 
'• 
~p more timeless and universal than the claim that all knowledge can be analyzed in terms 
of the social environments where it was born. Such considerations n1ight integrate with a 
moderated sociological approach and result in a powerful form of expression for the 
history of science. 
Those syn1pathetic to Shapin and Schaffer's sociological approach n1ight not see 
the need for such philosophical revision. Nonetheless, it is required, if only to moderate 
the seemingly inevitable conclusion that the authors intended their readership to reach: 
Boyle's natural philosophic project survived because of the social preeminence of his 
allies and the support they gave him. Is this in fact the only reason? Anticipating the 
Strong Programme qualification that social causes are not the only causes, can it therefore 
be said that such social factors were, as Shapin and Schaffer intended, the primary 
reasons? What will be seen is that a pair of philosophically devised historiographical 
tools, "ontological equivalence" and "epistemological sensitivity," suggest a significant 
53 Schaffer and Shapin, LAP, pp. 4-7. This clearly speaks to the impartiality 
requirement of the Strong Programme- see Chapter 2. 
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role for epistemological factors. Consider Boyle's and Hobbes' differing interpretations of 
the Torricellian space. Could Hobbes' rejected theory on the Torricellian space be granted 
the same legitimacy as Boyle's? Certainly from a purely scientific standpoint this question 
poses difficulties, as debates of the plenum versus the vacuum have yet to be answered, 
and, counter to Boyle's exhortations, are crucial, for instance, to twenty-first-century 
discussions of cosmology.54 
To start the argument, I will put the problem this way: both Hobbes and Boyle are 
looking at the same historical event "before their eyes," so to speak. 55 Yet their 
interpretations of that event differ. Shapin and Schaffer argued on sociological grounds 
that Boyle and Hobbes had different social aims and backgrounds, which resulted in 
different natural philosophical outlooks, and which therefore ultin1ately ended in different 
interpretations of what they have witnessed. 
Can their differences be seen in another light? Yes, and this is where the notion of 
"ontological equivalence" comes in. This notion turns on the idea that the experience of 
an event and the interpretation of it are two ontologically distinct entities; put simply, one 
54 Consider, for instance, the concept of "vacuum energy;" see Peter Coles, 
Cosmology: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University, 2001 ): pp. 91-92. 
55 Historically, of course, Hobbes was not present at any such exercise of the air-
pump, but for argumentative purposes, this need not concern us, for as Shapin and 
Schaffer argued, Hobbes did have a very good understanding of experimental practice and 
had taken considerable pains to familiarize himself with Boyle's work; even had he been 
present, Shapin and Schaffer's interpretation suggests they still would have interpreted 
the experiment differently, because of their different natural philosophic beliefs and 
political agendas. 
77 
is a mass of organized sensory data, whereas the other is a linguistic assemblage, which 
for the sake of convenience may be labelled description. Description is a different sort of 
thing than the sensory experience from which it derives. Consider a seemingly simple 
example: no one would mistaken a poem about a flower for the flower it aims to describe 
- they are obviously two different entities, whatever their descriptive interrelationships. 
But what about a scientific description of that flower? lt seen1s often that such a scientific 
i d~scription is taken to describe what a flower is, and is not simply seen as a reaction to a 
flower. However, from the perspective of ontological equivalence, it as much an entity 
distinct from the flower itself as the poem. A example from LAP will help bring this point 
forward. For instance, consider Shapin's insistence that acquiescence to Boyle's spring of 
the air was not the same as observing the changing level of the n1ercury in the void-in-the-
void experiment. This is sound because to observe something is not the same as · 
describing what is observed. In effect, it places a "gap" between thing interpreted and 
interpretation, a gap which human agents attempt to bridge with descriptions. Such a gap 
precludes a final, conclusive association of one interpretation with one event; in other 
words, the Jack of ontological equivalence between the two things means that the thing 
observed does not inexorably lead to a particular interpretation of it, but pern1its a 
multiplicity of plausible descriptions. To some degree, this too can explain the epistemic 
variety evident in human history- sociology is not alone in this regard. Further, the 
problem of the lack of ontological equivalence between the thing observed and the 
linguistically couched description of that observational experience gives credence to 
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Shapin's challenge to Boyle's experiment -theory aiTangement, but not solely on 
sociological grounds: the consequence is that the gap between observation and description 
may be seen as a universal feature of human experience, not reducible simply to 
sociological terms, and therefore open to other forms of analysis such as normative, 
philosophical analysis. Finally, and not least, the reader n1ust be wary about Shapin and 
Schaffer's intentions - were they saying, or at times intimating, that the scientific 
endeavour was political endeavour? Such a thesis would be untenable for anyone who 
takes the notion of ontological equivalence seriously, and certainly would not privilege 
sociology over other intellectual tools. 
What needs to be seen next is whether the gap between the thing interpreted and 
its interpretation itself might vary. For if, to invoke a spatial n1etaphor, the gap between 
the two can vary in distance, then n1aybe one might plausibly state that one interpretation 
better fits the event being interpreted than another. lt is on this head that the shortcomings 
of Shapin and Schaffer's approach become manifest. This is because the Strong 
Programme in its own way accepts such a lack of ontological equivalence, but takes it for 
granted that it has the same effect on all systems of knowledge, i.e. rendering them all 
equally open to redefinition as bodies of collectively held belief that can be compared to 
one another in terms of the power of the social groups that prop them up. Yet if the size of 
gap between thing interpreted and an interpretation of that thing varies, then possibly the 
Strong Programme sociological approach might have run into a serious limitation. Such a 
variance in distance might be intellectually appreciable for human agents, and they n1ay 
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take closeness or distance as further means to examine a claim and decide upon its worth. 
Such a critical ability on the part of human individuals would result in a severe reduction 
of the potency of purely sociological interpretation of the history of science. 
My intent is not to resurrect a dichotomy between the social and the intellectual. In 
fact, it is my contention that it is Shapin and Schaffer who have erected such a barrier. To 
put this in sharper terms, it seems Shapin and Schaffer saw nature as having a very lin1ited 
r~le in the generation of ideas. Consider it this way: nature presents a wonderful variety of 
events, but clearly there are boundaries to its experiential bounty. For instance, objects 
dropped on planet Earth do not fall up, they fall down (helium-filled balloons excepted); 
humans cannot live under the sea without technical aids; the sun rises and sets without 
consulting humans; whether it rains or shines is not my decision, nor yours. Additionally, 
human intellectual and sensory equipment do not detern1ine the course of nature, although 
human technologies may have a limited or haphazard effect (potentially disastrous, as in 
the case of climate change or nuclear war) on nature. To put all agency in the creative 
hands of hun1an communities seems gratuitous - mundane experience makes humans 
poignantly aware that nature lays constraints upon the descriptions observers generate, 
and the interface of humanity with nature seems to be at least as significant as the 
interface between humans in creating knowledge. Something, some external agency, is 
required upon which human descriptive powers may set to work. However, the lack of 
ontological equivalence between description and thing-described seemingly leaves the 
field open for draining reality of its epistemic significance: if no description can ever 
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exhaustively account for some phenomenon or entity, if there is not some one description 
which nature generates for human inquisitiveness to uncover, then how can one 
description, perhaps a scientific description, be said to be better or worse than others? 
One way to look at this is whether the interpretation is attempting to answer some 
question, and if so, what sort of question. For example, someone may want to know what 
is the relationship between the movement of the sun and the planets. lt seems clear that 
the best candidate response to this question is that the planets orbit the sun. However, a 
poem that places the Earth at the centre of the solar system, even of the universe, is not 
wrong in any simple way, unless it pretends to answer questions of celestial dynamics. 
Not all descriptions are equal in all circumstances- they all attempt to satisfy different 
human questions, different human longings. The absence of ontological equivalence 
between experience and interpretation provides humanity with an almost infinite capacity 
to interpret; this does not mean that it provides hun1anity with infinite experiential variety. 
One consequence of this for the historian is that he or she must determine exactly what 
the historical communities under examination were after. Sociological examination 
obviously has some lucid things to say on this head; for instance, on levels ranging fron1 
the surreptitious to the blatant, Boyle and Hobbes may have been attempting to use 
knowledge to achieve different social ends. However, on a more obvious level, it seems 
Hobbes and Boyle were likely after the same thing: the best possible explanation of the 
experiment in order to best describe natural phenomena. Achieving such an explanation in 
and of itself might help achieve other, associated goals; nonetheless, historians need to 
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recognize that in terms of human knowledge, Hobbes and Boyle had set themselves the 
same task, and therefore epistemic variety was not their aim, but a convincing, persuasive 
solution to a question about nature. 
Therefore, to supplement ontological equivalence a conception of 
"epistemological sensitivity," is required. This is basically a philosophical idiom with 
historiographical application that gives historians of science a way to deal with the breach 
~:ftween the historical event and its interpretation which the lack of ontological 
equivalence opens up. There are varying degrees of descriptive persuasiveness and 
conclusiveness. Consider again the description that says the known planets in our solar 
system orbit the sun. If one wants to know the interaction between the planets and the sun, 
this is the best description going. Others are possible and even useful. This description is 
not obvious, depending on sophisticated theoretical and observational techniques. Yet it is 
ludicrous to suggest its validity resides primarily in the power of a particular group of 
people to enforce it upon other groups. Or, from another angle, to say that the solar 
system, including the sun, orbits the Earth is just plain wrong. Using a number of 
techniques, theories, observations, and ultimately argun1ents, all but the n1ost obstinate 
humans could be shown the accuracy of this description. In other words, the description is 
not extremely epistemologically sensitive. 56 
56 The work of Otto Neugebauer provides a good reference to this issue. His 
exploration of ancient astronomy and mathematics, and the nun1erous descriptions of the 
heavens which are still accurate to this date, stands as the u1tin1ate example of the 
persistence of certain elen1ents of knowledge through long stretches of history and across 
a broad variety of cultures, and indeed throughout a variety of differing astronon1ical 
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Other elements of the current scientific outlook are not so secure. Acceptance of 
the Big Bang theory, for instance, is contested within the field of cosmology, and this very 
fact suggests that the relationship between available experimental and observational data 
and the theory are plagued by a rather serious ontological inequivalence. This is not 
simply a lack of data, however, as with any such large-scale event - large scale in both its 
occurrence in time and in overall cosmological significance - there is almost always going 
td: be the possibility for serious disagreement over fundamental definitions, entities and so 
on. Thus, there are numerous sound strategies for arguing against the Big Bang in ways 
that there are not for arguing against a heliocentric solar system. lt seems very clear that 
the conclusion that the earth orbits the sun will not change, no matter what crises the 
physics community experiences in coming decades; however, the survival of the Big Bang 
theory as it is now understood given, say, the disavowal of quantum physics as a 
theoretical cornerstone, is very questionable indeed. The case is similar with genetics, 
plate tectonics, and evolution by natural selection, each exposing varying degrees of 
epistemological sensitivity. In this case there is a relatively high level of epistemological 
sensitivity - without the theory, the Hmatters of fact," as Boyle would have called then1, 
would dissolve. The matter of fact of the planets orbiting the sun is not so 
epistemologically sensitive. 
systems. His works, however, do not negate the possibility of these different elements 
being imbued with different n1eanings at different times and places. See 0. Neugebauer, 
The Exact Sciences in Antiquity, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper, 1962): passin1. 
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Applied to the interpretation found in LAP, epistemological sensitivity casts Jight 
on issues of matter theory which Boyle and Hobbes contested. Indeed, they prove to be 
very epistemologically sensitive. The entities with which Hobbes and Boyle took the 
universe to be populated - corpuscles, fluid ethers, springs of the air and so on - did not 
describe anything readily observable. You see the sun in the sky and stand on the Earth 
regardless of their interrelations, but one could never hold the seventeenth-century 
rrfechanist' s corpuscle in one's hand, or even see it under a n1icroscope. The spring of the 
I 
air, the fluid ether- these were extrapolations, highly dependent on a particular theory that 
attaches to observations in the laboratory. This point must be emphasized: no 
seventeenth-century natural philosopher literally saw (to employ a visual metaphor) the 
spring of the air or a corpuscle. 57 Thus, matter theory is very episten1ologically sensitive: 
the niceties of theory impinge far more heavily upon matter theory than they do, for 
instance, on positing a sun-orbiting solar system. 
Concerning the Torricellian space, Boyle and Hobbes were dealing with an 
epistemologically sensitive problem; it is laudable for historians of science to not side 
with Boyle as "obviously correct" in the debate - Boyle was not "obviously" correct. 
However, epistemological sensitivity suggests that something more was going on than the 
simple in1position of Boy lean natural philosophic conclusions on the populace due to the 
power of his social clique vis-a-vis Hobbes'. The niceties differentiating Hobbes ' 
57 My thinking on this matter owes n1uch to Shapin's discussion of metonyn1ic 
relationships in "Cordelia' s Love: Credibility and the Social Studies of Science," 
Perspectives on Science: Historical, Philosophical, Social 3 ( 1995): pp. 261-266. 
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interpretation from Boyle's obviously did not provide much for interested audiences to 
show one bridged the ontological gap between interpretation and experiment more 
successfully than the other. However, Boyle's success in inventing and manipulating · 
experiments to show theoretical concepts "'in action" seen1s more supple than Hobbes' 
rationalistic enterprise. A hint of the failure of Shapin and Schaffer to appreciate a 
concept such as epistemological sensitivity in LAP can be found in this suppleness -
a~mittedly not a philosophically decisive term - is a theme they gave considerable 
significance in their Strong Programme sociology of science, which I shall caB 
"intellectual obstinacy." Before we move onto this component of the argument, let me 
conclude that the very possibility of recasting the Boyle-Hobbes controversy in terms of 
epistemological sensitivity shows the possibilities of a historiographical sensibility that 
takes both philosophy and sociology into consideration. And the in1portance of this will 
become clear below when both social and intellectual factors are shown to be crucial to 
Hobbes' failure to gain ultimate acceptance for his natural philosophic claims in 
seventeenth-century England. 
The issue of intel1ectual obstinancy is the most serious historiographical 
consequence of Shapin and Schaffer's lack of attention to epistemological sensitivity. 
What do 1 mean by intellectual obstinacy? By this 1 refer to the consequence of Shapin' s 
Strong Programme-derived maxim of studying knowledge - again, defined as collectively 
held belief- as a natural phenomenon. This entails that any acts that result in the creation 
of knowledge -assent, denial, argument, etc. - are worthy of study sin1ply because they 
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appeared in human epistemic history. There is not much objectionable here - surely all 
episodes have some intrinsic worth for scholarly study. When it becomes clear to the 
reader, however, that the obstinate refusal to alter one's intellectual standpoint in the face 
of overwhelming evidence to the contrary is seen as an epistemic act that speaks to the 
legitimacy of the overwhelming evidence's value, then it becon1es a concern, for such 
obstinance was probably noticeable also to contemporary audiences who would judge 
s~ch behaviour accordingly. This is exactly the case in LAP, where Shapin and Schaffer 
happily described Hobbes' obstinate refusal to accept the results of an experitnent that he 
had earlier cited as, if successful, an argument against his natural philosophy and in 
favour of Boyle's. 
When describing the idea of a crucial experiment, Shapin and Schaffer indicated 
how Hobbes still withheld assent despite Boyle's apparent success in proving a 
contentious experin1ental result. After many failed attempts, Boyle finally succeeded in 
having two pieces of marble separate from one another in the air-pump, which he 
demanded Hobbes acknowledge as proof of the pump's ability to create a vacuun1 and 
simultaneously of the power of the spring of the air to keep the two pieces of marble 
together in normal atn1ospheric conditions. Hobbes had explicitly stated that, should 
Boyle succeed in getting the n1arbles to separate, there would be no possibility of denying 
Boyle's hypothesis on air's spring. Shapin and Schaffer described Hobbes' reaction to 
Boyle meeting this challenge as follows: 
However, Hobbes did not recant. In the De cameron physiologicun1 of 1678, 
Hobbes still did not make any n1ention of Boyle's Hsuccessful" experiments on 
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cohesion in vacuo. He continued unconvinced and unrepentant. He still cited the 
cohesion of marbles as paradigmatic support for the plenist account. 58 
No reason was cited by which Hobbes n1ight have justified this move. Shapin and 
Schaffer saw this as an example of the failure of experiment to generate assent - Hobbes 
could, and did, deny the "conclusive" proof Boyle provided. 
True to their Strong Programme roots, Shapin and Schaffer were following 
Bloor's maxim of studying knowledge "purely as a natural phenomenon."59 ln their 
~~ 
I 
minds, the sort of obstinacy that characterized Hobbes' response to Boyle's experimental 
"success" was simply an observed component of human episten1ological behaviour. lt is 
not difficult to grant them this point- pride, folly, stubbornness seem universal features of 
the human character. What is more difficult to grant them is that it son1ehow shows any 
sort of failure in Boyle's method: if Hobbes was unwilling to accept the tern1s of a deal he 
himself articulated, then Hobbes was the worst for it. In terms of historical evidence to 
mark this as a socia11y recognized failure of Boyle's natural philosophy, Shapin and 
Schaffer failed to provide examples of any advocates of Hobbes' stepping forward to 
defend this act of intellectual obstinacy (which itself hints at the problem of Hobbes' 
exact social constituency, to be raised below), which, had they presented it, n1ight go 
some ways towards showing the accuracy of their sociological n1odel. Obviously others 
were persuaded of Boyle's success and Hobbes' failure, for Boyle's natural philosophic 
58 Schaffer and Shapin, LAP, p. 198. 
59 David Bloor, Knowledge and Social Jmagerv, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of 
Chicago, 1991 ): p. 5. 
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project went on to thrive, whereas Hobbes' disappeared into obscurity. In the end, this 
notion of intellectual obstinacy boils down to little more than an observation that pride, 
ignorance, and mean self-interest play a large role in human affairs. 
Intellectual obstinacy had a traceable pedigree in Shapin's writings. Scottish 
phrenologists and idealists both saw the same brains dissected, yet they refused to 
vindicate the other's interpretation.60 This quarrel had social origins, thus suggesting a 
f~ndamental opposition between epistemic views fron1 different parts of the social 
structure. This, for Shapin, was the key to the argument: one need not bend to another's 
claims about reality because those claims depended on a set of social experiences foreign 
to one' s own experience, and, because of the strife-ridden con1petition between social 
groups, possibly even detrimental to it. The in1plications of this stance extended not just 
to judgen1ents based on observation, but to all types of judgen1ent: n1athen1atical, logical, 
necessary, and so on. According to Shapin, 44the sociology of knowledge is built upon an 
appreciation of the contingent circumstances affecting the production and evaluation of 
scientific accounts. "61 These "contingent circumstances" were generally the judgement-
maker's social and political n1ilieu, and pa11icularly the interests one acquired through 
occupying a certain position in those milieus. Interests structured cognition; the scientist's 
60 Steven Shapin, ''The Politics of Observation: Cerebral Anatomy and Social 
Interests in the Edinburgh Phrenology Disputes," On the Margins of Science: The Social 
Construction of Rejected Knowledge, ed. Roy Wallis (Keele: Keele University, 1979): 
pp.l49-157. 
61 Steven Shapin, HHistory of Science and its Sociological Reconstructions," 
History of Science 20 ( 1981 ): p.l59. 
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"theoretical" interests (i.e. in proving the theory he or she espoused) determined the 
success or failure of experiments; Hprofessional vested interests" sorted good from bad 
theories and methodologies; interests in, for example, religion, made the boundary 
between science and non-science fluid; ideas for social and political organization guided 
the lines along which interpretation developed.62 Further, scientists might take ideas from 
other fields of knowledge, such as economics, and apply then1 to the natural world, using 
them as "resources" to fuel their explanations.63 From another angle, natural philosophers 
of the seventeenth century used knowledge about nature "to comment upon specific 
political events or the proper order of society."64 What this reliance of judgen1ent on 
social and cultural contingencies means is that no clain1 about nature has a necessary 
character. Many things can be said about nature, but in Shapinian science, there simply is 
no overarching canon of rationality or of intellectual conduct that makes a judgement 
universal, so there is no reason why one n1ust acquiesce to a particular account of nature. 
Through connecting this back into the discussion of episten1ologi~al sensitivity 
above, an interesting conclusion emerges: possibly, historical audiences may note 
obstinacy such as Hobbes' and "success" such as Boyle's and be swayed accordingly.65 
62 Shapin, "Sociological Reconstructions," pp.159, 164-165, 169-171, 188-189. 
63 Shapin, "Sociological Reconstructions," p.l77. 
64 Shapin, "Sociological Reconstructions," p.l81. 
65 Certainly, convincing portrayals of Hobbes' intellectual vicissitudes point to 
seventeenth-century audiences' assessments of his "extreme" materialisn1 and refusal to 
acknowledge mathen1atical error. See Douglas M. Jesseph, Squaring the Circle: The War 
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What makes this interesting is that both philosophy and sociology come out well in this 
conclusion: audiences may use rational and social criteria to assess knowledge claims; it 
is even possible that the rational tools employed may be socially derived. Thus, giving 
intellectual obstinacy an epistemological role as Shapin and Schaffer did distracted them 
from intellectually significant factors in the acceptance of knowledge claims. Stubborn 
refusal to assent cannot be placed on the same inte1lectua1 plain as attempts to directly 
a~dress opposing arguments. Such a conclusion is of the utmost importance to the success 
of the historian's craft. 
The philosophical sensibility above sheds critical light on the structure of society . 
proposed in LAP. For Shapin and Schaffer, its seems that the use of sociology in the 
history of science is predicated on a particular theoretical view of society as con1posed of 
mutually hostile social groups. Shapin saw knowledge as en1erging fron1 a strife-ridden 
social structure, and being subservient to the needs of the groups within that structure. 
Part of the Shapinian recipe is that nature itself plays a limited role in knowledge's growth 
- as has been described above, nature as shown through observation and experin1ent has a 
subsidiary role in the constitution of scientific knowledge: two individuals representing 
different social groups can look at the same experiment and conclude different things. 
Unfortunately, there is a tension here, a tension between the hun1an ability to know 
society and to know nature. For if society is to have formative power on the episten1ic 
between Hobbes and Wallis (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1999): pp. 276-277; and 
Noel Malcolm, "Hobbes and the Royal Society," Perspectives on Thomas Hobbes, eds. 
G. A. J. Rogers and Alan Ryan (Oxford: Clarendon, 1988): passim. 
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contentions of human beings, then there must be some mechanism that allows humans to 
ascertain, consciously or unconsciously, their social environs and to shape their 
knowledge claims accordingly. However, the Shapinian epistemology, relying as · 
described in Chapter 2 on the Strong Programn1e' s confidence in social causation, results 
in inconsistencies. If humans are barred from a perspicacious, intimate apprehension of 
the characteristics of nature, then how do they know the characteristics of the social 
structure? Unfortunately, no mechanism is supplied. Further, if they are in the same 
deficient position regarding knowing society as knowing nature, then how much 
significance can one attribute to the sociologically leaning historian's view that the 
structure of knowledge fo11ows the structure of society? After all, humans are as much a 
part of the natural world as they are the social world - perhaps their knowledge follows 
both? Shapin and Schaffer took detailed knowledge of the social structure for granted in a 
way that they would not let scientists take a detailed knowledge of physical reality for 
granted. 
Shapin and Schaffer premised LAP on a social structure which featured 
widespread competition and tension between different social groupings, while 
encouraging the reader to avoid correlating a particular description of nature with nature 
itself. Nowhere did Shapin and Schaffer prove that the seventeenth century had this 
particular social structure; even if one were willing to grant then1 this as proven,66 they 
66 As some of the historical background above has shown, homogenous class 
unity, for instance, was in no way a feature of the English Civil War; see Smith, Double 
Crown, pp. 129-130. For incisive comn1entary on the difficulties in pinning down class 
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nowhere explained how the historical agents in question, Hobbes and Boyle, themselves 
identified this structure. If the events Boyle and Hobbes observed in the air-pump were 
open to various interpretations, then why are their assessments of their personal locations 
in the social structure not subject to a similar variety of interpretations? Shapin and 
Schaffer assumed a finely attuned, accurate faculty of social knowledge, but denied such a 
faculty of natural knowledge. The reader needs to ask: how is knowing society different 
'• 
f~om knowing nature? Is it not possible that the process of extrapolation from the 
observed raw reality of human beings interacting with one another to a theoretical, 
sociological interpretation stating that such interaction is based on a class-based dynan1ic 
of social strife and tension may be the same as moving from the observed Ton·icellian 
space to the theoretical/factual claim of the spring of the air?67 
and its role in early modern British history, consult J. H. Hexter, "The Myth of the Middle 
Class in Tudor England" and "Storm Over the Gentry," Reappraisals in History: New 
Views on History and Society in Early Modern Europe (New York: Harper and Row, 
1961): pp. 71-116 and 117-152 respectively. 
67 The ontological equivalence and epistemological sensitivity concepts may help 
clarify this problen1. That humans interact with one another is undeniable, but that they 
interact in a setting of class struggle is something entirely more difficult to establish 
conclusively. ln short, one can confidently assert that humans interact; one can 
confidently assert that there are such things as cooperation and strife amongst humans; 
one can even say with assurance that some communities are better positioned in the 
struggle for survival than others. However, the particular, well-knit, class-based social 
world that Shapin and Schaffer assumed was a sophisticated entity indeed, one that is as 
dependent on a multiplicity of social and inte11ectual factors as was Boyle' s notion of the 
spring of the air. In other words, social interaction is not ontologically equivalent to a 
class-based social paradigm, and ascribing such a paradigm to a human comn1unity is 
n1uch more epistemologically sensitive than sin1ply identifying that there are such things 
as human communities. 
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These remarks echo earlier criticisms, notably those made by G. N. Cantor in 
response to Shapin's attempt to use sociological tools to explain the debate between 
phrenologists and moral philosophers in early nineteenth-century Edinburgh. Cantor was 
"very dubious whether the social realm is more actively known than the cognitive," 
challenging Shapin's "intuitive" understanding of "social conflict." Further, Cantor 
identified the lack of a "translational theory linking the social and cognitive realms" - in 
other words, the absence of a direct causal link between society and (in this case) 
phrenology.68 That such problems continued in LAP suggests one of the fundamental 
difficulties of the Strong Programme and Shapin's image of science: positing a human 
capacity for knowing society while undermining an equivalent capacity for knowing 
nature. 
In the end, Shapin and Schaffer were reluctant to leave any ground for real 
epistemological problen1s, fearing it might weaken the potency of their sociological 
interpretation. This is unfortunate, as it steals some of the wind from the sails of Shapin 
and Schaffer's historiographical revision of the Boyle-Hobbes confrontation. How so? By 
applying an inconsistent epistemological scheme that made the social universe more 
knowable than the physical universe, Shapin and Schaffer subtracted from the 
interpretational richness of factors that drive scientific creativity. The addition of a 
sociological gear need not annihilate all other approaches, but may augment and 
illuminate a multifarious engine of factors - cultural, personal, epistemological, and 
68 G.N. Cantor, HCritique of Shapin ' s Social lnterpretation," pp. 246-248. 
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intellectual. LAP sidesteps the question of how we know by substituting one reality for 
another. As Douglas Jesseph has pointed out, this smacks of sociological reductionism.69 
In any case, such a reduction casts an oversimplifying light on how characters, such as 
Boyle, Hooke, Wallis and other members of the Royal Society, a group of diverse social 
origins, could come together in one intellectual fold. It also comn1its an error of historical 
accuracy, making, for instance, the non-noble Hooke and noble Boyle seem to have more 
' ' 
i# common socially than Hooke and Hobbes or Boyle and Hobbes. Excessive zeal was 
part of the problem: Shapin and Schaffer were arguing an often-ridiculed interpretation of 
scientific knowledge, and therefore adopted a combative, give-no-ground style of 
presentation. 
Regardless of the absolute merit of Shapin's sociological theory and its 
application, there are also questions regarding the consistency of how he and Schaffer 
applied it in interpreting Boyle's and Hobbes' natural philosophic views. First, as Jesseph 
has noted, one problem with Shapin and Schaffer's sociological interpretation of Hobbes 
is that it is difficult to find a social group Hobbes actually represented.70 This is a crucial 
problem from a Strong Programn1e perspective because of its definition of knowledge as 
collectively held belief: 71 if only Hobbes held these beliefs, then they ren1ained just 
beliefs. There are two possible dimensions to this problen1, methodological and 
69 Jesseph, Squaring the Circle, pp. 343-356. 
70 Jesseph, Squaring the Circle, p. 351. 
71 Bloor, Knowledge and Social lmagery, p. 5. Also Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
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programmatic/historical in character. First, if the lack of identification of Hobbes' 
particular social group was an oversight, it was a serious one, for they should have spent 
time outlining the Hobbesian clique's interests and aims if they truly wanted to show the 
Boyle-Hobbes encounters as clashes between different social groups. Shapin and Schaffer 
provided ample evidence of the sort of social group to which Boyle belonged, specifically 
the Restoration nobility as it attempted to cut a line between an all powerful king and an 
unruly mob. They do not, however, provide Hobbes with any such group. Second, and 
potential1y more devastating, is if Shapin and Schaffer failed to identify a particular social 
group to which Hobbes belonged because no such group existed. If this is the case, then it 
is hard to see how Hobbes' system was anything more than idiosyncratic belief, which 
clearly fails to meet the definition of know ledge as co11ectively held belief, and therefore 
casts doubt on the whole project- surely group acknowledgement had to count for 
something in a sociological study of knowledge? Moreover, if a lone individual can 
concoct natural philosophic systems as sophisticated as Hobbes', then how can 
knowledge be said to be a sociological accomplishn1ent? 
Looked at more deeply, Hobbes' social position is not one for which Shapin and 
Schaffer's rigid sociological model can easily account. Hobbes certainly did have social 
support, genera11y emanating from those aristocrats who backed the king during the 
English Civil War - in other words, the Royalist camp. The character of this support was 
generally in the form of friendship and professional appointments as opposed to all out 
partisan backing. Hobbes was intin1ate with the Cavendish family, which included the 
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Earls of Newcastle and Devonshire; through the exiled English court in France ( 1651-
1660) he became tutor to the Prince of Wales, and gained the support of Henry Bennet, 
who became Secretary of State Lord Arlington after the Restoration. During the 1650s, 
Hobbes began to encounter considerable harassment because of his perceived religious 
views, more specifically his supposed "atheism." Nonetheless, he still managed to make 
friends in influential circles, including lawyers such as John Seldon, physicians like the 
f#med William Harvey, even succeeding in befriending some Cromwell sympathizers, 
such as John Hall. Even more interesting is the variety of friends he had in the ranks of 
Boyle's Royal Society. Noel Malcoln1 has pointed out that Hobbes could count a 
significant minority of Fellows of the Royal Society as friends (son1e 15 of a total 
membership of 46 in 1661 ).72 Hobbes certainly was not without social support. 
However, no clear group formed around Hobbes, and he was both in personality 
and intellect very much an individual. As the 1650s progressed, the views Hobbes 
espoused in Leviathan were more and more widely and viciously castigated as atheis1n. 
Atheism was a serious charge in seventeenth-century England, which connoted not simply 
disbelief in the existence of God, but also possibly unorthodox religious views, belief in 
materialistic ontologies, secular attitudes, or the placen1ent of human civil authorities 
above human religious authorities. Hobbes was very open to such charges, regardless of 
their truth, as these features characterized Hobbes' philosophy. Although Hobbes never 
professed atheism openly, many audiences felt the thrust of his natural philosophy was 
72 Malcolm, HHobbes and Royal Society," p. 51 and passi1n. 
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obvious, and the allegation of atheism forged alliances against Hobbes between groups 
that otherwise were at odds. In particular, the clergy of various, often antipathetic 
denon1inations and sects, and the universities came together to attack Hobbes due to his 
sharp anti-clerical arguments and his attacks on the universities as outdated bastions of 
Scholasticism working in support of the clergy. 73 Thus, even at the zenith of his natural 
philosophic career and status as a leading English man of letters, Hobbes had few 
supporters in England who vocally defended him, for fear of their own reputations. His 
notoriety also made him a convenient target for those who felt it necessary to buttress 
theirs. As one historian has argued, even potential allies of Hobbes were often 
vociferously outspoken against him because of the similarities in their thought; rivals such 
as Boyle endorsed a mechanistic natural philosophy similar to Hobbes, and therefore 
feared allegations of atheism would besmirch them too. In this way, attacks on Hobbes 
were a convenient way to protect one's own mechanistic theories fron1 accusations of 
atheism. Additionally, as Hobbes' reputation declined fron1 the 1650s on- partially due to 
his failed attempts to square the circle and the resulting heated rivalry with Wallis - his 
friends had even n1ore reason to hesitate to endorse Hobbes vigorously in public, which 
possibly explains his failure to be invited to join the Royal Society, despite his many 
friends there. 74 
73 For more on this topic, see Samuel L. Mintz, The Hunting of Leviathan: 
Seventeenth-Century Reactions to the Materialism and Moral Philosophy of Thomas 
Hobbes (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1969): pp. 44-45, 47-49. 
74 Malcoln1, HHobbes and Royal Society,'' pp. 60, 62-64. 
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Regarding the sort of absolutism that Shapin and Schaffer ascribed to him, it is 
important to keep in mind that the political situation in the British Isles was very tluid 
during Hobbes' life, and that absolutism was problematic in the political context of 
Restoration England. Certainly, the experience of Charles l' s "Personal Rule," 
characterized by his absolutist shunting aside of the Houses of Lords and Commons and 
relying solely on the advice of a few hand-picked counsellors, had enraged the 
~~rliamentarians. As Charles I attempted to centralize control of taxes, government 
policy, and religion in the hands of the king and Privy Council, tensions grew until the 
Civil War erupted. Despite the post-civil war settlement that saw a king again sitting 
supreme on the British throne, the British aristocracy and gentry demanded that their 
views and policies be the political basis on which the king ruled; even the lower classes 
that were largely ignored politically in the Restoration had shown little stomach for 
absolutism. 75 Thus, Hobbes seems to have had few natural allies when it came to the 
absolutist component of his political philosophy; to put it more exactly, possibly many of 
those who favoured absolutism were hesitant to speak out for Hobbes, for fear of 
upsetting the Restoration balance. His system may have been coherent and consistent 
from an intellectual standpoint, with a lasting legacy in political and social philosophy, 
but contemporary audiences in England handled Hobbes derisively or with care, but rarely 
75 This interpretation of Charles l' s rule and the subsequent civil wars is based 
largely on Smith, Double Crown, particularly Chapters 4-6. Although the civil wars were 
fought by all levels of society, a well-known thesis argues that the Restoration settlement 
was heavily biassed towards the gentry and aristocracy; see Christopher Hill , The Centurv 
of Revolution, 1603-1714 (London: Nelson, 1961): pp. 307-311. 
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without outspoken adoration, due to the perceived extremism of his political and religious 
VIeWS. 
LAP was a bold attempt to show the impo11ance of social agency in the 
constitution of scientific knowledge. Shapin and Schaffer's development of the idea of the 
role of social conventions in the formation of science was an in1portant step in 
understanding what it means to say that science is a hun1an activity. Whether they went 
too far in their revisionist zeal is a worthwhile question. Indeed, subscribing solely to 
sociological means to interpret the history of science proves inadequate, needlessly 
brushing away rich philosophical issues which inform supple and probing historical 
interpretation. Thus, the historical picture loses some of its accuracy. Shapin and Schaffer 
failed to account sufficiently for the paradigmatic promise of Boyle's experin1entalism- a 
feature Kuhn no doubt would have identified as key to Boyle's success. From another 
angle, using social means to solve the problem of how humans secure knowledge of the 
natural world really only replaces one problematic means for another. Knowledge of 
society in many ways seems no less fraught with episten1ological trouble than knowledge 
of the natural world. In the end, they sin1ply failed to apply their critical concerns 
universally, inexplicably absenting the social sphere. The criticisms in this chapter have 
tried to argue the value of other sensibilities, sensibilities less sociologically rigid and 
more philosophically tolerant. 
Shapin's later scholarly work responded, possibly unconsciously, to such 
considerations. As the reader will see in the next chapter, he continued to subscribe to a 
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sociological interpretation of science in A Social History of Truth. However, his depiction 
of how society works to found knowledge became more supple, and thus n1ore 
historiographically satisfying. A society that forged knowledge in the fires of social 
tension and struggle transformed into a society ripe with change and uncertainty, where 
social agents attempted to assess how best to fashion knowledge using the cultural means 
available to them. Now let us turn to A Social History of Truth. 
'' 
u 
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Chapter 4 
The "Social" Scientist: Individual versus Collective Knowledge in A Social Historv 
of Truth 
There is a massive mismatch between dominant characterizations of the 
sources of our factual knowledge and the ways in which we actually secure 
that knowledge. 
Steven Shapin, A Social History of Ttuth ( 1994 ). 
Man does not create gods, in spite of appearances. The times, the age, 
impose them on him. Man can serve his age or rebel against it, but the 
target of his cooperation or rebellion comes to him from the outside. 
Stanislaw Lem, Solaris (1961). 
After Leviathan and the Air-Pump (LAP), Shapin continued to employ 
sociological tools and interpretations. However, there were changes in approach. The 
most significant of these was the almost complete disappearance of social strife as a key 
factor in scientific development, and the seen1ing abandonn1ent of the idea of science as a 
political tool. Instead, Shapin turned to a sociologically grounded notion of credibility that 
exhorted the historian to look to the scientist-philosopher's local culture for explanations 
as to why his pronouncements about the universe were accepted as knowledge. In 
particular, this notion of credibility was predicated on trust - the ability of social agents to 
create a foundation for mutual cooperation and interaction. The prin1ary consequence of 
this change is that the historian no longer need seek out the fault lines between diffet:ent 
social groups, but instead those cultural factors which allow historical agents to trust one 
another. Shapin propounded this alternative in A Social History of T1uth (AST), his next 
major work. 
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4.1 The Role of Society in Scientific Knowledge 
One of the primary tasks Shapin set himself in AST was to contrast the power of a 
sociological idiom to that of an individualist idiom in the history of science; I will label 
this ethic of the individual in science as "epistemological individualism." According to 
this ethic, society should be a non-factor in knowledge, and when present can only blight 
the integrity of knowledge. In subscribing to this notion, a number of responsibilities fall 
tq: the scientist: he bows to no authority other than his own; he takes nothing on trust, but 
subjects all claims about the universe to his perspicacious mathematical-experimental 
technique; equal competence using these tools means that he has equal right to speak 
among his peers. The social dimension of the scientist consists mainly in the command he 
possesses in the public sphere due to his qualifications, and in the public nature of the 
results (they are not to be sequestered away from a public that de1nands the fruits of 
science). Epistemological individualism precludes a constructive role for society in 
making scientific knowledge. 1 Shapin sums up this popular image of science succinctly: 
In ideal-type empiricist schemata, an isolated individual, conceived as free, 
pure, and unconstrained, confronts a natural reality, conceived as 
transparent to his gaze. Within such a framework, the particular 
expectations, conventions, and interests transmitted to the individual from 
society can act only as sources of contamination and corruption.2 
1 Steven Shapin, A Social History of Truth: Civility and Science in Seventeenth 
Century England (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1 994): pp. 5, 16; Adi Ophir and 
Steven Shapin, "The Place of Knowledge: A Methodological Survey," Science in Context 
4, 1 (1991): p. 5. 
2 Ophir and Shapin, 44Place of Knowledge," p. 5. 
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Shapin described this association between individuality and epistemic integrity as a long-
established belief in Western cultures. One reason he postulated for this was that many 
people saw solitude as a sign of intellectual worth - that which the human does in 
isolation is more likely to be truth than that which is done in the company of others. This 
idea attached to prophetic religious experience, art, literature, and, through philosophy, to 
science. 3 The idea gained shape in seventeenth-century England, where Boyle and his ilk 
reiterated at length the importance of doing experiments oneself, and not turning to others 
I 
to form one's conclusions. For them, this stance constituted a break with the authority-
ridden Aristotelian philosophy of nature, a philosophy they saw as exhorting one to bow 
down to the words found in a book as opposed to the experience of one's own eyes. The 
best way to find out about the universe was to study it oneself. 4 
In opposition to episten1ological individualism, Shapin posited a thoroughly social 
model of science, open to sociological examination. Let us call this model 
"epistemological collectivism." The main fruit of this was AST. What are the core ideas 
in AST? There are two, but each contains a number of threads to be drawn out and 
elucidated. First, it contains the idea that the primary constituent of science is trust. 
Second is the idea that knowledge is always a resu1t of community cooperation. As a 
3 Steven Shapin, "'The Mind is lts Own Place': Science and Solitude in 
Seventeenth-Century England." Science in Context 4 ( 1991 ): pp. 192-194, 202-206; 
Steven Shapin, "The Invisible Technician," American Scientist 77 ( 1989): p. 561; Shapin, 
AST, pp. I SO, 416. 
4 Shapin, "Invisible Technician," pp. 556, 561; Shapin, AST, pp. xxv, 5, 16, 201-
202. 
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counter to epistemological individualism, AST advances an epistemology built around a 
social dynamic. Science is not disembodied knowledge, but depends as crucially on the 
culture in which it formed as on the universe it studies. In contrast to the antagonistic 
model Shapin developed in LAP, this dynamic of trust depends less on political 
allegiances and the struggle for dominance than on the need to conform knowledge to a 
culture's canons of respectability and believability. Truculence as a motor for scientific 
dhange recedes, and social cooperation advances. Over the following pages we will 
I 
evaluate the model of trust and social cooperation in order to set up a comparison of the 
two approaches in this thesis' Conclusion in Chapter 5. 
How could Shapin say that the primary component of scientific knowledge is 
trust? This provocative claim arose from Shapin's characterization of knowledge as a 
"collective good" and as a "social institution." What this means is that knowledge is a 
product of human beings working together. No one ever gains knowledge on his or her 
own, but forms scientific claims in a group environment and then submits them to a 
greater community, which exercises either approbation, modification, or rejection. Shapin 
was outspoken on this head: knowledge is never an individual activity. The glue that 
Shapin proposed unites the multifarious components of the knowledge community is the 
"moral bond" of trust.5 In AST, Shapin built his concept of trust in light of its antithesis, 
scepticism. Understanding this concept demands attention be paid to what he termed "the 
natural attitude" or "mundane reason," concepts taken from various strains of 
5 Shapin, AST, pp. 5-7. 
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phenomenology. Understanding how he applied this idea to historical interpretation of the 
world of Robert Boyle and seventeenth-century English natural philosophy will be 
imperative. 
That trust is constitutive of all knowledge is about as close as Shapin will ever 
come to a universal generalization. Shapin described how 1nany generations of scholars 
identified the importance of trust in a functioning society. He was aware, however, that 
f~w theorists had placed much confidence in trust as a tool for establishing reliable 
systems of knowledge, a state of affairs he sought to remedy. To make his point, he 
compared the role of trust to the role, highly-vaunted in scientific rhetoric, of scepticism. 
Shapin envisaged the popular justification of the potency of scientific knowledge as 
reliant on the "solitude, passivity, and impersonality" of its gathering; "[k]nowledge is 
supposed to be the product of a sovereign individual confronting the world; reliance upon 
others produces errors. "6 Shapin entered the very laboratory of the scientist to show the 
inadequacy of this image. Returning to his days as a student of genetics, Shapin 
scrutinized the claim that cytosine is a constituent of DNA. He took the reader through the 
process he followed in the laboratory to analyse the DNA. What he concluded was that at 
any number of points he could have taken a sceptical stance regarding the materials he 
was using, the process itself, or the conclusions based upon it. Jnstead, overall he opted 
for credulity. He trusted the 1neasurements of thern1on1eters and the centrifuges; he trusted 
the label which told him that the liquid he was using was ethanol; he was confident 
6 Quotes from AST, pp. 5, 17. 
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without additional research that the substance he was analysing was a rat's liver; and so 
on. All of these assumptions, Shapin said, could have been subjected to rigorous 
scepticism, but each sceptical move would have relied on new assumptions, ad infinitum. 
The whole idea of scepticism, then, depends on there being large components of trust 
already in place. Shapin contended that for him to espouse radical scepticism in the 
laboratory would likely lead his colleagues to dismiss him fron1 that very place of 
ebdeavour - a serious social consequence. So scepticism plays a much more limited role 
I 
and trust a much larger role in the modern scientific endeavour than much rhetoric would 
suggest.7 
Shapin's next move was to expound a loose epistemology founded upon the 
dynamic of trust.8 This loose epistemology owed much to his reading of Wittgenstein, 
pragmatism, and phenon1enology. He offered the phenomenologists' idea of the "natural 
attitude" as the unreflective general trust humans hold that there is an external universe, 
consistent in its behaviour and structure, and that other hun1an beings experience this 
7 Shapin, AST, pp. 5, 8-22. 
8 Shapin continued to be quite critical of the discipline of epistemology in AST, 
maintaining this Strong Programme theme; for instance, see his disparaging remarks 
about epistemology in Steven Shapin, "Rarely Pure and Never Sin1ple: Talking about 
Truth," Configurations 7 ( 1999): passim. For Shapin, it seems epistemology and 
philosophy of science can only be strictly rationalistic, realist and individualist. l consider 
this an unwarranted stereotype which, even if true, need not be the case. My definition is 
that anything that describes how knowledge is made and warranted can and should be 
called epistemology. lt should also be noted that Shapin himself was n1ore attentive to 
epistemology in AST, using sociologically modified philosophical concepts such as those 
described in the following pages to solve practical problems related to hun1an knowledge. 
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world in a consistent manner. Upon this basic assumption humans form their 
"moral/social"and "cognitive" orders. Without this assumption, human action would be 
impossible, for it is difficult to imagine an environment of social cooperation where each 
individual thought they experienced a universe they themselves ordered. The natural 
attitude is the field upon which limited scepticism can play and upon which knowledge of 
things and people is made and destroyed. Because humans regularly do experience 
vtrriation in interpretation of phenomena, the mechanism of "mundane reason" evolved. 
I 
By mundane reason Shapin was indicating the collection of explanations humans use to 
explain away divergent experiential accounts while maintaining social order. Humans in 
daily social intercourse will qualify claims, attribute different views to differing 
perspectives, and so on, without concluding fron1 divergent views that each human 
experiences a different world. The natural attitude and mundane reason, Shapin 
emphasized, were both quotidian, functional concepts. Because of their fundamental 
character as assumptions, Shapin dismissed proving then1 through intellectual means. The 
justification of their worth was in the broad success of their use.9 
Elsewhere, Shapin talked of the "n1undaneness postulate." Care must be taken to 
distinguish "mundane reason" and the "mundaneness postulate." Mundane reason is a 
process for dealing with the world and other humans who would make claims about it. 
The mundaneness postulate points to elements of the scientist's environn1ent that the 
9 Shapin, AST, pp. 27-34. This last point is a tip of the hat to the later 
Wittgenstein and the Strong Progran1me. 
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canons of epistemological individualism do not take to have any bearing on the 
truthfulness of knowledge. The latter concept emphasized that the cognitive and social 
processes that go on in the laboratory under the head of "scientific reason" are no different 
from the collective of modes of reasoning applied in ordinary human action.· Shapin 
enumerated quite a few potential targets for the historian using the mundaneness 
postulate: "conversing ... coercing ... making marks on blackboards ... gesturing ... 
grunting . . . retrieving routine social knowledge about the standing and identity of those 
k. 1 . "10 rna 1ng c a1ms .... 
Shapin fleshed out the notion of mundane reason through examining the events of 
Robert Boyle's life. Key to this examination was Boyle's standing as a "gentleman." 
According to Shapin, the gentleman was the trustworthy agent of seventeenth-century 
England. This conclusion went back to two considerations: the nature of the "free agent," 
and the possession of "virtue." Boyle was a free agent because he had the means of a 
gentlen1an: noble birth (he was a son of the Earl of Cork), freedon1 from remunerative 
labour, political standing, and so on. Had he been in a position where he had to ply his 
skills to earn a living, he would not have been a free agent. On this foundation of social 
status and economic means the gentleman established his virtue. Because he had wealth 
and power, and because he was a man (being a woman in seventeenth-century England, 
even one of gentle upbringing, generally meant a low degree of credibility), he did not 
10 Please see Shapin, "Rarely Pure," pp. 7-8 for the quote, and pp. 7-10. There 
Shapin was very explicit that the mundaneness postulate guided the production of AST. 
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need to lie to attain reputation and standing; because he did not labour for a master, and 
was indeed a master himself, he was free from the taint of serving another's interests, and 
spoke only for his own. Shapin also added flavours of Christianity and the secular warrior 
code into the gentle constitution: the seventeenth-century English gentleman who was 
seen to espouse Christian piety while defending his honour from slights was seen as 
virtuous. Moving further, Shapin wanted to make a special point about the gentleman: 
t~at truthfulness was his identifying characteristic, both from his own perspective and 
from the perspective of others in society. The gentleman was bombarded by this belief 
from all sides: the traditions of chivalry encouraged it; Christ and God demanded it; 
courtiers wrote long tracts about it; Classical secular literature defined and polished it. 
The importance of being honoured with the epithet of honesty was symbolized in the 
ultimate response to an accusation of lying- the duel. One should risk one's life defending 
his honour, and defence of honour almost always meant defence against an accusation that 
one had committed an ill or unjust act. To say a gentleman lied was to ren1ove from him 
his warrant to the title "gentleman." Shapin's conclusion was that if any one sort of 
individual was going to be trusted as a truth-maker in seventeenth-century England, it was 
going to be the gentleman. 11 
Being gentlemanly, however, was not simply something that applied once and for 
all to a person - it was something that an individual worked at inculcating in his popular 
image, and a living concept that others applied to individuals. With conscious purpose, an 
11 Shapin, AST, Chapters Two and Three, passim. 
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individual could accentuate and define his gentility. 12 Shapin very much portrayed Boyle 
as someone who blatantly embarked on a strategy of highlighting his gentle status; to put 
it another way, Boyle recognized the epistemic potential in his social identity and 
accentuated those features which would amplify his credibility in the social circles he 
frequented. His strategy included the following elements: a ce1tain social self-description; 
a particular self-modelling of Christian characteristics; and a self-fashioned gentle 
stholarly identity. Each of these deserves treatment in tum. 
I 
Even though his peers recognized him as a gentleman, Boyle worked to accentuate 
those features of his gentility that would vivify his truthfulness. For instance, he stressed 
his love for his father - although it is likely that he rarely saw the n1an. Boyle described 
his status as a younger brother as an asset, because it n1eant that he did not carry the 
burden of responsibility of land and power associated with being eldest. Boyle claimed, 
according to Shapin, that he was "so precisely positioned at the golden mean of basic 
social identities" as to occupy a perfect position for contemplating the universe. His 
particular social placement meant that the worries of rule or property did not assail him, 
but that the nobility of his birth and the comfo11 of his n1eans encouraged his taste for 
philosophy. Although most writers on gentlemanly conduct ridiculed the distance 
scholarly sorts maintained from society, Boyle thought learning a mark of gentility, 
suggesting discipline amidst the manifold corruptions of social life. Thus, Boyle 
12 Shapin, AST, pp.l26-130. Also see Shapin, "'Personal Development and 
Intellectual Biography: The Case of Robe11 Boyle," British Journal for the Historv of 
Science 26 ( 1993): passim. 
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propounded a mixture of "solitary disengagement" and "civic duty" for the gentle 
philosopher. Interestingly, Boyle did nothing to hide his persistent sickliness, for it too 
was a sign of high-mindedness. Scholarship took a toll on the body, so the thinking went, 
and Boyle used his unstable physical constitution as a tool to build up trust in his 
philosophical doctrines. 13 
Public display of his Christianity also underpinned his reputation for intellectual 
ability. Boyle described himself as someone who had been touched by God's grace, 
I 
having been saved miraculously from likely fatal injury a number of times as a youth. As 
when he yoked learning to the secular ideal of the gentleman, he also defended the idea 
that the study of nature was a sign of Christian devotion. Further, when one articulated 
truths about the natural universe, he displayed to others God's favour, for only God could 
constitute one so as to find such truths. Combined with other statements about his 
religiosity, and his advertised tendency towards Protestant Christian vi11ues such as 
chastity and introspection, Boyle made his Christianity a pillar of his truthful image. 14 
As alluded to above, Boyle made a great effort to combine learning and scholarly 
pursuits with prominent notions of gentility. For Shapin, this was Boyle's n1ost creative 
13 Shapin, AST, pp. 135-137, 141, 147, 149-156. For more on the role of the body 
in founding credibility, see Shapin, "The Philosopher and the Chicken: On the Dietetics 
of Disembodied Knowledge," Science ]ncarnate: Historical En1bodiments of Natural 
Knowledge, eds. Christopher Lawrence and Steven Shapin (Chicago: University of 
Chicago, 1998) pp. 21-55; and Shapin, "Descartes the Doctor: Rationalisn1 and 1ts 
Therapies," British Journal for the Historv of Science 33 (2000): pp. 131-154. 
14 Shapin, AST, pp. 157-160, 163-165. 
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achievement, for although many younger sons of noble parentage pursued philosophy, 
Boyle was unique in his attempt to make the philosophical enterprise a component of the 
gentle identity - others eschewed gentle living after their avowal of learning. Philosophy 
for Boyle was a fortress, where one could productively develop vi11ue, holding out fron1 
the social ills prevalent in gentle circles. Simultaneously, however, Boyle had to dissolve 
the perceived irascibility of scholarly living. 15 Most gentle folk saw philosophers as 
ahogant and tending toward unwholesome dispute, attributes incompatible with genteel 
I 
interaction. Boyle's philosophical appearance, that of the "experimental philosopher," 
attempted to remedy this by making a greater show of humility and modesty, which he 
accomplished partly through following traditional Christian and gentle norms. One of the 
key features of an experimental philosopher not shared by the n1ore traditional 
philosopher was a dedication to sharing knowledge with the public. This helped convince 
his peers that Boyle was a different type of philosopher, for the theme of secretiveness 
was key to the traditional view of the scholar, particularly in the form of the alchemist. 
When he published a text, Boyle stated his reticence to publish, suggesting a deeply set 
humility, but stating that he had decided to do so because of its felicitous benefits for the 
public, thus showing his generosity of spirit. His publications generally stressed the 
author's fallibility. Boyle wanted to show he was no over-confident braggart, introducing 
15 A detailed look at the culture that disparaged the pedantry and social clun1siness 
of the scholar can be found in Shapin, "'A Scholar and a Gentleman': The Problen1atic 
Identity of the Scientific Practitioner in Early Modern England," Historv of Science 29 
( 1991 ): pp. 279-327. 
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his works with many statements indicating the potential errors in his conclusions, 
resulting from the many weaknesses of the human condition. Shapin contended that Boyle 
tried to appear as someone unaccustomed to making philosophical statements. This 
technique reduced the perceived personal investment Boyle had in his work, making it 
appear less a vocation than an honourable hobby done to honour God and uphold truth. 
He was a free agent, not a person dependent on the academy or the priesthood for his 
li~ing; the desired conclusion was that, "[Boyle] was the so11 of man who had no reason 
to misrepresent how matters stood in nature."16 Fellow Englishmen would see him as 
honest because of his disinterest and disassociation from the conclusions he advanced. 
His attempted disassociation was so complete that he even underlined his supposed 
general philosophical ignorance as a strength: he was unfamiliar with other philosophies, 
so they did not unfairly prejudice his conclusions; he saw nature with an innocent clarity 
impossible for someone overwhelmed with bookish theories. 17 
To summarize my reading of the above, the salient point for Shapin was that 
Boyle's credibility was a social phenomenon. The persona Boyle radiated gave his claims 
a credible lustre. The inherent intellectual value of his clain1s was usually out of the reach 
of his audiences; what made the experimental philosophy attractive for them had more to 
do with the upstanding figure Boyle cut in seventeenth-century English aristocratic and 
gentle circles than with the perspicuity of his claims. The deeper conclusion is that 
16 Shapin, AST, p. 180. 
17 Shapin, AST, pp. 175-182. 
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knowledge claims depend greatly on the image of the person making them; rational 
analysis of the claims itself is only a small part of the total assessment. 
However, even that small, rational component of knowledge-n1aking was founded 
on social organization. Simply believing in someone was not enough - one needed ways 
to judge claims about what sorts of entities populated the universe. This situation was 
particularly critical in seventeenth-century Europe, as European explorers visited parts of 
t~e world previously unknown to them and as technologies such as the telescope and 
microscope revealed new worlds to human observation. Because one's own experience 
was limited, one needed a way to deal with the multiplicity of new claims. Shapin 
described the situation as one of "ontological openness." As claims of new entities arose, 
entities not described by Aristotle and other ancient philosophers, doubt seeped into son1e 
minds about whether the last-word authority of the ancients was deserved. Traditional 
philosophical method turned on what classical philosophy pronounced - for many 
scholars, if it was not in Aristotle's works, then it was not to be found in the universe. 
Those who were sceptical, however, voiced the need for some intel1ectuallatitude as to 
what existed - thus ontological openness. 18 
Perceived epistemic anomalies within the Aristotelian model of nature encouraged 
many to dispose of Aristotelian methods of inquiry and seek new techniques for 
18 Shapin, AST, pp. 194-202. 
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understanding the universe. 19 The characteristic features critics discerned in the 
Aristotelian epistemology were authority and testimony, and these two methods for 
collecting knowledge became the primary targets of modernist derision. Such critics 
advanced a wide-ranging personal experience as a more reliable path to knowledge. One 
could trust oneself, but not others; trust in authority and testimony led to "corrupt[ ion] by 
credulity. "20 
,~ 
I 
What Shapin observed in their pronouncements, however, was a certain way of 
"managing" trust, for, according to his thinking, trust could never be entirely abandoned. 
The management of testimony involved "epistemological decorum" and "prudential 
maxims." Here human thinking attains a distinctly circumstantial flavour. 
Epistemological decorum united how people know what is socially proper for them to 
know and how they are to go about knowing socially. Shapin used the idea of 
episten1ological decorum to explain how people distinguish differing types of knowledge, 
and devise different evaluations of ce11ainty to apply to them. It would be socially 
impractical to reject any epistemic claim based solely on its absence from one's own 
limited experience. It would also be patently unreasonable for an individual to demand 
19 At this point in the discussion, Shapin qualified his talk of radical change in 
philosophical understandings of nature by pointing to the fact that no individual or group 
can ever entirely eschew a former world view, for then one would find oneself con1pletely 
unanchored when trying to evaluate the new realm of entities. This is a striking exan1ple 
of the conservative theme in Shapinian knowledge. See Shapin, AST, p. 200. 
20 Shapin, AST, pp. 195, 200, 202. 
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certainty in equal degrees in all fields of knowledge.21 Shapin presented the common 
argument of seventeenth-century English philosophers and theologians that, despite the 
fact that Christ's existence could not be proven mathematically or even experimentally, 
and was really conveyed only by testin1ony, it was still very much the individual's 
responsibility to know that there was a man named Christ, whose actions were historical, 
not fictional. In short, there was a 1noral obligation to assent to the truth of Christ's 
liistorical reality, despite the fact that no seventeenth-century Englishman had ever laid 
I 
eyes upon him. Testimony thus could be a formative element in human knowledge. 
Shapin consistently aimed to tie knowledge to a social foundation, and in AST Shapin's 
conception of the social never wandered far from the moral. 22 
The "prudential maxin1s" provided a fulcrum upon which episten1ological 
decorum turned. Concentrating n1ostly on the work of John Locke, Shapin delineated how 
thinkers in seventeenth-century England recommended one deal with testimony. Locke 
propounded a system where the person encountering testimony was to judge it by its 
plausibility, number of sources, consistency, immediacy of the testifier to the event, 
expertise of the testifier, the comportment of the testifier while presenting his testimony, 
21 These statements are Shapin's sociological attempt to deal with the package of 
intellectual issues I branded under the head "epistemological sensitivity" in the previous 
chapter. This sociological engagen1ent with epistemological issues shows the increased 
maturity of Shapin's thinking in AST, and reveals a change of tact in his thought, if not in 
his rhetoric. The consequences of this change will be explored more fully in Chapter 5. 
22 Shapin, AST, pp. xxix, 202-21 1; in particular pp. 209-210 for the exan1ple of 
religion. 
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and the ''acknowledged integrity and disinterestedness" of the testifier. Shapin 
emphasized that there were flexible "maxims" to guide behaviour, not iron-clad ''rules" 
that dictated it. Epistemological judgement varied from place to place, from situation to 
situation. The important thing was that social consensus exist at the end of the epistemic 
process. A historical agent like Boyle might invoke the prudential maxims of testimony 
differently in different situations, including occasionally resorting to their ."counter-
niaxims," which also had thrift in the intellectual economy of seventeenth-century 
II 
England. For instance, although having a plethora of sources making the same episten1ic 
claim was a prudential maxim to judge testimony, it n1ight also be prudent to disavow 
claims made by a broad selection of individuals. Such breadth conferred banality upon the 
claim, and banality n1ight suggest epistemic \Vorthlessness?3 
Fluidity was a primary trait of Shapinian scientific reasoning in AST. This fluidity 
was clear in the historical episodes Shapin explored. Shapin aimed to show that knowing 
about the entities that populated the universe was intin1ately tied to knowing about the 
people who described them. Before an individual could establish anything about the 
characteristics of, for instance, comets, he or she had to establish something about the 
character of the person making claims about comets. Indeed one of the most gripping 
historical accounts Shapin provided was about a dispute between Adrien Auzout and 
Johannes Hevelius over the celestial location of comets appearing in 1664 and 1665. A 
23 Shapin, AST, pp. 212-227, 232-233, 238-240; for examples of other 
"countermaxims," see pp. 233-238. 
1 17 
·-· 
closer examination of this episode will help frame the issues to which Shapin was most 
drawn in his thinking. 
Observations of two comets were involved in the debate. The first, which Shapin 
called "C 1 ", presented itself to Europeans in late 1664 and disappeared from view in 
March 1665. It attracted widespread attention from the elite of seventeenth-century 
European natural philosophy: Christiaan Huygens in Holland, Hevelius in Poland, Isaac 
Newton in England, and others. With their eyes turned to the heavens, they spotted a 
second comet ("C2") in March 1665; by mid-April it faded from view. Great excitement 
stirred amongst the learned, for comets were a celestial treat that posed serious 
philosophical challenges and potentially great philosophical rewards in helping to collapse 
the Aristotelian cosn1ology. As Shapin indicated, for these philosophers to be able to plot 
the course of a comet in advance and with accuracy would be an important 
accomplishment. Auzout offered just such a plot. Within a short time natural philosophers 
all over Europe, including in England, accepted Auzout's work as legitimate. Similar 
events transpired over the more transient C2. Ahhough he prevaricated somewhat 
regarding the accuracy of the predictions, Auzout also produced a plot for this comet.24 
Controversy arose once Hevelius published his observations of the two comets. 
Auzout pointed out that Hevelius' observation of the last celestial point Cl occupied 
varied greatly from what others had predicted or observed. Hevelius refused to recant his 
observation, and asked the Royal Society to adjudicate the matter. Unfortunately, upon 
24 Shapin, AST, pp. 266-272. 
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further consultation, the members of the Royal Society in England found that apparently 
only Hevelius made observations of C 1 on the date in question - the rest of the 
community only had Auzout's predictions, as well as some other independently achieved 
plots, to consider. Eventually, in 1666, because the weight of the philosophical 
community was behind Auzout's prediction and there was no corroboration of Hevelius' 
observation, the Royal Society decided that the latter's observation was an error. 
Ptediction won out over observation.25 
II 
Hevelius remained obstinate, refusing to renounce his claim. At this point, things 
became thorny. Boyle and his fe11ows in the Royal Society, as we11 as their natural 
philosophical peers in the rest of Europe, had built parts of their edifice with contributions 
from both Auzout and Hevelius. Both were in1portant members of the community who 
were woven into its epistemic fabric. In short, the Royal Society could not insist Hevelius 
atone for his mistake, but they also did not want Auzout to see their not taking his claim 
of Hevelius' error seriously. Hevelius' protestations led n1athen1atician John Wallis and 
secretary of the Royal Society Henry Oldenburg to placate hin1 with statements that the 
issue would be reconsidered and offering a possible epistemic exit for the controversy: 
that Hevelius had indeed observed a comet, but not C 1 - he possibly saw the early 
appearance of C2. This said, the Royal Society gradually let the matter fall from the table 
of debate, and Shapin could find no further statements relating to the matter.26 
25 Shapin, AST, pp. 273-280. 
26 Shapin, AST, pp. 280-287. 
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Shapin interpreted this whole episode as primarily a social and moral exercise, 
with little of the rational contributing to the actors' epistemic decisions. Pride, integrity 
and social stability were the major issues, not the overarching goal of truth. Further, 
epistemic decisions such as 'What constitutes an accurate observation/prediction?' were 
negotiated socially. Each individual's set of observations/predictions were discrepant, but 
only Hevelius breached the corridor of variation which the majority of actors had agreed 
upon, whether tacitly or explicitly. Because Auzout and Hevelius were both part of the 
epistemic and social fabric of the community, adjudicators sought to find a courteous way 
to solve the problem. In their initial solution, they offered Hevelius a way to humble 
himself without denigration, in fact a way that emphasized his social merits and overall 
importance to the community. When this proved too n1uch for him, the community took 
another strategy: silence. By putting the matter aside, they, without words, asked Hevelius 
and Auzout to move away from acrimonious debate to continued productive research. 
Social and epistemic stability won out over an unswerving dedication to rationality and 
truth.27 
Shapin drew a number of conclusions about how seventeenth-century English 
experimental natural philosophy operated from his empirical investigations. First, close 
sceptical scrutiny and detailed processes of verification did not accompany the adn1ission 
of new bits of knowledge into the catalogue of the experimentalist school. Episodes such 
as the one described above were, according to Shapin, deviations from the norm. The aim 
27 Shapin, AST, pp. 286-291. 
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was to build the stock of knowledge and this in the main involved building the human 
community. Knowing, thus, was primarily a social act in both means and ends.28 What 
critiquing the natural philosophical community actually carried out was more a process of 
social analysis, based upon what Shapin called "systen1s of recognition." In general, those 
who did natural philosophy knew each other personally. Intermediaries worked to 
introduce new members to the community, recommending then1 as trustworthy 
,. 
irl;dividuals. Shapin's last conclusion was that there was a certain reciprocity between 
II 
members of the natural philosophical community. Unbounded scepticism entailed risks 
for the sceptic because such unruly behaviour might result in an equal degree of 
scepticism towards his knowledge claims. The overall tenor of Shapin's treatment of 
these episodes was that accepted members of the comn1unity treated each other amicably, 
or at least aimed to do so, while the claims of those from outside of the community might 
be dismissed with relative ease.29 
Shapin made explicit the epistemological consequences of this orientation towards 
amicability through a study of Boyle's attitude towards the use of mathematics in natural 
philosophy. The crux of Shapin's argument was that Boyle advised against the use of 
mathematics as a language for describing nature because it was too precise. This idea 
returns us to the matter of how closely a measurement or description con·esponds to 
28 Shapin, AST, pp. 303-304. 
29 Shapin, AST, pp. 303-309; for an example of those who Boyle dismissed, see 
Shapin's discussion of the divers and pressure, AST, pp. 258-266, 289. 
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reality is a matter for social negotiation. Shapin hammered on the point that Boyle was 
neither intellectually nor categorically against the use of mathematics in natural 
philosophy: on a number of occasions he lauded the power of mathematics.30 Despite the 
deluge of intellectual reasons why a natural philosopher who espoused a mechanical 
ontology might turn to mathematics as the language of nature, Boyle declined to do so for 
social reasons. Mathematics smacked too much of the arcane, and, if made a centrepiece 
of Boyle's experimentalist natural philosophic endeavour, would render it opaque to 
wider audiences. Inclusive membership in the community demanded a less obscure way 
of expression. The idiom Boyle opted for was analogical, not mathematical. This strategy 
aimed for Hinte11igibility," which "was defined by the public character of philosophical 
language."31 The gentlemanly natural philosopher would use familiar objects to describe 
the world of corpuscles and other esoteric entities. Sophisticated Jnathematicallanguage 
rendered this impossible: 
Boyle understood mathematics to encon1pass an abstract, esoteric, and 
private form of culture. That was a major reason why he worried about its 
place within experin1ental natural philosophy. If experimental philosophy 
was to secure legitimacy and truth by implementing a public language, 
then the incorporation of mathematical culture n1ight threaten a new 
privacy.32 
30 Shapin, AST, pp. 317-322. 
31 Shapin, AST, p. 336. 
32 Shapin, AST, p. 336. 
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It will be remembered that at least a degree of sociability was crucial to the gentleman's 
identity, while reclusiveness described the traditional scholar. Boylean natural philosophy 
depended on as big a community as possible for its epistemic justification, so overly 
mathematized descriptions of nature just would not do. 33 
Besides the historical curiosity of Boyle's position, Shapin wanted another point 
to emerge from his treatment of Boyle and mathematics, nan1ely that science is a forn1 of 
, . 
'1?nversation. Boyle saw mathematics as disruptive because it was overly precise, useful 
for abstract, esoteric reasoning, but obstructive for immediate, public experimentation. 
Insistence that reality show mathematical exactitude and constancy would bog down the 
philosophic community, or, in Shapin's idion1, inhibit the flow of conversation. Pragmatic 
reasoning in science was key. Absolute, unswerving trust at every historical n1oment was 
unnecessary; in fact it was even detrin1ental to the philosophic enterprise, because it 
would undermine a general, more ineffable atmosphere of trust that allowed knowledge-
making to proceed. Properly expressed doubt reenforced a general sense of trust. Natural 
philosophy, and science by extension, was a form of engagen1ent with both nature and 
society, and thus might be seen as a type of conversation. 34 
The final major sortie against the notion of individualisn1 in scientific knowledge 
in AST was Shapin's exposure of the master-servant relationship in Boyle's natural 
philosophical laboratory. Although it is widely said that Boyle made such and such an 
33 Shapin, AST, pp. 333-338. 
34 Shapin, AST, pp. 351 -354. 
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experiment or discovered such and such a property of nature, a sophisticated culture 
underlaid such claims. Boyle himself did few experiments, but assigned experimental 
tasks to "laborants," "operators," "assistants," "amanuenses," "workmen," and 
"domestics" - terms used to describe remunerated staff and servants at the time. 
Sometimes Boyle was present, sometimes not. Nonetheless, his role was crucial, not just 
as financier and source of inspiration, but as episten1ological authority. Boyle had 
authority to speak about nature, because of his social position and because of the way he 
portrayed himself to contemporary society. Some veins of political theory in seventeenth-
century England stated that the free gentleman represented not just himself, but those 
indebted to him for their living; servants had no say in the state themselves, but 
supposedly had their interests protected and voiced in the person of their gentleman 
master. Whereas servants had no legitimacy as speakers about nature, and remunerated 
specialists might be seen as interested in achieving a certain epistemic outcome to make a 
living, Boyle faced no such limitations as a wealthy gentleman. Gentleman Boyle 
purportedly possessed the capacity to understand what it was his lab workers had done -
such understanding did not necessarily exist in those labourers themselves. What is 
interesting here was the extension of mundane, general culture into the sphere of natural 
philosophical endeavour. Just as gentlemen had servants and assistants to handle most of 
the daily needs of the household, they also staffed their laboratories with servants and 
assistants to explore the mysteries of nature. Doing natural philosophy was not different in 
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this way from tending the garden or cleaning the laundry or cooking the master's dinner.35 
Far from being the solitary effort of Boyle, his natural philosophy was the work of a tean1. 
Because an array of epistemological biases attended the work of non-gentle folk, 
however, Boyle needed to command the situation and make the links of labour and work 
invisible, placing himself as the sole "author" of the work. The work would thus attain 
credibility in the eyes of the rest of the experimentalist establishment.36 
I 
f Shapin's "epistemological collectivism" thoroughly integrated science into the 
I 
general culture. He carried out this integration by making a convincing case that scientific 
knowledge depends greatly on the same canons of judgement humans employ in their 
social interactions; the effect of this argument is to bring a moral flavour to scientific 
knowledge: how one judges a knowledge claim often depends on how one judges the 
maker of the claim. Another result of this is that science takes on a less revolutionary, 
ground-breaking character, and becomes a much more fixed elen1ent of the cultural 
landscape, relying on the Barnesian cultural "resources" described in Chapter 2: previous 
35 Indeed there is a considerable element of humour in Shapin's account of 
Boyle's relationship with his servants and assistants: Boyle's servants, plucked off some 
mundane task, running about in the winter cold to carry out what n1ust have seetned to 
them another quirky request of their pensive master, to see whether hot water would turn 
to solid ice more quickly than cold water, thus smiting another blow to the Aristotelian 
conception of nature. See Shapin, AST, pp. 387-388. 
36 Shapin, AST, pp. 362-365, 374, 382-383, 403-406; also see Shapin, "Invisible 
Technician," pp. 557, 560, particularly for Shapin's emphasis that n1orally both 
gentlemen and servants saw nothing wrong in the fact that the forn1er took n1ost of the 
credit and the latter did most of the work. 
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understandings of the world provide the blueprints for future knowledge making. 37 The 
following section will provide a critical appraisal of some of AST' s signature arguments 
and claims that underlie this image of science. 
4.2 A Critical Appraisal 
AST is highly recommended because of its engaging interpretation and well-
employed historicism. The sense which Shapin's notion of historicism carried was 
described in Chapter 2, and AST was an excellent realization of it. To some degree, 
Shapin's increased sensitivity to epistemological factors mitigates the concerns I 
expressed in regards to LAP in the last chapter. Nonetheless, there are problems. 
Primarily, these relate to the difficulty of relying solely on gentlemanly codes as the 
foundations of credibility in seventeenth-century English science. An overly heavy 
reliance on a particular sociological interpretation detracts from the importance of the 
scientist's actual epistemic interest: the natural world. What is needed is a concept of 
"intellectual awe," which I will sketch over the course of this critical section. In short, this 
concept al1ows rational faculties and social factors to work together historiographically to 
show how historical agents establish communal acceptance for particular epistemic 
claims. Let us examine these issues in detail. 
With its probing vision and mass of well-organized data, Shapin's AST provides 
an excellent account of how science's history (if only one pa11icular episode) unfolded. 
37 Shapin, AST, p. 200. 
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All historians of science are exposed to the failures of epistemological individualism in 
the actual historical episodes of science's past. The very nature of the historian's 
enterprise entangles him or her in the vagaries of actual action, the failure of life to remain 
consistent, the meanderings of the hun1an mind from the ideal path of reason. 
Interestingly, Shapin's epistemological collectivism ameliorates the situation, providing a 
social lens that cuts right to the epistemological heart of science. Shapin's fusion of the 
'. 
~cial with the scientific is thus a seminal achievement, and makes for stimulating 
II 
reading. 
What most recommends Shapin's epistemological collectivistic interpretation of 
the history of science is its historicism. Shapin's account of Boyle is immersed in the 
events, even the minutiae, of the past. There is a strong sense of continuity in Shapin's 
account: Boyle and his peers do not sin1ply break with the past in a n1oment of revelation, 
but rework and manipulate their intellectual, social and historical environments to effect 
change. Although this is possibly less romantic and less ambitious than showing how a 
scientific revolution took place in these years, it does resonate plausibility.38 Boyle's 
period was one of vigorous change in how human beings (predominantly Europeans) 
looked at the world. Such change took hard work, and had to be based on some traditions. 
From another angle, Shapin's historicism respects the past. For instance, consider a 
statement made by Shapin in characterizing a common internalist tendency in the history 
38 This theme was taken up by Shapin in his book on the Scientific Revolution. 
See Shapin, The Scientific Revolution (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1 996): pp. 1-4. 
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of science: "Instead of discerning the internal and external in historical actors' terms, 
analysts have been overwhelmingly content to speak of scientific boundaries as if they 
were those obtaining or nonnative in present-day science."39 Shapin in AST certainly did 
show a great respect for the epistemic culture of seventeenth-century England. This 
dedication to writing the history of science with the aim of showing what the historical 
agents in question saw as legitimate knowledge is laudable, and helps to moderate if not 
correct the common tendency towards presentism: the interpretation of the past purely in 
terms of the present. The discovery of scientific truth indeed does have a history, and 
social factors played a role in how this history unfolded. A sociological approach to the 
history of science can result in a deep appreciation of the power of events and the 
historical dimension of human stories about truth. 
The main problem with Shapin's interpretation in AST is that too much pressure is 
put on sociological factors to explain the rise of the scientific establishment. Shapin made 
an insightful argument in indicating the importance of gentlen1anly codes in establishing 
the origins of scientific credibility in seventeenth-century England, but the primacy of this 
code can be exposed to criticism that cha1lenges Shapin's social in1age of science. Shapin 
stated that ~~the setting" he was describing was a place "where n1any aspects of what now 
count as reliable truth-generating practices were put in place and institutionalized ... "40 
This is no doubt true. Judging by the focus of the rest of the book, it is clear that Shapin 
39 Shapin, "Discipline and Bounding," p. 351. Shapin's italics. 
40 Shapin, AST, p. 5. 
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was contending that Boyle "put in place and institutionalized" these "practices." While 
Boyle's significance in this regard might be somewhat exaggerated, there is no doubt that 
he was an important figure.41 Through drawing in considerations of Sir Isaac Newton's 
prominence, an argument in favour of a notion of "intellectual awe" can be articulated, a 
notion that might temper and contribute to Shapin's epistemological collectivism. First, I 
will set up a Newtonian counterpoint to Shapin's Boyle-based interpretation, my basic 
'' 
a$1gument being that Newton's scientific accomplishment helps see Shapin's claims in 
II 
broader terms, and shows some of the historical weaknesses attendant to them. Then, l 
will reexamine a theme prevalent in the last chapter: that of the role of nature and the 
intellect in human knowledge. In the case of AST, Shapin's tendency was to drain 
historical agents of real intellectual significance, ascribing all seemingly intellectual 
accomplishments to social and personal features. 
Shapin consistently treated Boyle as if he were a gloss on a considerable po11ion of 
subsequent scientific practice. Boyle was no doubt important to the young scientific 
establishment in England specifically, and in Europe more general1y. His sustained 
defence of the role of experiment in studying nature and his constant attempt to an·ive at 
41 lt is worth noting the individualistic significance Shapin ascribed to Boyle, a 
tendency ironic in the face of his sociological, anti-individualistic leanings. Even if Boyle 
built his credibility from social factors , it was nonetheless done by an individual. Fron1 a 
historiographical perspective, individuals seem to play an irreducible role in science. 
Depending on the individualism invoked, this need not necessarily assault a sociological 
sensibility, but is nonetheless a notable feature of AST, considering Shapin's overall 
assault on individualism .. Interestingly, less sociologically an1bitious historians have 
avoided this pitfall. For instance, see Michael Hunter, Science and Society in Restoration 
England (Aldershot: Gregg Revivals, 1992): Foreword, pp. 32-58. 
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experimental solutions to stubborn natural questions indeed meant that he rose to 
prominence and made real contributions to the development of a scientific mentality and 
community. Newton subsequently built upon Boyle's contributions. Boyle reached his 
ascendancy in the 1670s, and died in the last decade of that century. Newton had risen to 
prominence, even dominance, in the Royal Society by the late seventeenth century, with 
the publication of the Principia in 1687 being a watershed. Boyle was alive and 
philosophically active during the same period as Newton. Boyle lived to see Newton 
become the dominant intel1ectual figure in England, and in much of Europe. Newton's 
influence was strongest in the Royal Society, the very vehicle Boyle had used to promote 
his own vision of natural philosophy. Newton came to dominate the same community 
Boyle inhabited. Certainly, Boyle's significance as an exemplar of the new natural 
philosophic practice was considerable in the rest of Europe; regarding Newton, there is 
absolutely no doubt in this regard, particularly after the publication of the Principia.42 
These considerations show the combined importance of the Boy lean-Newtonian 
achievement. 
However, it should be pointed out that there were considerable differences 
between the Boy lean and Newtonian conceptions of natural philosophy, and that Shapin 
was not unaware of this concern. On at least a pair of occasions in AST, he alluded to the 
considerable sea change that occurred in English natural philosophy with the rise of Isaac 
42 RichardS. Westfall, Never at Rest: A Biography of lsaac Newton (Can1bridge: 
Cambridge University, 1980): pp. 472-473. 
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Newton.43 Elsewhere, Shapin contended that the Boylean and Newtonian models of 
scientific practice remained current side by side, characterizing them as different games to 
which scientists might turn to describe their work in different situations.44 There is no 
doubt some truth to this, both philosophically and historically. From a philosophical 
perspective, the probabilistic epistemology which Boyle favoured offered some respite 
amidst sharp and persistent intellectual debates, while Newton's more absolutist 
imtellectual streak offered a persuasiveness and strength that might also appeal to 
,, 
intellectuals. However, judging from Newton's vitriolic exchanges, he did not entirely 
embrace Boyle's gentlemanly practice- the eminent philosopher and mathematician 
Gottfried Leibniz was but one of the foes that Newton actively and bellicosely worked to 
besmirch with allegations of error and ill intent.45 
Society trumps intellect in Shapin. He revealed much about Boyle's social origins: 
his nobility, his wealth, his political power, and so on. Shapin did not want to suggest 
Boyle's position within the natural philosophical community was some sort of deceit, 
based on influence and power. Shapin did want to convince the reader, however, that 
Boyle's social standing had formative consequences for his way of looking at the natural 
43 Shapin, AST, pp. 185, 312. 
44 Shapin, Scientific Revolution, pp. 111-117. 
45 Many historians and sociologists of science point to the relative stability within 
science, and the rarity of sharp, tumultuous dispute; for example see Shapin, AST, pp.19-
21. For more on Newton's battles with Leibniz, see A.R. Hal1, Philosophers at War: The 
Quarrel between Newton and Leibniz (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1 980): passin1. 
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world, for promoting his views, and seeing then1 institutionalized. Boyle's gentlemanly 
conduct in society was imported into his activity in natural philosophy. Shapin's argument 
was that people trusted Boyle because of his social and cultural comportment. For the 
most part, AST contains no attempts to show that Boyle possessed formidable intellectual 
capabilities, powers of observation and description, intense concentration or any other 
such skills. This ability is taken for granted; it is as if Shapin considered the power of 
intellect, dismissed it, and sought for other means with which one n1ight convince others 
of epistemic worth. This pessimistic assessment of the power of argument and intellect to 
persuade, emerging from Bloor's notion of social causation described in Chapter 2, is a 
central then1e of Shapin's epistemological collectivism, but it is unwatTanted. The social 
characteristics of Newton help elucidate this conviction. 
The fact that Newton represented the pinnacle of natural philosophic achieven1ent 
for centuries afterwards demands that the historian modify and extend the explanatory 
n1ethods of Shapin's epistemological collectivisn1. Consider Newton's relatively humble 
social origins: he came from a yeoman family, not ranked among the upper echelons of 
society, and certainly far beneath Boyle on the social ladder. He did not have the financial 
means of the gentleman, nor the social comportment. Philosophy was his career, the 
major source of his income. His epistemological tendencies were not probabilistic and 
tolerant, nor did they eschew the identification of causes. He used the sophisticated 
language of mathen1atics, including "fluxions," the calculus he himself devised, to 
describe nature. Finally, Newton waged open and vicious battle with en1inent intellectual 
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rivals, including Boyle's protegee Robert Hooke, the first Astronomer Royal John 
Flamsteed, and Leibniz. In other words, Newton conducted himself with little humility, 
little decorum, and a very unBoylean degree of confidence.46 Shapin's Boyle, on the other 
hand, played up to his fellows through accentuating his nobility, showed his 
disinterestedness and diffidence towards philosophy, and construed philosophy as the 
study of observable phenomena, eschewing causes. Boyle saw mathematics as a threat to 
' . 
tne philosophic community, while Newton used his mathematized natural philosophy to 
I I 
conquer the very community to which Boyle propounded this argument. Boyle attempted 
with genteel graces to use natural philosophy to facilitate conversation, while Newton 
tried with vitriol to use it to crush religious and intellectual opponents. If Boyle was very 
much the gentlemanly noble, then Newton was very much the disputatious scholar. The 
reader is left with one conclusion: that if Shapin has accurately described how credibility 
manifested itself in seventeenth-century England, then Newton should not have been a 
significant figure in that nation's intellectual history. That he indeed was recommends that 
the historian develop new concepts to rectify this short-coming of Shapin's 
epistemological collectivism. 
In particular, Shapinian historical agents need revamped intellectual capacities 
merged with their social skills. Shapin downplayed intellectual perspicacity in the name 
of social adroitness. While almost infinite social variation exists, in Shapin' s universe 
46 ln fact a visage hiding considerable inner doubt. See Westfall, Never at Rest, 
pp.699 
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human agents seen1 to be pretty much intellectually uniform. Yet Boyle was obviously of 
a more intellectually alert mind than many of his contemporaries: his philosophical 
writings and experimental activities point to this. Many of Boyle's contemporary peers 
lagged behind his abilities, and they were duly impressed with his powers of mind and 
expression. Although his prominence cannot solely be ascribed to his intellectual acumen 
or his social dexterity, a combination of the two seems likely. To use a more extreme 
example, Newton's powers of observation, mathematical skill, intellectual creativity, 
focus of mind, intensity of concentration, scope of imagination - in short, his intellect -
leave little doubt on this head: they were awesome, beyond the pale of most of his 
contemporaries, and indeed many subsequent generations.47 lt may be true that all of these 
would mean little in the face of a concerted effort on the pa11 of society to ignore or 
suppress the intellectual prowess of a great mind; it may be tJue that a complete social 
deviant or bumbler possessing such prowess might not end up a recognized 
philosophical/scientific authority; but in the case of Newton it seen1s plausible that these 
abilities were crucial in founding his credibility through the respect they garnered. 
Newton had few of the cultural tools, but plenty of the intellectual skills, to accomplish 
great things in a natural philosophical comn1unity primarily inhabited by gentle and noble 
47 For famous examples of the products of Newton's intellect, see lsaac Newton, 
Principia, trans. Andrew Motte and Florian Cajori (Berkeley: University of California, 
1946): passim; Opticks, trans. Silvanus P. Thompson (Toronto: Encyclopedia 
Britannica, 1952): passim. For an example of the difficulties of contemporaries in 
grasping Newton's thought, consider John Locke's approaching Huygens for assistance 
with Principia- see Ed. l. Bernard Cohen, Newton's Papers and Letters on Natural 
Philosophy, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1958): p. 402. 
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folk. Even in the face of his most obvious deficiencies for living in gentle society, others 
pushed aside their concerns, or at least allowed them to cohabit with their respect for his 
philosophic abilities. 
The sociologically based epistemology Shapin relied on n1akes the intellect purely 
a matter of social form over intellectual content. As has been said in the previous chapter, 
Shapinian historical agents therefore operate in a world drained of epistemic significance. 
Their persuasive capacities reside in social image, their intelligence appears in their dress 
I I 
and mannerisms, their success resides in making strong buddy-networks that avoid 
scathing inte11ectua1 censure. Rarely do perspicuous observations, creative intellectual 
solutions, and the like come into play. What Shapin has done is draw our attention to the 
fact that social, cultural and personal factors do reside in our appreciations of inte11ectual 
worth; in his zeal, however, he has downplayed real intellectual ability to the point where 
its need seems obviated.48 This is unwarranted. To fuse social and cultural factors with the 
history of science properly does not require that the intellect be abandoned. Let 1ne be 
en1phatic on this point: my reading of Shapin is that he saw intellect and society as 
incompatible. Reacting to earlier historiographical trends that degraded or ignored the 
social in favour of the intellect in science, Shapin's revision went too far in the opposite 
direction, making it seem as if social factors, conceived of as being fundamentally non-
48 For instance, consider Shapin's caveat when introducing his exan1ination of 
Boyle's attitudes towards mathematics: "Nothing that l want to say about these episodes 
depends upon deciding the real state of Boyle's mathematical skills." This staten1ent 
nicely sumn1arizes Shapin's tendency to shunt aside issues pertaining to the power of the 
intellect. Shapin, AST, p. 314. 
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intellectual, were the most pertinent elements. Some historians had dispensed with the 
reality of social influence in science - Shapin responded by dispensing with the reality of 
the perspicacious intellect. However, the sociological study of science need not entail this 
conclusion. Both may be real, and the division of the two may be a widespread product of 
the human ability to analyse his or her situation; to employ Shapin's own terminology, the 
division n1ay be an institution, a boundary established over centuries, if not millennia, of 
cultural discourse. Their mutual reality, therefore, may mean they are mutually dependent, 
and both may require elucidation in a manner which shows this. 
What is needed is a notion that combines the two. I advance the notion of 
"intellectual awe," which suggests that both the historical actor's intellectual power and 
his audience's ability to access and interpret that power are crucial to writing effective 
history of science. Audiences of thinking, critical individuals can recognize intellectual 
ability and acknowledge it, no matter the dress or mannerisms of the person presenting 
knowledge claims. Without this intellectual con1ponent, historically unsatisfying accounts 
of the history of human knowledge are inevitable, accounts that fail to describe why 
someone like Newton was so prominent in human history, or unfairly portray Boyle as 
more schmoozer than natural philosopher. In Shapin's terms, Newton should have been a 
profoundly incredible speaker about nature. That audiences did not consider him in this 
way speaks to oversights in Shapin's interpretation. The awe of Boyle's and Newton's 
audiences in the face of their intellects was a massively important factor in founding 
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natural philosophical credibility, an awe around which audiences may have constructed 
social explanations to make the philosophers acceptable to society.49 
Newton's success challenges two key components of Shapin's epistemological 
collectivism: the idea of the free agent; and the idea that epistemic legitin1acy is a function 
of social conformity. The key component of Shapin's sociology of knowledge is the role 
of the disinterested, free agent. Shapin emphasized that Boyle was a free agent, financially 
' ' 
ftree to pursue his academic pursuits as hobbies, and that this disinterest established the 
II 
foundations of his epistemic legitimacy. Yet Newton was not noble, not rich. His wealth 
largely came from his truck in philosophy. The whole culture Boyle founded quite clearly 
did not contain much for Newton to build upon, but yet he seized the philosophic upper-
hand convincingly in Boyle's lifetime, in the very same philosophical community. The 
character of Newton's ascendance may lead the reader to ask: did that culture of 
credibility which Shapin used to explain Boyle's success exist at all? His neglect of the 
intellect in the Boy lean achievement may leave just such a residue of doubt in the reader's 
mind. 
49 A successful social and cultural portrayal of Newton does not seen1 impossible, 
although it would not fit the gentlemanly model Shapin developed; possibly a rectified 
vision of the scholar might be the path to such an interpretation. A number of distinctly 
social, cultural and n1oral tethers could attach to Newton's credibility. Robert lliffe, for 
instance, has examined the importance of Newton's self-po11rayal as an absent-minded, 
melancholy, sickly philosopher as a social signifier of his epistemic credibility. See Rob 
lliffe, "Isaac Newton: Lucatello Professor of Mathematics," Science Incarnate: Historical 
Embodiments of Natural Knowledge, eds. Christopher Lawrence and Steven Shapin 
(Chicago: University of Chicago, 1998): pp. 1 21-1 55. 
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Some final remarks. AST continued many of the themes that Shapin had 
developed jointly with Schaffer in LAP. Society is still the primary factor in the scientist's 
endeavours. It shapes his attitudes, methods, and conclusions. Knowledge remains highly 
anthropocentric, speaking equally if not more about the people who make epistemic 
products as about the natural phenomena those epistemic products ostensibly describe. 
Nonetheless, there is discord. The most noticeable change was a significant downplaying 
of the idea that science had a distinct and dominating political ethic. Boyle's political 
goals are far less pronounced in AST; Shapin has translated the political energy that 
charged LAP into the motivation to establish oneself as credible and trustworthy, with 
such attributions seeping across social categories. In short, in AST Shapin was more 
concerned with showing how science is a cultural and moral collective enterprise based 
on trust , as opposed to a political, cultural and Inoral collective enterprise based on social 
strife. Shapin wanted to show how knowledge is made and justified in society, not 
necessarily how knowledge ain1s to shape and mould society. Shapin was generally 
successful in executing this thesis, a more subtle and palatable option than that of LAP. 
Despite the many social factors that weigh on the scientist, despite the possibility 
of these social factors shaping both the production and reception of knowledge claims, 
canons of intellectual distinction still exist. The implication of Shapin's writing in AST, 
despite the fact he provided means to escape the prevalent dichotomy of intellect versus 
social, was that the role of society excluded the role of the intellect. My aim through the 
notion of intellectual awe has been to show that pa11 of the solution is that the foundations 
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of scientific knowledge are a constant interplay between scientist and audience, thus 
meaning there are irreducible elements of both the social and the intellectual, should we 
wish to continue to honour this dichotomy. Their social character will always be 
influenced by the external universe, and the determination with which one pursues 
defining and describing that universe. Whatever the case, Shapin is guilty of 
overemphasizing the universal importance of social factors at the expense of the human 
' 
if)tellect. 
,, 
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ChapterS 
Conclusion: Sociological Continuity, Interpretational Variety: Society in the 
Thinking of Steven Shapin. 
Margrethe Physics, yes? Physics. 
Bohr This is physics. 
Margrethe It's also politics. 
Heisenberg The two are sometimes painfully difficult to keep apart. 
Michael Frayn, Copenhagen ( 1998). 
1 Shapin's writings on science provide insight into the relationship between society 
and science, and ambitiously attempt to show how the former fundamentally shapes the 
latter. The previous chapters have shown Shapin's unyielding dedication to providing 
sociological explanations for science, and in both Leviathan and the Air-Pump (LAP) and 
A Social History of Truth (AST) it is clear that this dedication results in important 
findings. Primarily, they both show that reasonable cases can be made for the idea that 
social considerations permeate science to its very core. Nonetheless, the approaches found 
in LAP and AST do differ, particularly in what social factors they think significant for the 
historian's attention. LAP emphasized elements of the social struggle between classes, 
whereas AST delved deeply into a society's culture, ethics and canon of interpersonal 
interactions, with less emphasis on the politics of these attributes. Probing these 
differences and unravelling their consequences will conclude this exploration of Shapin's 
thought and provide a critique of Shapin's approach to writing the history of science. 
What is perhaps most interesting is the historicizing of scientific knowledge that 
results from the sociological treatment. Obviously, the very existence of the academic 
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discipline of ''history of science" suggests the possibility of a historical ·contribution to 
understanding science. However, an interpretation such as Shapin' s brings history right to 
the heart of scientific know ledge itself, providing historically specific explanations for 
specific knowledge claims. As described in Chapter 2, Shapin, basing his move on the 
thoughts of Thomas Kuhn and the Edinburgh Strong Programme, was part of a tradition 
of trying to bring historical elucidation to the core of scientific activity itself, erasing 
borders that placed society "outside" science. In LAP and AST, Shapin showed such 
historicization to be a result of a sociological approach. Displaying the power of historical 
inquiry in such a manner cannot but excite historians. 
The particular character of such sociologically founded historicization depends, of 
course, on the particular character of the sociological tools employed - it is hardly 
surprising that sociology is not one, unified set of methods and approaches. LAP uses 
sociological techniques to explain science, but what vision of society did Shapin employ 
to elucidate science's success and power? As indicated in Chapter 3 themes of a society 
fraught with social strife and competing social groups run through LAP. Shapin largely 
distinguished Hobbes and Boyle by their membership in different social classes: Boyle is 
clearly a member of the English nobility, while Hobbes less clearly belongs to some sort 
of middle class. When their intellectual worlds collide, their social worlds collide, with 
their respective memberships rallying around their man. From the standpoint of the 
history of ideas, the Marxian tincture of Shapin' s thought is more pronounced: ideas 
matter less than actions; social , economic and political power decide scientific questions, 
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not trenchant arguments and well-couched criticisms. Class loyalties matter more than 
intellectual acuity. Power derived from social factors governs intellectual debate. 
AST too is dedicated to providing a sociological explanation of science, but the 
vision of society that it chooses hinges less on the politics of a class society than the 
dependence of intellectual credibility on local cultural attributes. Here Shapin examined 
how one makes oneself believable, how one fits an intellectual viewpoint into a general 
cbltural scheme that will lend the ideas credibility and therefore power. The power of 
' 
belief rests not in the intellectual consistency of an idea, but in the possibility of rendering 
that idea amenable to popular notions of decorum, propriety, and knowledge. Boyle's 
contemporaries approved of him as polite, generous, authoritative - in short, noble - which 
gave credit to his ideas, for the most part in Shapi~' s presentation regardless of their 
intellectual worth. The Shapin of AST imbued ideas with socially-founded credibility, not 
class-based power. 
The differences in these two sociological approaches have significant 
consequences, not the least of which is that the historian who adopts the approach of LAP 
will find his attention drawn to quite different features of society than the historian 
following AST' s techniques. The LAP-style historian would want to find fault lines in the 
social structure of the community of people practising science, and then trace how 
variance and controversy in scientific ideas closely parallelled these differences. On this 
model, intellectual conflict represents the surface of deeper socia11y based, interest-driven 
conflict. In the AST camp, the historian would want to isolate the cultural comn1unity of 
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the proponent of a certain scientific idea, and then describe the cultural resources 
available at that time and place to make the idea credible. The internal dynamics of the 
social group are crucial here, as the historian is at pains to show how the .idea in question 
gains currency amongst the social actors in a community. Notably, the actors that make up 
an epistemic community need not be all of the same class, and although the historian n1ust 
note this variation in status, AST provides tools to explain what dynamics allow for 
different social actors to form one epistemic community. LAP is not so flexible. 
These difference resulted in two different books. LAP and AST certainly read 
quite differently, LAP being much more pessimistic about the foundations of modern 
science, whereas AST offers a more optimistic a1ternative to traditional realist-
individualist epistemologies of science. Primarily, these different feels can be ascribed to 
the fact that the Shapin of LAP constantly shone light on the besmirched ideas of Hobbes, 
which Boyle and his scientist progeny seem to have given an unfairly bad rap. In AST, 
however, Shapin matter of factly described how Boyle went about building credibility in 
the only way open to him or any other scientist: through the cultural means available to 
him in his society. The difference here is that the light of an older epistemology 
occasionally pierced the clouds of LAP: the belief that intellectual worth means 
something independent of what society may have to say about it. Ironically, the world of 
LAP still has vestiges of a realist episten1ology, where the worth of ideas can be measured 
against something extra-social, but where such measurements are quashed by those whose 
only epistemology is fundamentaJly a brutal calculus of power and self-aggrandizement. 
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There are the fumes of conspiracy in the pages of LAP: Boyle and his minions crushed the 
scientific notions of Hobbes using a social stratagem, not a frontal intellectual assault. 
AST, on the other hand, seems more comfortable with the social interpretation, 
cogently offering arguments for the social foundations of Boyle's knowledge system. 
AST's world has a completely socialized epistemology, where historical agents forge 
ideas using the materials of culture and society available to them in their particular 
j~ncture of time and space. There is a far reduced sense in AST of any intellectual wrong-
'' 
doing ·on the part of Boyle and company, because, in the intellectual universe they 
inhabited, ideas were exchanged in the coinage of culture. There was no realist "answer" 
veiled behind a screen of aristocratic intrigue and manipulation. Thus, should a culture 
survive, then likely its ideas would survive with it. There can be no controversy in this 
world about whether Hobbes was right or Boyle was right, because social acceptance is 
the only factor. Shapin thoroughly purged realism from the pages of AST in a way he 
failed to do in LAP. The notion that science might be "reformed" once its suspect social 
origins are revealed lurks in LAP; such hopes of reform found no place in AST. 1 Shapin 
was at peace with a thoroughly social interpretation in AST, a peace which lessened his 
1 Ian Hacking's reflections on the "gradations of constructionist comn1itment" 
help elucidate Shapin's attitudes in LAP and AST. Hacking listed six grades defining the 
ends of constructionist thinking such as Shapin's sociological interpretation. These were 
historical, ironic, reformist, unmasking, rebellious, and revolutionary. The Shapin of LAP 
can be described as rebellious, if not revolutionary, whereas the AST-Shapin is more 
ironic-reformist. See Hacking, The Social Construction of What? (Cambridge: Harvard 
University, 1999): pp. 19-21. 
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scepticism towards modern science, an irony which no doubt should give many of his 
"realist" critics pause to think.2 
Does this mean that the interpretations put forth in LAP and AST are 
incompatible? Superficial1y, no. The interpretation of LAP is a case study in the dynamics 
between conflicting ideas. AST attempts to establish the social foundations of credibility. 
Shapin could plausibly argue that the processes outlined in AST create the ideas that then 
come head to head in the arena of conflict described in LAP. Both Hobbes' and Boyle's 
ideas had credibility in their respective social circles, but when they met in a competitive 
environment, the superior social power of Boyle and his associates decided the day.3 
Go a little deeper, however, and· this argument for compatibility needs to be 
qualified. The matter hinges on the concept of trust and the concept of society. AST 
explicitly aimed to show that trust is the founding con1ponent of all knowledge. Shapin 
did this quite adroitly. LAP wanted to dissolve simplistic notions of scientific truth by 
extending social competition into the heart of scientific practice. There is considerable 
tension here. The question that must be asked is: how compatible are Shapin's strife-
oriented view of society in LAP and his trust-based view of science in AST? The fact is 
2 Ralph Estling, "ls Science Concerned with Truth?" Skepticallnquirer 22, 4 
(July/ August 1998): pp. 55-56. Although not specifically concerned with Shapin, this 
article nonetheless reveals one of the general "pro-science" criticisms of the type of 
scholarly work Shapin pursues. 
3 Although, as pointed out in Chapter 2, exactly what social clique Hobbes 
represented is unclear. See Douglas Jesseph, Squaring the Circle: The War between 
Hobbes and Wallis (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1999): p. 351. 
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that AST considerably toned down the strong parallel between social-economic class with 
epistemic loyalty. Social origins still play a role, but one that is more productive and less 
provocative than in LAP, showing that the boundaries of social classes are porous to trust. 
AST made a strong case for how various members of the scientific community interacted, 
and this included Anglo-Irish nobles like Boyle, French scholars like Auzout, non-noble 
experimentalists like Hooke, Boyle's servants and so on. Hobbes and Boyle may have 
I . 
qpcupied different social spaces, but they were not radically different, and their social 
spaces certainly overlapped in a number of places. Social tensions were either absent or 
managed quite successfully in this interpretation, lacking the manipulative, even bellicose 
force of LAP. Further, if strict class breakages were present in LAP, then the lack of 
internal divisions is also notable. Shapin failed to show any competition within the 
nobility to attain the mantle of philosophic supremacy. Why not? Did not some of Boyle's 
social equivalents develop their own ideas about nature, ideas which ran counter to 
Boyle's? A weakness of many socially minded histories is that they downplay individual 
characteristics to the point of non-existence, and the Shapin of LAP headed too far in this 
direction. Neither is AST strong on this head, but at least it made some strides with its 
examination of the Hevelius-Auzout controversy, even if this still lent the impression of a 
strict unity within the English philosophic community. lt is not novel to remark that pride 
and competition can indeed be present within comn1unities, and these can have 
deleterious effects on the abilities of one individual to lead inte1lectua1ly. The flow of trust 
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and struggle is not limited to the borderlands of communities, it may simply be more 
pronounced there. 
So which of the two approaches is more appropriate for the historian of science? 
LAP certainly makes for exhilarating reading. The interpretation tackles head on the issue 
of society's role in scientific knowledge. There is great drama in the struggle of opposing 
scientific views as each side marshals its forces. lts boldness is striking: Shapin 
vigorously took sociology to the heart of historical explanation of scientific knowledge, 
revealing a great confidence in the completeness and accuracy of this approach, a 
confidence which cannot but impress the reader. 
Nonetheless, the interpretation Shapin crafted in AST provides a better starting 
point for the historian of science, primary because it is a cool-headed and flexible 
approach. LAP's exhilarating character has much to do with its vigorous espousal of the 
sociology of science over realist schools of explanation. AST, despite its toned-down 
language, is much more careful, and makes the case for the sociology of historical events 
in science more through detailed argument than daring attack. Shapin established AST's 
sociological mechanism much more thoroughly, directly bringing to bear an array of 
sociological and philosophical sources and original thought in a unique synthesis. The 
care with which Shapin built his theoretical platform and then extended it to his actual 
episodes of historical interpretation may not be as thrilling as the assertive approach 
embodied in LAP, but it does clearly present the strengths and weaknesses of the 
sociology of science. 
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Both approaches, however, suffer from an inability to adequately integrate the role 
of nature and intellect into the social image of science. Fundan1entally, natural science is 
about the universe: atoms, genes, meteors, clouds, stars, rocks, bones- all those things 
which constitute the physical universe. Shapin and his Edinburgh Strong Programme 
mentors made knowledge a matter of collective belief, a move which was hostile to the 
naive realism of most scientists and the laity. Part of this is a necessary component of 
'· 
t~eir struggle against a realism which disallows a functional, positive role for human 
society in the development of science. Yet, the pendulum has swung too far to the social 
side of its arc, and some re-balancing is in order to show exactly what sort of constraints 
"reality" places on historical human actors. I will not pretend to have an answer for this 
stubborn question, but the notions of epistemological sensitivity and intellectual awe do 
offer, I believe, some hope to the historian of unifying an insightful sociological vision of 
science with a concept of nature that evades traditional problems of induction and realistn. 
A final, quite unintentional consequence of Shapin's sociological approach is that 
of intellectual complacency. The arguments of LAP and AST may suggest that, because 
either power or culture determines the course of knowledge no standard exists by which to 
measure knowledge, and therefore scientists and academics may continue on in their own 
veins of thinking without ever taking criticism seriously. Shapin, I am confident, would 
not embrace the complacent thinking that backs this sort of pawn-shop relativism. The 
poverty of this should be obvious to all. The high calibre of the research and argun1ent 
found in Shapin's oeuvre itself should suggest to the reader that the intellectual culture of 
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which we partake is capable of generating high standards by which scholarship can be 
measured, whatever the "final" foundations of our knowledge systems. Intellectual 
integrity may be rare, but it does exist, as an eye to Shapin's own fastidiousness of 
evidence and argument should adequately prove. 
In the end, what the differences between LAP and AST show is that faith in the 
ability of sociological characteristics to explain science does not result in a uniform 
interpretation of science. Indeed, the historian must choose what sort of society will be 
employed to explain science. He or she sets the social standard. This choice carries all the 
biases, strengths, limitations and insights of any choice. Some choices, however, are 
clearly better than others. The choices Shapin made in AST are the more promising ones 
for the history of science. 
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